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ABSTRACT 
DRIVERS AND CONSEQUENCES OF NON-MARKET DECISION-MAKING 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: EVIDENCE FROM GLOBAL CORPORATE DISASTER 
GIVING  
Luis Ballesteros 
Witold Henisz 
The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of the determinants of 
non-market strategy and its consequences for the firm and external stakeholders by 
studying the provision of collective goods in the aftermath of natural disasters. I use an 
integrative theoretical framework whose cornerstone is the strength of a firm's economic 
connection with a national market, or economic reliance. I build this construct by 
drawing on insights from the theory of clubs. In the first chapter, I argue that firms 
consider the relative importance of a national market’s collective goods for their own 
operation when they decide to engage in its provision—i.e., to behave pro-socially. Using 
a model of economic reliance that considers the market standing of the firm, market 
concentration, and the country’s institutional development, I empirically show that 
accounting for economic reliance results in a more accurate prediction of corporate pro-
social behavior than widely accepted arguments in the extant literature. In the second 
chapter, I study the performance consequences of disaster giving by complementing the 
effect of economic reliance with insights from the literature on sensemaking. I argue that 
the firm’s financial reward or loss associated with non-market decisions made under high 
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informational and time constraints are often socially constructed and not strongly 
associated with the physical characteristics of the firm, its donation, or stakeholder needs. 
This occurs because firms and external stakeholders follow different prominent and easy 
to collect signals not associated with the focal decision (i.e., cognitive referents) to decide 
about the contextual appropriateness of organizational decisions and spur action. While 
stakeholders rely on pre-disaster media reputation, firms focus on financial performance. 
In the concluding chapter, I study the effect of corporate disaster giving on the magnitude 
and speed of national recovery from natural disasters. I draw on the dynamic capabilities 
literature to argue that firms economically reliant to the affected country are better-
equipped than other entities to sense areas of need following a disaster, seize response 
opportunities, and reconfigure resources for efficient relief efforts. The evidence shows 
that nations benefit greatly from the intervention of economically-reliant firms when 
disasters strike. 
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PREFACE 
What determines firms’ engagement in the provision of collective goods that benefit 
external stakeholders—i.e., pro-social behavior? And what are the conditions and 
mechanisms of performance benefits associated with such behavior, and those of an 
economic surplus for external stakeholders? The goal of this dissertation is to address 
these questions that lie at the heart of corporate non-market strategy. I pursue this goal 
by studying a growing non-market strategy: the company provision of monetary and in-
kind resources in the aftermath of natural disasters. Between 1990 and 2015, for 
instance, the fraction of the 10,000 largest multinational enterprises engaging in 
corporate disaster giving in any given year went from 15% to over 70% and their average 
donation increased 18 times. Thus, firms have been responsible for the largest increase in 
proportional participation to disaster aid and, for some disasters, their total donation has 
surpassed the combined contribution by governments, multilateral agencies, and private 
charity (Ballesteros, Useem, & Wry, 2017).1  
In comparison, the literature on corporate disaster giving has expanded at a slow rate 
and become increasingly equivocal over time. Behind this ambiguity, there is a crucial 
factor that academic research has neglected: how firms’ economic reliance to market 
systems —i.e., the extent to which firms sell, buy, or rent raw materials, final products, 
or services, or hire human capital to/from a given market system—explains the corporate 
                                                 
1 For instance, firms accounted for 55.4% of international aid for the 2010 earthquake and tsunami in 
Chile, 68.3% for the 2011 tsunami and earthquake in Japan and 51.7% for Typhoon Haiyan in the 
Philippines—more aid than all other international sources combined  (OCHA, 2016). 
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provision of collective goods and its consequences. The essence of this relationship is 
captured by a manager from Coca Cola when reflecting on Coke’s motives to donate in 
the aftermath of the 2011 disaster that devastated East Japan: “We are part of a system. 
If the Japanese government cannot (effect a recovery) … we need to rebuild, we need the 
market to recover,” 2 he said. This argument was recurrent across my interviews with 
corporations donating to Japan and Chile in the aftermath of the 2010 disaster. These 
informants pointed to a strategic consideration that existing theories on non-market 
strategy do not capture (Dorobantu, Kaul, & Zelner, 2017).  
Economic Reliance and the Corporate Provision of Collective Goods 
My dissertation thus follows an integrative theoretical framework that centers on the 
economic reliance of firms to market systems to study the drivers and consequences of 
corporate disaster giving. This framework centers on insights from the theory of clubs 
(Buchanan, 1965), which marked a theoretical departure from the pure public-goods 
approach (cf., Samuelson, 1954) 3 by suggesting that universal accessibility of collective 
goods—i.e., the pure public good—is rare. Instead, societies are comprised by systems, 
or clubs that entities need to join to use certain physical assets and social benefits. A club 
is a voluntary group deriving mutual benefits from production costs and consumption 
rights of collective goods (Sandler, 2013). 
                                                 
2 International Public Affairs, Coca-Cola Company, in interview with the author.  
3 The theory of public goods outlines the conditions and potential threats for the establishment and 
sustainability of social systems of non-excludable goods that are too costly as to be provided by a private 
(non-central) agent and whose benefits require the organization of co-operative, collective sharing 
arrangements. 
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I argue that market systems—i.e., socioeconomic and political structures for 
commercial exchange, such as national markets, are economic clubs that firms join 
through their economic affiliation. Market systems are comprised by club goods—i.e., 
collective goods that are exclusive of the market and necessary to maintain, improve, or 
reestablish its welfare. Local infrastructure is thus a public good from the perspective of 
local market—i.e., in the absence of membership fees or quotas, any firm operating in 
the local market can use the roads or telecommunication systems. However, such 
infrastructure is a club good from the perspective of a global economic system in which 
the local market is only a part. 
The intuition is simple. In the context of the disruption created by disasters, relief and 
recovery are club goods whose scarcity may reduce the expected profitability and 
sustainability of firms that rely economically in the affected market. These firms have a 
strategic need in the reestablishment of the market’s status quo through relief (e.g., 
provision of water, food, and first aid), and restoration of education, health, 
transportation, communication, and housing. The biggest the share of a firm’s financial 
performance explained by a disaster-stricken country, the greater the strategic value for 
the firm of contributing to the country’s relief and recovery. That is, corporate pro-social 
behavior that is driven by economic reliance is in line with profit maximization and, 
indeed, a form of strategic consideration.  
Therefore, if economic reliance to specific markets varies across firms and across 
time, this second-moment should play a non-trivial role in collective action among 
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multinational enterprises because it explains their willingness to supply collective goods. 
This means that firms with a negative expectation to freeride have a comparatively 
greater interest on the recovery of the market. In other words, corporate disaster giving, 
and corporate pro-social behavior in general, can be studied by applying essential 
insights from game theory (Camerer & Fehr, 2002). Identifying a prominent causal 
factor of corporate donations thus centers on formalizing measures of economic reliance 
that a given firm has in the affected country market. 
What the construct of economic reliance brings to the literature?  
If the causal effect of economic reliance on pro-social behavior is sizeable, the study 
of corporate disaster giving calls for a theoretical paradigm absent in the extant literature 
on non-market strategy. This literature has shown that modeling corporate pro-social 
behavior as a pure public good is inappropriate because such behavior may not be 
unselfish at all (cf., Dorobantu et al., 2017; McWilliams & Siegel, 2011). Widely evoked 
theories based on strategic considerations approaches emphasize the role of reputational 
capital (Muller & Kräussl, 2011), consumer visibility (Madsen & Rodgers, 2014), 
informal risk hedging (Douty, 1972), or rent-seeking behavior (Marquis & Qian, 2013). 
Scholars have found that corporate giving responds to institutional pressures at the local 
(Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013) and national levels (Zhang & Luo, 2013). To a lesser extent, 
social-preferences approaches argue that managers pursue psychological and 
sociological objectives (Charness & Rabin, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002). 
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Despite such theoretical separation, the literature on corporate disaster giving and the 
broader scholarship on non-market strategy continue to rely largely on the Samuelsonian 
assumption that private actors benefit of the collective good by virtue of their provision 
(Andreoni, 1989; Dorobantu et al., 2017; Kaul & Luo, 2017; Roberts, 1984; Yildirim, 
2013).4 However, this assumption is not easy to generalize.  
Imagine that Coke had no operations in Japan in 2010 and no future interest to enter 
such market. Scholars would argue that Coke’s donation resulted in a direct benefit, such 
as a warm glow that it is appropriated by its employees (Flammer & Luo, 2015; 
Yildirim, 2013) or an indirect benefit, such as buttressing the support of soda consumers 
interested in the welfare of Japanese victims (Wilburn & Wilburn, 2011). However, it is 
unclear how Coke appropriated the collective good per se. In other words, it is unclear 
how firms with no economic reliance benefit directly from the rebuilt roads and housing 
in Japan, for instance.  
The sources of benefits of disaster giving for an economically-reliant firm come from 
the market’s exclusive collective goods—i.e., club goods—and the private goods—i.e., 
the firm may capture direct (e.g., a warm glow) and indirect utility (e.g., reputational 
capital) or both. On the other hand, the benefits of firms with no economic reliance are 
not a function of the club goods of the affected market. Distinguishing between high and 
                                                 
4 The management literature has overcome the theoretical limitations of the public-goods model 
regarding the private gains associated with the provision of collective goods. On the one hand, strategic-
considerations approaches hypothesize that giving is instrumental for the achievement of indirect benefits. 
On the other hand, the less developed literature on social-preferences explain that managers indeed achieve 
intrinsic gains such as the satisfaction of altruistic or reciprocal motivations (Muller et al., 2014), prestige 
and respect (Jia & Zhang, 2011) or the avoidance of social scorn (Zagefka & James, 2015). 
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low demanders of such goods thus derives in the identification of firms with a relatively 
high willigness to engage in pro-social behavior. 
In summary, economically affiliated firms give with relatively high frequency and 
magnitude because they have more certain and proximate benefits associated with a 
market’s club goods and face lower information asymmetry and transactions costs of 
giving than non-affiliated firms (George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & Tihanyi, 2016). 
Pro-social behavior is less frequent among non-affiliated multinational firms because 
they are part of a broader public-goods systems where free-riding is pervasive (Alessi, 
1975; Douty, 1972). 
In Chapter 1, I offer evidence that the effect of economic reliance is not explained by 
the traditional strategic considerations such as reputational capital with internal (Flammer 
& Luo, 2015) and external stakeholders (Muller & Kräussl, 2011), a social license to 
operate (Wilburn & Wilburn, 2011), an agency cost (Jia & Zhang, 2011), or institutional 
pressures (Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). Likewise, it is not captured by the social-
preferences theories of altruism (Batson & Powell, 2003) and fairness (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986).  Additionally, the explanatory power of economic reliance is 
not equaled by physical distance (Muller & Whiteman, 2008) or embeddedness (Jamali & 
Neville, 2011). Overall, this suggests that study that centers on economic reliance 
uncovers a form of strategic consideration whose effect remains understudied. 
Error! Reference source not found. compares the optimization problem of 
corporate pro-social behavior using my approach, social-preferences’ impure altruism, 
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and alternative strategic considerations approaches. In addition to the role of economic 
reliance, I integrate the role of cognitive affiliation. As noted, building on club goods and 
using economic reliance as baseline achieves a clear characterization of the set of agents 
that benefit from the market’s exclusive collective goods and, consequently, have a 
relatively high willingness to donate to such a market. Error! Reference source not 
found. summarizes the predictions of my model, social preferences, and strategic 
considerations. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of the optimization problem in the corporate provision of collective 
goods 
Model 
Club members 
(firms with economic reliance) 
Non-members 
(firms with no economic reliance) 
Cognitive affiliation 
No cognitive 
affiliation 
Cognitive affiliation  
No cognitive 
affiliation 
Pure public-goods 𝑈(𝑋, 𝐺) 
where X is the set of private goods, G is the set of club goods, g is the private gain (e.g., a warm glow) 
Social 
preferences 
Pure 
altruism 
Impure 
altruism 
𝑈(𝑋, 𝐺, 𝑔) 𝑈(𝑋, 𝐺) 𝑈(𝑋, 𝐺, 𝑔) 𝑈(𝑋, 𝐺) 
Alternative strategic 
considerations 
𝑈𝑡0(𝑋); 𝑈𝑡1(𝑋, 𝑧);  
where z is a form of indirect utility in time 1 (e.g., gain out of reputational capital) out of the donation 
made in time 0 
Clubs theory of 
economic reliance and 
pro-social behavior 
𝑼(𝑿,𝑮,𝒈) 𝑈(𝑋, 𝐺) 𝑈(𝑋, 𝑔) 𝑈(𝑋) 
    
Table 2. A comparison of predictions with impure altruism and alternative strategic 
considerations 
Main prediction:  
Economic reliance affects positively 
donation likelihood and magnitude 
Clubs theory of economic 
reliance and pro-social 
behavior 
Social Preferences’ 
Impure Altruism  
Alternative arguments in 
strategic considerations  
M
o
d
er
at
o
r 
Exclusivity of the club (market 
size) 
+ + - 
Intervention of central providers  - - + 
Quality of governance (agency 
problem
5
) 
- +/- 
No clear prediction in the 
literature 
Social standing + +/- - 
                                                 
5 Where the principal is the market membership and the agency is the club management (i.e., 
regulatory institutions). 
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The findings in Chapter 1 suggest that the average donor is a firm economically 
proximate to the affected market, with a prominent level of social standing, and 
operating in monopolistic markets. Furthermore, the frequency and size of corporate 
giving drops with the intervention of local governmental agencies, but increases with 
external intervention and national development. 
Economic Reliance and the Consequences of Corporate Disaster Giving 
The causal relationship between economic reliance and disaster giving should also 
provide a baseline for analyzing the consequences of such behavior. As explained above, 
when corporate revenue is a function of the economic welfare of the market, corporate 
donors gain benefits from the collective good—i.e., recovery—and not only from the 
private good—e.g., reputation. Moreover, corporate donors with economic reliance may 
also obtain greater private benefits than donors with no reliance because such connection 
materializes institutional forces affecting stakeholder expectations (Marquis, Davis, & 
Glynn, 2013). This aligns with the prediction that companies will act in the public good 
when doing so serves their own interests (McWilliams & Siegel, 2011).  
However, the extant empirical literature embraces little nuance to understand the 
value of this argument as it commonly limits to assess post-donation differences between 
donors and non-donors (Crampton & Patten, 2008; Madsen & Rodgers, 2014; Muller & 
Kräussl, 2011). When studying the implications for firm value, scholars have left behind 
two important characteristics of corporate disaster giving that may affect how businesses 
benefit from such behavior. First, the combination of donation timing and size is, 
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arguably, an important determinant of the capacity to profit from disaster giving. The 
theoretical prediction in the extant literature is that the donation amount that would yield 
the largest per donor value should vary across companies because of differences, such as 
market share and size (Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009). Nevertheless, the pattern of 
significantly different firms donating the same amount with different timing occurs in 
almost 65% of natural disasters with corporate donations in the period 2000-2015. Thus, 
one may expect that the lack of consideration of donation timing has led to incorrect 
measurements of the size and direction of the relationship between disaster giving and 
financial performance.  
Integrating theoretical elements from the timing strategy literature (Fosfuri, Lanzolla, 
& Suarez, 2013; Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013) to the role of economic reliance thus 
is a promising method to study the material consequences of disaster giving. Holding 
everything else constant one face the following questions: is the first economically-reliant 
corporation to donate more likely to realize rents than one that is subsequently donating 
an identical amount or one than is subsequently donating a different amount? 
Additionally, is the imitator better off than the firm deviating from the amount donated 
by the economically-reliant first mover? 
Similarly, when studying the economic consequences of corporate disaster giving for 
external stakeholders, accounting for the effect of economic reliance should offer a 
method to identify those firms with specific capabilities to generate economic surplus. 
That is, holding everything else constant, stakeholder benefit is a function of the 
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capabilities of the corporate donor to deploy its aid in a certain manner that meets their 
needs and expectations. Economically-reliant firms should scan post-disaster needs at the 
local level and deliver aid more efficiently than entities with no economic reliance (Kaul 
& Luo, 2017).  
To the extent that decisions about how to respond to market disruptions are best made 
when informed by nuanced and diverse data. Economically-connected firms are likely to 
benefit from local relationships developed through their operations. They use local grass-
roots relationships, affiliate networks, and partner organizations to assess disaster 
damages and to determine where aid is most urgently needed and will have the greatest 
impact (Useem, Kunreuther, & Michel-Kerjan, 2015). That is, a source of a comparative 
advantage of firms to deploy aid is their economic reliance to the affected country 
market. 
Why is important to complement the role of economic reliance (based on club-
goods theory) with managerial and institutional arguments?  
Despite the arguments above, relying solely on the strategic value of economic 
reliance is likely to produce a theoretical framework with serious econometric 
deficiencies due to the behavioral and institutional forces affecting the decision to engage 
in disaster giving. In fact, the literature has relied heavily on the assumption of 
deliberative thinking among corporate donors and their stakeholders (Luo, Zhang, & 
Marquis, 2016; Muller & Kräussl, 2011; Zhang & Luo, 2013).  
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Managers are portrayed as users of computation and logics (Matten & Moon, 2008) 
that undertake trade-offs (Flammer, 2013), recognize relevant interdependencies 
(Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007) and, ultimately, assess the characteristics of corporate 
pro-social behavior that maximizes its associated private returns (Aguinis & Glavas, 
2012; Porter & Kramer, 2006). Likewise, external stakeholders are often considered as 
actors that have copious data on the expected outcomes of different organizational 
decisions (Hillman & Keim, 2001), which allow them to focus attention on the 
determinants of socially efficient responses (Madsen & Rodgers, 2014) and identify their 
substantiveness and sincerity (Cuypers, Koh, & Wang, 2015). 
However, like other non-market decisions, corporate disaster giving occurs under 
conditions of high uncertainty, causal ambiguity, and time pressure. First, the potential 
material and human impacts of disasters to the firm and the market are often difficult to 
estimate. Information on the social need is often unavailable or inaccurate for months 
(Kousky, 2013). Firms often make donation decisions that conflict with the logics of 
market operation (Lampel, Shamsie, & Shapira, 2009) and follow referents not 
necessarily associated with the characteristics of the emergency (Wassenhove, Tomasini, 
& Stapleton, 2008). The mining firm Anglo American, for instance, used its annual social 
budget in Chile as a referent for its donation in the aftermath of the 2010 disaster.6  
Second, a calculation of the expected benefits associated with particular 
characteristics of the donation is complex (Kunreuther, Meyer, & Zeckhauser, 2002). 
                                                 
6 VP of Corporate Affairs in interview with the author.  
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Disaster giving is an infrequent and unstructured behavior for most firms whose 
projection in the annual financial plan is rare (Ballesteros, 2015). Furthermore, the 
uniqueness of disasters hampers the value of experience. Firms often have to deal with 
temporal institutional arrangements and societal contexts for which they lack information 
(Klinenberg, 2003). They are involved with myriad non-traditional stakeholders whose 
strategic role is hard to discern (Zyck & Kent, 2014). Moreover, external stakeholders 
commonly lack the cognitive resources to assess the economic value of firms’ choices 
(White & Lang, 2012). 
In these contexts of uncertainty and causal ambiguity, firms face a decisive tradeoff 
when deciding to donate. Waiting can bring relevant data. Laggards have better 
understanding of the association between corporate choices and stakeholder reactions 
than early movers had. Yet, on average, about 84% of corporate pledges come within a 
month of the disaster, when information of the impact to the firm and the market, and 
stakeholder needs is scarce (E. Cavallo, Galiani, Noy, & Pantano, 2013). This suggests 
that capturing rents has a comparatively short span and decision makers do not engage in 
lengthy processes of exploration (Kaplan, 2008). Given these conditions, scholars have 
underappreciated the possibility that the performance consequences of non-market 
choices are often socially constructed.  
To theoretically account for high informational and time constraints that result in a 
collapse in the mental processes that facilitate deliberative thinking (Camerer & 
Kunreuther, 1989; Weick, 1996), I complement the arguments from club-goods theory 
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with the microfoundations of institutional theory (Powell & Colyvas, 2008), and 
particularly the role of sensemaking (Weick, 1996). Sensemaking brings meaning to “an 
undifferentiated flux of fleeting sense-impressions…” (Chia, 2000).., the micro-processes 
behind the generation of institutions are simple and aimed at interpretation (Weick, 1996; 
Wry, Lounsbury, & Jennings, 2014). 
In chaotic contexts, decision-makers engage in constructivism and rely on cognitive 
referents or prominent and widely available signals whose gathering entails a low 
transactional cost and are not necessarily associated with the focal good or decision 
(Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009; Whiteman & Cooper, 2011; Wry et al., 2014). Cognitive 
referents represent measures of appropriateness valid in a specific socioeconomic context 
where choices and exchanges of goods take place and help decision-makers interpret the 
potential consequences, its contextual appropriateness, and spur action (Bitektine, 2011). 
A prominent idea in my dissertation is that firms and external stakeholders differ in 
the cognitive referents that they use to manage informational and time constraints. I test 
this idea in chapter 2 and show that while firms follow their peers’ financial performance, 
stakeholders focus on firms’ pre-disaster media reputation to form beliefs of their 
corporate capacity to respond efficiently to the catastrophe. A positive reputation, 
measured by the net pre-event media coverage sentiment score, provides a signal to 
customers, governments and other stakeholders that an organization is apt to select 
options whose means and ends are contextually appropriate (Galaskiewicz, 1997). Thus, 
reputable first movers are likely to accrue first-mover advantages. The legitimization of 
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their behavior influences consumers, for instance, to increase willingness to pay for the 
firm’s goods when faced with market choices (Sirsly & Lamertz, 2007), workers to be 
more productive for a given wage (Flammer & Luo, 2015) and governments or other 
external stakeholders to give the firm preferential treatment (Henisz, 2014). 
Comparatively, firms with bad reputations are prone to suffer larger performance 
shortfalls. Because these firms recurrently lead the industry in responding to disasters 
(Muller & Kräussl, 2011) and they may also be strong performers (Weigelt & Camerer, 
1988), imitation often results in performance losses. At the same time, I argue that 
mimicking reputable firms generates legitimization spillovers that can override followers’ 
bad reputation and imitating a first mover with a negative reputation results in spillover 
harm (Barnett & King, 2008).  
Given these institutional forces, firms err frequently in their timing and imitation 
choices due to the salience of cognitive referents when making fast strategic decisions 
under high uncertainty and ambiguity (Kunreuther et al., 2002; Pahnke, Katila, & 
Eisenhardt, 2015). Followers find difficult to divert from the choices of high-performing 
first movers (Henisz & Delios, 2001) because they consider these firms comparatively 
successful in identifying stakeholder expectations (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013) and abiding 
by institutions (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). This exacerbates the negative consequences 
of the divergence in cognitive referents between firms and stakeholders because firms 
with bad reputations see moving first as a chance to accumulate reputational capital 
(Muller & Kräussl, 2011).  
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In other words, my dissertation proposes that corporate disaster giving is a non-
market area where pro-social behavior is often uncorrelated with underlying 
characteristics of the social need. This variance is also not directly proportional to the 
scale of the rent; firms gain performance benefits despite their donation being 
economically suboptimal. Hence, performance advantages created in institutional 
contexts like the aftermath of disasters are more a function of stakeholder perceptions of 
the contextual appropriateness of the corporate response—i.e., its legitimacy in the eyes 
of stakeholders—than a function of its objective social value. This proposition represents 
a departure from the extant literature where the material benefits are mostly associated 
with the characteristics of the organizational choices and the physical characteristics of 
the donor (Madsen & Rodgers, 2014; Muller & Kräussl, 2011).   
Finally, a systematic evaluation of the implications of corporate disaster giving for 
stakeholder welfare is absent in the empirical literature; a reflection of the focus on the 
broader scholarship on non-market strategy (cf., Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Mellahi, 
Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 2015). The idea that societies benefit from corporate disaster 
giving has generally been assumed rather than systematically evaluated. Conceptually, 
the topic has been subject to significant tension. Some work, for instance, suggests that 
corporate intervention focuses more on firm goals than stakeholder interests, 
symbolically addressing them but not genuinely responding to them (Cuypers et al., 
2015; Marquis & Qian, 2013). At the essence of these empirical issues is the lack of 
theory to predict the conditions and mechanisms under which corporate pro-social 
behavior generates social value (Dorobantu et al., 2017; Kaul & Luo, 2017). 
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When building a theoretical argumentation based on economic reliance for studying 
the economic value of disaster giving, Professors Michael Useem, Tyler Wry and I 
considered that disaster-stricken nations may obtain disaster relief and recovery from 
different sources. Here we confronted the question that, while the business community 
has the potential to contribute to social welfare based on their resources and influence, 
this work may be best left to entities such as government—e.g., USAID—and 
multilateral agencies—e.g., UNOCHA—that specialize in these activities and can be held 
accountable for their pursuit (Frynas, 2005; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004).  We then suggest 
considering the unique capabilities of firms as a social entity, and the situations where 
these capabilities are likely to be deployed in ways that yield positive social outcomes. 
We chose the literature on dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) as an 
ideal theory that complements club-goods theory to conduct this comparative evaluation 
of the social value of corporate giving. Studies in this literature examine how firms sense 
threats in the external environment, seize response opportunities, and reconfigure routines 
and resources to do so (Teece, 2007). Although, this approach is commonly used to 
explain variance in firm-specific performance, there is evidence that dynamic capabilities 
vary systemically among entities with different forms (Rindova & Kotha, 2001). Recent 
work applies the dynamic capabilities framework to study the management of stakeholder 
expectations via corporate diplomacy (Henisz, 2016). 
We draw on this work to argue that firms have dynamic capabilities that enable them 
to address social needs in the aftermath of disasters more effectively than other types of 
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entities. Following Teece (2007), we decompose dynamic capabilities and suggest firms 
with economic reliance in disaster-stricken nations are well suited to sense threats and 
diagnose areas of critical need following a disaster, seize upon opportunities to respond, 
and swiftly reconfigure routines and resources to do so effectively.  
We complete this argumentation by reflecting on the strategic value of firm specific 
versus general routines and resources. Applied to disasters, this idea points to a 
distinction between firms that respond with general resources—such as donating money 
to relief efforts—versus those that respond by reconfiguring areas of core expertise. 
According to the dynamic capabilities literature, firms work to develop areas of core 
expertise around co-specialized routines and resources, which they then look to deploy in 
response to environmental shocks (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Teece, 2014).  
Calculating a Measure of Economic Reliance 
To construct a measure of economic reliance, I considered three variables—i.e., 
subsidiaries, sales, and employees—and focused on the share of company affiliates in the 
country (adjusted for corporate hierarchy) as the main explanatory variable. This measure 
captures the strategic role of organizational structure in the firm’s economic dependency 
to geographical markets (cf., Andersson et al. 2002). The calculation entailed the 
following steps: 
To account for the diverse types of affiliates, such as joint ventures and fully-owned 
subsidiaries, I used the Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations database to code for the type 
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of affiliate and its relative importance for the corporation.7 I calculated the ratio of the 
number of affiliates of a given company level in the disaster country to the total number 
of affiliates of the same company level at the international level. For instance, a company 
that has three of its 10 affiliates level “5” in one country has a ratio of 3/10 for level “5” 
in that specific country. Finally, I obtained the sum of weighted ratios of all the available 
company levels. I calculate economic reliance based on the status of firm affiliates on the 
official day of the occurrence of the disaster.8  
With this procedure, I produce a conservative estimation of economic reliance. First, 
firms that have the interest of entering the market in the near future have, arguably, a 
higher motivation to aid the system than firms with no such prospective consideration. 
Likewise, firms that plan to exit the market system in the immediate future after the 
occurrence of the disaster should have few incentives to give. Second, economic reliance 
does not include export and import and sporadic activity not represented in the Corporate 
Affiliations database. That is, the number of corporate donors with some sort of 
                                                 
7 This scale starts with “0,” for headquarters, and it goes as many levels as the organizational tree has 
(e.g., a “9” indicates eight levels between the specific affiliate and the headquarters). To consider the 
descending relative importance of affiliates as the distance from the top organizational structure increases, I 
assigned each affiliate with its reciprocal inverted value. For instance, for a firm with nine levels in the 
organizational tree, the headquarters received the number “9;” and affiliates at the bottom of the 
organizational tree, a “1.”     
8 For example, to calculate the economic reliance of 1.95811 that the corporation Amgen had to 
Turkey during the Izmit earthquake, I obtained the number of subsidiaries of a given hierarchical level in 
Turkey on the 1st of May of 2003.The firm had 8 affiliates of level 5, 6 of level 3, and 3 of level 2. Then I 
calculated the share of subsidiaries by adding the ratios of the number of affiliates by level in Turkey to the 
total number of Amgen affiliates by level at the international level. Amgen had in total 49 subsidiaries of 
level 5, 38 of level 3, and 15 of level 2. Hence, [(8/49) + (6/38)+(3/15)]. Given that Amgen has seven 
organizational levels on 5/1/2003 (i.e., 0 to 6), the assigned index values for Turkish affiliates are “2” for 
level 5, “4” for level 3, and “5” for level 2. I multiplied these values to the correspondent ratio. Thus, 
[((8/49) x  2)+ )+((6/38) x 4)+((3/15) x 5)]. 
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economic reliance is likely higher than the one reflected in the analyses, which is likely to 
result in the underestimation of its effect.  
An integrative theoretical framework for the study of corporate disaster giving 
Therefore, my dissertation combines the main predictions of the theory of clubs 
identify with sensemaking and dynamic capabilities. Through the integration of these 
theories, I propose a methodology to predict which firms will donate frequently and in 
large amounts (i.e., those that are economically reliant to a national market), when firms 
will be better off by donating first, imitating or deviating from the donation amount of the 
first donor (i.e., when economically-reliant firms focus on the cognitive referents used by 
stakeholders—media reputation—instead of the cognitive referent used by firms—
financial performance), and when corporate donors have a comparative advantage to 
generate economic surplus (i.e., when they have local operations and use their core 
competences to deliver aid).  
This integrative framework results in more precise predictions regarding the pattern 
of corporate giving with respect to characteristics of the event, the country in which it 
occurs, the timing relative to peer donations, and its competitive and economic 
implications than extant theories employed in the extant literature. This literature offers 
conflicting accounts about the characteristics of corporate donors and the conditions and 
mechanisms under which these donors realize performance benefits and generate 
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economic value for external stakeholders.9 Most of these studies are cross-sectional 
evaluations (covering a single or a few events) of publicly-listed U.S. corporations—a 
reflection of the empirical literature in non-market strategy (Dorobantu et al., 2017). This 
trend represents a valid concern for the achievement of statistical regularities given the 
longitudinal fragmentation of the phenomenon at the international level and the diversity 
in the country of origin of corporate donors (White & Lang, 2012).  
Using my theoretical approach, for instance, I show that monopolistic firms engage in 
pro-social behavior more frequently and in a greater magnitude than firms operating in 
fragmented industries. This finding challenges empirical work in the institutional and 
strategic philanthropy literatures suggesting that the benefits of corporate pro-social 
behavior are comparatively large in competitive industries where the quest and returns to 
differentiation are relative big (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Godfrey et al., 2009).  
Complementing the effect of economic reliance with institutional factors that affect 
how firms and external stakeholders perceive behavior (Powell & Colyvas, 2008), I show 
that firms often follow wrong cognitive referents and make inefficient decisions 
regarding their engagement in disaster giving. I found that 43% of first corporate 
                                                 
9 Some authors, for instance, show that firms with a local presence in disaster-stricken countries are 
frequent donors (Muller & Whiteman, 2008), while others have found that the giving from locally-
headquartered firms is comparatively low in the wake of high-impact disasters (Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). 
Similarly, the literature on the consequences of corporate disaster giving provides ambiguous insights of 
the strategic value of such behavior. Some authors have found that some corporate donors do not realize 
sizeable returns. Particularly, firms with a reputation for social irresponsibility—proxied by the concerns 
data from the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini database, which are frequent donors, obtain insignificant 
short-run insurance value of their stock prices. They still suffer price drops associated with the disaster 
(Muller & Kräussl, 2011). Conversely, other studies find support of a positive association between disaster 
giving and financial performance measured by cumulative abnormal market returns (Madsen & Rodgers, 
2014).  
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responders in my sample obtained revenue lower than expected from pre-disaster trends. 
Furthermore, almost 51% of the time, firms engaging in this behavior obtained negative 
performance consequences that were significantly larger than the size of their donations.  
By bringing insights from institutional theory, I show empirically that firms need to 
consider pre-disaster media reputation when choosing when to lead or who to follow. I 
show that, under high informational and time constraints, the argument that moving fast 
with a large and substantive action accrues greater material benefits than a late, small, 
and symbolic choice often does not hold (Anderson, 2010; Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; 
Posen, Lee, & Yi, 2013). I provide evidence that the divergence in cognitive referents 
between firms and stakeholders is enduring even when the degrees of uncertainty and 
ambiguity subside. 
Finally, my dissertation shows that, contrary to what the statistics on corporate 
philanthropy suggest (Becerra, Cavallo, & Noy, 2014; Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, & Wisner, 
2014; Kellett & Caravani, 2013; White & Lang, 2012), firms with an economic reliance 
in the affected country detect more efficiently a country’s economic vulnerability to large 
calamities than public and multilateral donors. We confirm that economic reliance offers 
firms an advantageous position to help drive timely delivery of disaster aid, thereby 
lessening the adverse impact of natural disasters on social welfare.  
My dissertation thus offers evidence for the societal benefits of the corporate 
provision of collective goods and identify factors that generate and enhance positive 
outcomes. This addresses a weak spot in the non-market strategy literature and 
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complements firm-level studies by suggesting that, at least in the context of disaster aid, 
strategic pro-social behavior may indeed be a win-win proposition (McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2011). 
In conclusion, the integrative theoretical framework of my dissertation reconciles the 
evidence of the corporate provision of collective goods with the theory on disaster giving. 
When complementing club-goods theory with institutional and managerial approaches, 
my dissertation offers insights on how core strategy theories can inform the study of non-
market behavior conducted under high informational and time constraints. Chapter 1 
identifies conditions and mechanisms under which private actors can overcome the 
collective action problems outlined by theories on public choice (Morgan & Tumlinson, 
2012).  Firms with comparatively high stakes in the country market are particularly prone 
to cooperate in its sustainability because foregoing market profit entails a high 
opportunity cost. Orders of economic reliance are likely to distribute stakeholders 
according to their strategic value for the firm (Freeman, 2010), and affect how firms 
relate to them (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999), and the frequency and magnitude 
by which firms invest resources to meet their expectations (Henisz, 2014).  
Given that the findings suggest that proximity to the disaster damage affects the 
drivers and consequences of corporate giving, my work is relevant for the study of the 
non-market strategy of multinational enterprises. The exposure of these firms to disaster 
risk is historically at the peak due to the internationalization of capital and global 
interdependencies (Boehm, 2014; A. Cavallo, Cavallo, & Rigobon, 2013). Similarly, the 
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economic hardship associated with natural disasters is expected to continue to grow 
globally because of expanding human settlement in disaster-prone areas (Cutter, Emrich, 
Webb, & Morath, 2009; Dong & Tomlin, 2012; Kunreuther & Useem, 2009; von Peter, 
von Dahlen, & Saxena, 2012). Traditional sources of humanitarian aid and standard 
insurance practices have not proven sufficient to disaster losses, particularly in large 
markets (Kellett & Caravani, 2013; Noy, 2012; Weitzman, 2011). The value of corporate 
disaster giving for socioeconomic development is thus likely to increase over time. In this 
context, the cardinal practical question will be how such form of pro-social behavior can 
be stimulated and disciplined organically, and this dissertation may inform such 
endeavor. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 “We are part of a system. If the Japanese government cannot… we need to rebuild, we need the market to 
recover.”  
Manager, Coca Cola, in the aftermath of the 2011 tsunami and earthquake in East Japan 
INTRODUCTION 
The study of what drives firms to incur a cost and provide goods that benefit 
communities external to the organization—pro-social behavior—has primarily focused 
on the argument that business decision makers achieve a direct or indirect gain by giving 
(Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2011; Marquis et al., 2007; Muller & Whiteman, 2008; Porter 
& Kramer, 2002; Whiteman, Muller, & Voort, 2005). Yet work embedded in social 
preferences—a desire to win social and psychological objectives such as prestige and 
respect (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002; Marquis et al., 2007; Olson, 1971), and strategic 
considerations—instrumental achievements that help the organization “do well by doing 
good” (Godfrey, 2005; McWilliams & Siegel, 2011)—provides little attention to the fact 
that such pro-social behavior often results in collective goods that firms themselves 
require for their market operation. That is, firms vary in their need for geographically 
located goods, such as transportation and communication systems, the availability of 
qualified labor force, or the maintenance of consumer purchasing capacity; these goods 
are critical for firm performance and sustainability (Gimeno, 1999). This chapter 
investigates the role of this variance in the organizational decision to supply collective 
goods.  
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Building on the theory of club goods initiated by Buchanan (1965), I argue that 
organizations benefit from certain collective goods through their economic reliance on 
markets; that is, the extent to which they sell, buy, or rent raw materials, final products or 
services, or hire human capital to/from geographical communities. Because market gains 
are a function of club goods (i.e., collective goods that are exclusive of a market system 
and necessary to sustain, improve, or reestablish its welfare, such as social and economic 
infrastructure), ceteris paribus, a firm’s willingness to behave pro-socially in a given 
market is directly proportional to that market’s relative economic importance for that 
firm. Thus, economically affiliated firms give with relatively high frequency and 
magnitude because they have more certain and proximate benefits associated with a 
market’s club goods and face lower transactions costs of philanthropy than non-affiliated 
firms. Pro-social behavior is less frequent among non-affiliated firms because they are 
part of a broader public-goods systems where free-riding is pervasive (Alessi, 1975; 
Douty, 1972). 
The case of corporate disaster giving—organizations’ provision of pecuniary and/or 
in-kind giving to disaster relief and recovery—provides an example of the potential 
empirical consequences of neglecting economic reliance in the study of pro-social 
behavior. For instance, consider the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami that devastated East 
Japan in 2011. Following the indirect-benefit paradigm, strategic philanthropy may help 
identify key firm-specific characteristics that led firms to give. First, some scholars would 
predict that firms with low social standing gave in the hope of accumulating reputational 
capital (Du et al., 2011; Freeman, 2010; Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006; Godfrey, 2005; 
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Roberts & Dowling, 2000; Sacconi, Blair, Freeman, & Vercelli, 2010). Alternatively, a 
recent history of financial volatility might have motivated some managers to donate 
because they aimed to smooth market performance by consumers’ goodwill from the 
firm’s charitable record (Muller & Kräussl, 2011; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Given the 
high magnitude of the shock, a third prediction would be that managers from corporations 
headquartered in Japan engaged in scarce giving (Muller & Whiteman, 2008; Tilcsik & 
Marquis, 2013). This result would be attributed to two factors: financial concerns 
constrained pro-social behavior, and the network of local philanthropy was damaged to 
such a degree that external aid would crowd out the local response (Ballesteros & Useem, 
2016). 
On the other hand, scholars drawing from institutional theory suggest that 
environmental factors also play a role in philanthropic incentives (Marquis et al., 2007; 
Zhang & Luo, 2013).These theorists would predict that corporate giving would be greater 
in fragmented than in concentrated markets serving Japan given that the quest and 
potential returns to differentiation are bigger in such settings (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; 
Godfrey et al., 2009). Likewise, work on CSR predicts pro-social behavior to be 
inversely associated with economic development (Twigg, 2001). Hence, the Tōhoku 
disaster might have prompted a lesser amount of donation than shocks in less developed 
economies, such as the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Finally, foreign governments’ pledging 
might have fueled private giving due to firms’ interest in using political capital as a risk-
management mechanism against stakeholder opportunistic behavior (Baker, Gibbons, & 
Murphy, 2002; Godfrey et al., 2009; Henisz, Dorobantu, & Nartey, 2013).  
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The empirical assessment of these predictions is difficult because decision-making is 
likely endogenous to the suggested factors. The risk of documenting a spurious 
relationship is particularly high since the discussed organization-specific variables (e.g., 
financial performance) and pro-social behavior are likely moving in the same direction as 
idiosyncratic unobserved factors (e.g., managerial capabilities and risk aversion). 
Alternatively, the direction of the causal relationship may not be clear. To address these 
issues, in addition to exploit the exogeneity established by the occurrence of sudden 
natural disasters,10 I tried to mitigate the potential self-selection issue of geographic 
location and propensity to donate by coarsened-exact matching the data. In evaluating the 
predictions, I replicated the empirical measures for a range of theoretical arguments 
found in the extant literature and analyzed giving of corporations representing 40 
headquarters countries to the relief fund of 3,115 natural disasters that affected 175 
countries between 2003 and 2013, inclusive. The analyses suggest that the average 
corporate donor was a firm economically proximate to the affected market, with a high 
level of social standing, and operating in monopolistic markets. Furthermore, the 
frequency and magnitude of corporate giving dropped with the intervention of local 
governmental agencies, but increased with external intervention and national 
development.  These findings are in line with the predictions of the theoretical argument 
that accounting for firms’ varying dependence on markets provides a more efficient 
identification method than approaches that ignore such relationship.  
                                                 
10 These phenomena are, at least, exogenous to a variety of societal processes correlated with the 
private provision of collective goods. However, one can argue that the magnitude of disasters and, until 
some extent, their frequency may be associated with historical processes of creation and modification of 
human settlements.   
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By testing the robustness of my argument to factors drawn from institutional theory, I 
demonstrate that economic reliance has stronger explanatory power than embeddedness 
(Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013; Uzzi, 1996) or physical presence (Whiteman et al., 2005) 
alone. Finally, this study adds to the strategy literature by analyzing corporate decision 
making across national contexts, and applying the concept of business 
internationalization to the understanding of firm-market dynamics. More importantly, this 
chapter presents an attempt to harmonize attention to firm’s market and non-market 
activity in a discussion of the potential role of corporate pro-social behavior in market 
sustainability. My study also represents a parallel to the main predictions of the literature 
on industry self-regulation (Baron, 2010; Barrett, 2010; Ostrom, 2003; Prakash & 
Potoski, 2007).11 As I develop later in this chapter, this literature situates the motives of 
the provision of collective goods (i.e., public goods) in a collectivity circumscribed by the 
industry (Baron, 2009). My study focuses on the notion of a business community defined 
by geographical markets, a collectivity of industries. From this perspective, my study 
extends the literature on industry self-regulation to explain variance in the studied 
behavior across nations (i.e., groups of industries) using a profit motive.  
A THEORY OF ECONOMIC RELIANCE AND THE CORPORATE 
PROVISION OF COLLECTIVE GOODS  
                                                 
11 For exceptional work that delineates such parallel between clubs theory and theory and industry self-
regulation, I recommend the studies by Aseem Prakash on corporate engagement in environmental 
regulation; notably, Prakash and Potoski (2007) and Potoski and Prakash (2005).    
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Universal accessibility of collective goods (i.e., the pure public good) is rare. 
Societies are comprised by systems, or clubs, that entities need to join in order to use 
certain physical assets and social benefits (Buchanan, 1965). Consider a geographically 
circumscribed market (i.e., a socioeconomic and political structure for commercial 
exchange) a club. Only firms that are economically reliant to such local market have a 
direct need of the market’s specific social and economic infrastructure and other market-
exclusive collective goods (i.e., club goods) to provide products and services. In other 
words, local infrastructure, for instance, may be a public good from the perspective of the 
local market—in the absence of membership fees or quotas, any entity operating in the 
local market can use the roads or the telecommunication systems. However, such 
infrastructure is a club good from the perspective of a global economic system in which 
the local market is only a part.  
Therefore, firms’ dependency on a given market’s collective goods is a function of its 
economic reliance to the market. The degree of local investment alters economic reliance. 
From no operation, firms may sporadically rent, buy, sell, or hire raw materials, final 
products, services, or human capital. Also, firms may be regular exporters, importers, or 
leasers via foreign subsidiaries; or manufacturers or producers via owned transformation 
facilities (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977).   
Empirical contexts in which overall market output falls due to the exogenous 
destruction of collective goods, such as natural disasters, can help to empirically 
discriminate between theoretical arguments based on club goods theory and more widely 
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invoked alternatives. A firm economically affiliated with a geographical community 
affected by a disaster is more likely to suffer a direct economic impact than a firm with 
no such affiliation. In absence of full provision from a central entity such as a national 
government, managers acting in the firm’s interest finance the reconstruction of roads, 
bridges, or airports because the profitability and/or sustainability of their business depend 
on the restitution of their value chain. That is, firms, along with governance institutions 
and civil society groups, share the costs and benefits of club goods (Harrison & 
Hirshleifer, 1989; Roberts, 1984).  
Firms distribute their resources between composite demands of private goods and 
collective goods and face a budget constraint. It is assumed that private organizations can 
produce collective goods from private goods through a simple linear technology and 
normality in private and collective goods.12 Consumption equality is not necessary. 
Under a model of club goods, if the firm is a member of the market (i.e., it has an 
economic reliance with a focal market system), its utility is comprised by the market’s 
exclusive collective goods (i.e., club goods) and the firm assets (i.e., private goods). With 
its giving, the firm may increase its utility through a direct (e.g., a warm glow) or indirect 
gain (e.g., reputational capital) or both. On the other hand, if firm is a non-member, its 
utility is not a function of club goods.  
Thus, business organizations with relatively high stakes in the market are particularly 
prone to cooperate in its sustainability because foregoing market profit entails a high 
                                                 
12 An indirect provision, through tax contributions, is feasible and studied below.  
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opportunity cost. In other words, firms’ demand of club goods is positively associated 
with their economic reliance in a focal market system. Because high and low demanders 
of club goods are distinguishable, firms with a relatively high proneness to engage in pro-
social behavior can be identified. In sum, the main prediction, which serves as baseline 
for this study, is characterized by the following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 1 (H1): The greater the firm’s economic reliance on a given market, the 
greater the likelihood and magnitude of the firm’s engagement in the provision of 
collective goods for such a market 
The effectiveness of a theory that centers on economic reliance to overcome the 
identification issues of alternative approaches depends on several factors that moderate 
the main relationship in H1. These moderators are described below.  
Exclusivity of the club or market size 
A necessary condition of the sustainability of market systems is the achievement of 
an optimal affiliation size because the utility that a focal organization receives from club 
goods depends upon the number of other members with whom the organization shares 
benefits.13 That is, with respect to club goods, markets are sharing economies, and 
                                                 
13 By designating a private good, 𝑋𝑟 and partially deriving (1) with respect to j and r, we obtain the 
marginal rate of substitution between the collective good and private good for the ith agent, 
(𝑢𝑗
𝑖)
(𝑢𝑥
𝑖 )
.  If we add 
the club-size variable, we obtain 
(𝑢𝐺𝑗
𝑖 )
(𝑢𝑥
𝑖 )
.  This ratio describes the rate at which a focal firm is willing to give 
up consumption of the collective good when the size of the system increases with additional members in 
exchange for the private good.  
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members’ utility functions are interdependent. Reflecting on the example of a sports club, 
restricting the use of the club pool to one agent is not economically viable given 
maintenance costs, but allowing too many members to use the pool at the same time is 
also an inefficient solution (Buchanan, 1965).  
Affiliation or membership, the number of private entities that consume the collective 
good, is endogenous but independent of the decision of who provides and maintains 
collective goods (Sandler & Tschirhart, 1997). That is, the firm’s strategy and resources 
to compete in a market determine economic reliance. Thus, the cost of providing 
collective goods is independent of the costs of entering the business club (i.e., market 
entry), which are partly determined by market barriers, institutions, and other 
idiosyncrasies of the market and its stakeholders. Ordinarily, accessing club goods does 
not entail per se transaction costs or direct fees; market competition naturally allocates 
consumption rights. That is, my theoretical approach differs from club models with 
positive exclusion mechanisms such as a fine or a coarse exclusion. 
Formally, in the absence of central provision, changes in the number of members that 
share a collective good affect the individual cost of the good to any focal agent. Cost 
inequality is possible; some club affiliates may bear a disproportionate share of the 
burden. Pareto optimality is observed by equalizing the marginal cost and utility and such 
condition represents the rate at which a firm is willing to give up utility in exchange for 
additional firms in the business club. When the marginal loss in utility equals the 
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marginal reduction in cost, the business club achieves a stable equilibrium.14 Factors 
endogenous to market competition (e.g., investment in R&D and marketing) and 
environmental factors such as institutional arrangements (e.g., trading regulations) may 
affect the achievement of an optimal market size. 
Holding everything else constant, the smaller the number of entities holding a share 
of the market in the system is, the greater the benefit per-firm. When the system is 
relatively large, each affiliate is less likely to capture collective benefits (Putnam, 1998). 
Conversely, the larger the size of the system, in number of entities, the lower the 
individual cost of collective-goods supply due to economies of scale. Therefore, 
affiliation size is never a trivial decision for the willingness to give to collective goods. 
Regarding the expansion of market systems, incumbents balance marginal decreases in 
market gain and collective-goods consumption and cost-sharing gains of maintaining the 
system. Ceteris paribus, the opportunities of unpunished free-riding are positively 
associated with market size. The likelihood that any given firm will engage in collective-
goods provision in any given time is inversely proportional to the number of entities in 
the market. Hence, I suggest that: 
Hypothesis 2.a (H2a): The greater the exclusivity of the system, the stronger the 
relationship between economic reliance and the provision of collective goods  
Intervention of central providers 
                                                 
14 Given this, it is clear that some collective systems may not meet the condition for optimal 
membership when partial sharing arrangements are not feasible (i.e., private-goods systems) and when any 
group of finite size is smaller than optimal (i.e., pure public-goods systems) (Buchanan, 1965).  
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The provision of collective goods in market systems adopts a variety of forms: firm 
provision, public provision, or a public-private partnership. Because of the ubiquity of 
free-riding, central entities, such as governments, have traditionally played a critical role 
in the provision of collective goods that are too costly for a single private entity and 
whose benefits require the organization of co-operative sharing arrangements. Even when 
a Pareto optimum may be fostered through the intervention of central entities, such 
intervention may disturb the perceived value of optimality for club members and, thus, 
firms’ incentives to engage in pro-social behavior.15  
Specifically, with full central provision, firms may substitute the foregone utility of 
giving (e.g., the warm glow or reputational capital) with higher consumption of private 
goods. Conversely, in settings where central entities do not obtain and mobilize resources 
in a magnitude such that the cost of collective goods is financed, the outpouring of 
private participation becomes frequent and critical for the maintenance, improvement, or 
restoration of social welfare (Ballesteros, 2013; White & Lang, 2012). This crowding-out 
effect is integrated in the model in the following way: 
Hypothesis 2.b (H2b): The greater the relative magnitude of intervention of central 
entities, the weaker the relationship between economic reliance and corporate provision 
of collective goods 
Quality of governance of the club 
                                                 
15 However, free-riding is commonly overestimated when pro-social behavior is modeled as a pure-
public good because firms’ giving may not be orthogonal to self-interest (Andreoni 1993, 2006, Harrison 
and Hirshleifer 1989, Yildirim 2013). Hence, private provision not necessarily converges to zero in large 
economies, as predicted by public-goods theory (Samuelson, 1954). 
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As discussed above, although self-management by private entities is feasible (Ostrom, 
2003), market systems commonly have a government agency. In this context, business 
organizations play the role of the principal. In the presence of agency costs, which are 
paid in lieu of direct giving to collective goods (e.g., a tax levy), the greater agent’s effort 
is, the lower the cost of collective-goods provision. However, the agency aims at 
maximizing her utility, 𝑈 = 𝑡 − 𝑐(𝑒), where 𝑡 is a transfer from the membership (e.g., 
officer pay). The principal-agent problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) may arise because 
the agency’s allocation of public resources does not lead to an optimal provision of 
collective goods that maximizes private effort and investment in capital. For instance, 
government agencies may underinvest in communication systems that would reduce 
coordination costs. Market members can observe the cost of collective goods, but not the 
manager’s effort. Because this information asymmetry raises the cost of provision, the 
marginal benefit of cost sharing increases, which may generate an expansionary bias that 
results in market sizes bigger than the optimal (Sandler & Tschirhart, 1997).  
Therefore, the materialization of private incentives into pro-social behavior may be a 
function of institutional quality and governance effectiveness (Ballesteros & Useem, 
2015; Cohen & Werker, 2008; Henisz & Delios, 2001; Marquis & Qian, 2013; Zhang & 
Luo, 2013). Systemic issues such as lack of accountability may deter private provision of 
collective goods because business decision makers fear resources will not be well spent 
by the agency. In other words: 
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Hypothesis 2.c (H2c): The higher the quality of governance of a market system, the 
stronger the relationship between economic reliance and corporate provision of 
collective goods 
Social standing  
Market affiliation entails a normative influence for the firm’s pro-social behavior. 
Affiliated firms operate amid mechanisms of accountability and expectation to contribute 
to social welfare. Therefore, pro-social behavior arises not only with the expectation of 
obtaining a direct or indirect utility, but also to avoid societal sanctions. We can think of 
these sanctions as an individual cost of free-riding. The cost of free-riding for the 
affiliated firm is a function of its donation to collective goods 𝑔𝑗, and the firm’s relative 
visibility or standing in a correspondent referent group (e.g., country). Social standing 
connotes identifiability and goodwill from the perspective of the public (Douty, 1972). 
Given the standing of firm i, the public expect the organization to contribute at least 
𝑔1
𝑖+𝑔2
𝑖+,… ,+𝑔𝑛+𝑚
𝑖  at some point in time. The organization may receive a societal 
sanction if its total contribution, 𝑔𝑖, is below social expectation, that is, if 𝑔𝑖 < ∑ 𝑔𝑛+𝑚𝑗=1 . 
Such sanction will be stronger if the public believes that the firm’s giving is necessary for 
the improvement, sustainability, or recovery of the system’s status quo, which arguably is 
positively related with the firm’s standing. Therefore, I expect that: 
Hypothesis 2.d (H2d): The higher a firm’s social standing in the market system, the 
stronger the relationship between economic reliance and corporate provision of 
collective goods 
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To summarize, a comparison of the optimization problem using my approach vis-à-
vis social-preferences’ impure altruism and alternative strategic-considerations 
approaches is shown in Error! Reference source not found. in the Preface. In addition 
to the role of economic reliance, a firm-community cognitive affiliation is integrated in 
the analysis. As noted, building on club goods theory and using economic reliance as 
baseline achieves a clear characterization of the set of agents that benefit from the 
market’s exclusive collective goods and, consequently, have a relatively high proneness 
to donate to such a market. Likewise, Table 2 contrasts the predictions of my approach 
vis-à-vis social preferences and strategic considerations. 
CREATING A DATASET OF DISASTER GIVING  
Regarding the empirical setting, I have coordinated a collaborative project with 
researchers in Wharton and UPenn’s Department of Computer and Information Science 
to build, arguably, the largest database on disaster aid at the international level. The 
output of four years of data collection and coding using a combination of manual and 
automatic procedures, the dataset covers every monetary and in-kind donation from 
firms, governments, multinational agencies, and non-governmental organizations 
reported in news media to the relief and recovery fund of all natural disasters that 
affected the world from 1990 to 2015.16 The coded data of corporate aid comprises 
93,247 donations from 38,980 firms from 83-headquarters countries to 4,637 natural 
disasters that hit 176 countries in the period 2003-2015.  
                                                 
16 I covered newspapers, trade press, magazines, newswires, press releases, TV and radio transcripts, 
digital video and audio clips, corporate websites and reports, institutional websites and reports, and 
government websites and reports, among other sources. 
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We conducted Boolean searches of combinations of the name of the affected country 
(e.g., United States), the type of the disaster (e.g., Hurricane), and in some cases the name 
of the disaster (e.g., Katrina). These searches resulted in over 2,310,000 reports from 
which we searched for mentions of cash and in-kind donations (i.e., free products, 
services or labor) from business organizations. To make these reports computationally 
tractable, we applied differential language analysis to code information on the donor 
organization, the characteristics of the donation (i.e., in-kind, monetary or both, amount, 
currency, and timing), the target entity (i.e., government agency, NGO, or victim group), 
the target area or sector (e.g., rebuilding of schools), the initiator within the firm (i.e., 
employees or top management), and the organizational vehicle (e.g., subsidiary, group of 
employees, department or unit). 
For in-kind contributions, we monetized the total value of the goods using the 
monetary value reported by the donor, when available; if not, we used the value of 
similar donations reported by other donors. Where neither of these two sources was 
available, we calculated the value of the donation using current prices in the affected 
nation. We also converted values into U.S. dollars when necessary using the exchange 
rate on the donation date.  
We coded giving from economically-reliant corporations and the degree to which 
disaster aid leverages firm-specific routines or resources. We used an automated coding 
process to search within each report for details about the type, financial value, date, and 
source of each donation. A group of researchers coded donations that were coming from 
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corporations with local affiliates as reflected in the Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations 
database. We developed a measure of related giving that reflects the degree to which 
disaster aid leverages firm-specific routines or resources. To calculate this, we began by 
using a firm’s four-digit SIC code to identify its key business activities. We coded the 
dollar number of in-kind donations that aligned with these activities as related [i.e., 
products, services, or activities that are relevant for the firm’s market operation (e.g., 
Bayer giving medicines in response to Typhoon Haiyan)].  
Then, we randomly selected a sample of 5% of coded donations. A group of 
researchers not involved in the earlier procedures checked for measurement error. We 
repeated this process with a separate group. This resulted in fewer than 5% of the selected 
sample that marked as inaccurate. About 60% of these errors were associated with 
monetizing the in-kind value of donations, with less than 8% of the donations were 
incorrectly marked as related giving. The rest of sample of discrepancies were due to 
missing data on the nature of donor’s business. Figure 1 illustrates an example of our 
coding. 
 
 
17 
 
Figure 1. Coding donations from economically-reliant corporations and aid associated with 
the donor’s core operation 
 
Finally, I hired independent researchers to conduct two different procedures to verify 
the quality of the dataset using third-party sources such as company sustainability reports. 
We randomly selected five percent of the events (156) for the period 2003-2013 and 
researchers searched reports using Google, Lexis Nexis, and Factiva. From this 
procedure, 5.1% percent of the selected events (8) had data inaccuracies, e.g., donation 
amount, date of donation. We had access to exclusive information of donation for the 
2010 tsunami and earthquake in Chile via the Chilean government. By comparing our 
database with the list of donors given by the Chilean government, we found that our 
dataset comprised 68% of the official source. Our tracking did not include donating 
frequency of small- and medium-sized Chilean, non-multinational enterprises. In terms of 
magnitude, our dataset accounted for 92 percent of the total corporate aid for the event.      
We first ask, does the donor firm has an affiliate in the affected country?: (0,1)
Then we ask, is Anglo American’s donation related with an activity instrumental for 
its market operation or where the firm can use its market resources and routines?
Market-nonmarket Relatedness:                                                                                         
% of in-kind donation related to the donor firm’s core business
01
In-kind=
$8.75 M
$4.5 M
We code this amount as giving from a locally active firm
$10.0 M
$ 1.2 M
Cash=
$1.25 M
Food & medicines
$ 7.55 M
Constructing school buildings   with
mining-related resources
and skills
Then, we coded that 
75% of Anglo’s 
donation was related
giving
from locally active 
firm
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When available, we corroborated the accuracy of the data using external sources: a) 
the Financial Tracking System (FTS) of the United Nations Office for Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which is a global database that records self-reported 
international humanitarian aid for different humanitarian crises.17 The FTS has 
information on corporate donation for about 3 percent of the tracked events; and 
government and NGO donation for about 10 percent of the tracked events. In all cases, 
for corporate giving, the built dataset was larger than the FTS dataset. b) Disaster 
corporate aid trackers of the Corporate Citizenship Center (CCC) at the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce Foundation.18 This source provided information on corporate donation for 
0.61% of the tracked events. In all cases, our database was larger than the CCC dataset.   
For my dissertation, I merged this proprietary database with several other event-
specific (e.g., Swiss Re's SIGMA database on disaster insurance),  country-specific (e.g., 
The World Bank's World Development Indicators), and firm-specific (e.g., Lexis Nexis' 
Corporate Affiliations and Capital IQ) databases. Additionally, I built a dataset that 
reports media reputation of the firm one year before and after the official date of the 
disaster. The measure uses computer linguistic software, as implemented by Factiva, 
which quantifies the tone (i.e., sentiment) of each media report.  
The database offers a more efficient empirical tool for observing the effect of 
organizational, industry, country, time, and event variance, and mitigating unobserved 
                                                 
17 For information about the method of collection of FTS data and their verification, visit the following 
site: http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=AboutFTS-Data.  
18 These data are available at http://www.uschamberfoundation.org/corporate-citizenship-
center/disaster-corporate-aid-trackers.  
 
 
19 
 
heterogeneity than existing studies on corporate giving, which traditionally focus on 
single or a few events, one geographical context (e.g., the U.S.), and a type of 
organization (large, publicly listed firms).  
Scholars in specific sub-fields in the management literature may find benefits from 
the use of these data. For instance, international business scholars can increase their 
understanding of the role of internationalization and country-specific risk and uncertainty 
on pro-social behavior. Taken together, the frequency of exposure to systemic shocks that 
affect local communities is higher for multinational enterprises than for single-country 
organizations. Accordingly, disasters are relatively likely to affect the strategic trajectory 
of MNEs.  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
For studying the causal relationship between economic reliance and the frequency 
and magnitude of corporate disaster giving, I restrict the study to natural disasters 
because their frequency is arguably exogenous to the studied behavior. Furthermore, I 
focused on sudden disasters (e.g., earthquakes); shocks whose outbreak is clearly 
identified and is not significantly distant in time (i.e., more than 30 days) from the trigger 
(e.g., shaking and displacement of ground). Hence, I did not consider evolutionary 
disasters (e.g., famines or heat waves) that are long-lived events without a single, easily 
identifiable source or whose trigger is remote in time from the disaster peak (e.g., 
extended period of below average precipitation). The reason is that such disasters imply a 
complexity of ex-ante and ex-post socioeconomic and political factors that may be 
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correlated with the likelihood of receiving disaster aid (Birkland, 1997; Klinenberg, 
2003; Platt, 2012). For a similar rationale, I did not include manmade shocks. 
The main dataset of the firm-specific predictors is the more than 1.9 million firms 
worldwide of the Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations database (CAD). 19 The analyzed 
sample comprises the largest 550 multinational organizations by firm value at the 
international level (Capital IQ). These firms represent 40 countries based on their 
ultimate-parent’s headquarters location.  
There are 3,523 sudden natural disasters in the EM-DAT database in the period 
2003—2013. I dropped 119 disasters with imprecise dates and 191 that did not meet the 
30-day rule. The final list was comprised by 3,115 events that affected 173 countries.20 
On an average sample year, there were around 307 events associated with an economic 
loss of at least US$102 billion,21 affecting over 166 million people22 and killing almost 
102,000 others.  
                                                 
19 This is an international directory of corporate structure of public and private companies. The CAD’s 
criteria for content inclusion is annual revenue of $1 million or greater for privately held parent companies. 
For U.S. Public firms: all major publicly traded companies with U.S. located headquarters traded on one of 
the three major U.S. exchanges: NYSE, NASDAQ and NYSEAMEX. Also included are significant 
companies traded on smaller U.S. exchanges. Also included are outside service firms attached to the parent 
companies. Included are the parent companies and their subsidiaries, no matter where the subsidiaries are 
located. International companies listed generally have revenues of US$10 million or greater, in excess of 
300 employee totals or substantial assets/net worth. 
20 Additionally, given that the applied econometric specifications include country-fixed effects, for 
some models I did not include 12 countries hit by only one disaster and considered events that received 
corporate disaster giving at least once. 
21 The economic impact of a disaster usually consists of direct (e.g. damage to infrastructure, crops, 
housing) and indirect (e.g. loss of revenues, unemployment, market destabilization) consequences on the 
local economy. In EM-DAT estimated damage are) given in US$ (‘000). For each disaster, the registered 
figure corresponds to the damage value at the moment of the event, i.e. the figures are shown true to the 
year of the event (EM-DAT, 2014). 
 
 
21 
 
Dependent variable 
For each disaster, I recorded a binary variable that takes value “1” if the firm donated 
or made a pledge and a continuous variable for the total dollar amount of the donation. 
Hence, I estimated two dependent variables: Y={0,1}, donating; and Y={0,…,n}, USD 
donated. Given the one-year tracking window, the data reflect donations that mostly 
target disaster relief (i.e., giving that addresses immediate life-threating concerns), and 
recovery (i.e., giving that focuses on reconstruction, restitution, and resettlement and 
rehabilitation). The average donation of sample firms in the analyzed 10-year period was 
close to $1.7 million.  
Main predictor: economic reliance  
I used the measure defined in the Preface. I used a polynomial expansion of 
subsidiaries, sales, and employees as an alternative measure of economic reliance. There 
are two considerations regarding the sole use of sales and employees as proxies of 
economic reliance, which have 23 and 27 percent of missingness in the CAD database, 
respectively. One can argue that the restriction of the analyses to these variables reduces 
construct validity dramatically. Sales only accounts for the demand side of the market 
and it does not capture the relevance of the market as a supplier of inputs for the firm. For 
instance, a disaster in a developing country can potentially reduce the economic standing 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 People that have been injured (i.e., individuals suffering from physical injuries, trauma or an illness 
requiring medical treatment), affected (i.e., individuals requiring basic survival needs such as food, water, 
shelter, sanitation, an immediate medical assistance during a period of emergency) and left homeless (i.e., 
individuals needing immediate assistance in the form of shelter) after a disaster are included in this 
category (EM-DAT, 2014). 
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of a corporation buying materials from or manufacturing in such country. If the affected 
country is not an important end user of the firm’s goods, the period sales would likely not 
be affected. Finally, some industries are under or overrepresented by sales subsidiaries. 
Similar considerations apply for the share of employees as some industries and are more 
intensive in their use of human capital than others. Additionally, variance in the number 
of employees by country does not necessarily capture the dependency of the firm on the 
market’s collective goods (Sandler, 2013).  
Nevertheless, to use the additional information that income and human resources 
provide in robustness tests of economic reliance, I estimated a Chebyshev polynomial 
expansion in subsidiaries, market share, and proportion of employees as a functional form 
of economic reliance. The central tenant behind this approach is that a high-order 
polynomial can be used to approximate most functional forms (Kolsarici & Vakratsas, 
2015). For this calculation, I am not imputing missing values. Modeling missingness is 
not expected to increase efficiency in a significant fashion given the loss in statistical 
power (note that non-sales subsidiaries are not to be considered).  
Sales. I calculated market share using the annual dollar amount of national sales was 
calculated by adding the reported income by all the subsidiaries in a country. This 
amount was divided by total dollar amount of sales for the corporation in the same period 
of observation.  
Employees. I divided the sum of employees by subsidiary that the firm has at the 
country level by the total number of employees at the international level.  
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The economic reliance, k, of firm i to country m at time t has the following form: 
𝑘𝑚
𝑖 = 𝑓(𝜎𝑚
𝑖 , 𝜔𝑚
𝑖 , 𝜀𝑚
𝑖 )t                                                                                                    (1) 
where    
                 𝜎𝑚
𝑖
=∑(
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡
𝑛
0
) 𝑥 ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
𝜔𝑚
𝑖 =
∑ (𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 )𝑛0
(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡)
 
𝜀𝑚
𝑖 =
∑ (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡)𝑛0
(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡)
 
I considered expansions up to the 20th degree, opting for third-order polynomial based 
on the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).23  
To assess the construct validity of this measure, I hired researchers to conduct an 
independent qualitative assessment of the accuracy of the independent variable to 
measure economic affiliation. A total number of 50 firms, 2.5 percent of the sample, were 
randomly selected. Diverse sources were analyzed to identify information of the 
economic importance of geographical areas during the period 2003—2013. The sources 
were annual corporate reports, Factiva Dow Jones, and Thomson Reuters. 
Moderators 
To measure exclusivity of the club, I built on the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) 
(Rhoades, 1993) and constructed a measure of market concentration. Exclusivity is the 
sum of squares of the market share of the largest five firms in the focal country. This 
variable provides a normalized value of the market concentration of the business club 
                                                 
23 See Donoghue et al. (2012) and Kolsarici and Vakratsas (2015) for a discussion.  
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[0,1].24 Relatively large values of the variable suggest the existence of monopolistic 
market systems; conversely, relatively low values are an indication of competitive, 
fragmented clubs. The data source is the CAD. 
Agency intervention is the estimated proportion of total cost of the disaster that was 
financed by the national government proxied by the ratio of the estimated economic cost 
of the disaster to the general government total expenditure. Similarly, external 
intervention is the ratio of the estimated economic cost to the net official development 
assistance and official aid received. These data were obtained from the World Economic 
Outlook the World Development Indicators.25 For robustness purposes, I used two binary 
variables for each construct. Respectively, whether the national government requested 
external resources and whether there was an official aid appeal or a response plan 
reported by the Financial Tracking System of the United Nations Office for Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (e.g., a volcanic eruption in Peru in 2006). Arguably, 
aid appeals foster donations from outside the club system (i.e., from public-goods 
donors). 
To proxy quality of governance, or agency performance, I used scale indicators based 
on the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).26 For selecting the 
                                                 
24 As an alternative measure, I calculated the HHI by industry (four-digit SIC code). Large values of 
the variable (e.g., .324 for Arrangement of Passenger Transportation in Brazil in 2009) suggest the 
existence of monopolistic industries; conversely, relatively low values (e.g., 0.014 for Apparel, Piece 
Goods, and Notions in Sweden in 2009) are an indication of competitive, fragmented clubs. One argument 
against the use of this variable is that concept of a club is broader than a single industry. Moreover, the 
hardship caused by the disaster extends to different industries. A given company, hence, consider not only 
the firms in its own industry, but also in other industries when engaging in disaster giving.   
25 (International Monetary Fund, 2014) and (The World Bank, 2014). 
26 According to the World Bank, the WGI is a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of 
governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial 
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dimensions that better explain variance in collective-goods provision without creating 
redundancy, I tested for multicollinearity using variance inflation factors (VIF) and 
selected government effectiveness and regulatory quality.27 For the sake of maintaining 
the information that each indicator captures, I run interactions with individual betas. For 
example, in 2010, Haiti had low government effectiveness (3) and regulatory quality (17) 
in comparison with Belgium (93 and 86, respectively). Finally, standing is proxied by 
rank of the corporation by firm value (Capital IQ), lagged by a year related to the disaster 
date.28  
Control variables 
One of the estimation vectors has disaster, organization, country, month, year, and 
firm-by-country fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant factors and path-
dependent CSR-related investment in the market. To account for potential yearly trends 
in the availability of disaster risk and aid (e.g., urbanization has increased exposure to 
certain types of disasters), I included year dummy variables. Additionally, I used month 
dummies because disasters like hurricanes show seasonal patterns in their frequency and 
magnitude. 
                                                                                                                                                 
and developing countries. The six broad dimensions of governance that comprise the WGI are rule of law, 
voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, and control of corruption. For further information, please refer to (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 
2011). 
27 Government effectiveness reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies (Kaufmann et al., 
2011). Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. The estimates range 
from 0 (weak) to 100 (strong). 
28 Alternatively, I used the count of regional and national newspapers articles that mention the name of 
the firm over a year before the disaster date in the affected country. The source was Factiva.  
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At the firm level, I controlled for industry (four-digit SIC code), and one-year lags of 
firm longevity (logged number of years), logged values of employees, revenue, market 
capitalization, and return on assets (percentage) because research has suggested these 
variables correlate with philanthropic behavior (Marquis et al., 2007; Muller & Kräussl, 
2011; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Additionally, I controlled for customer orientation 
because firms with an end-user focus (i.e., business-to-individual industries) may have a 
different propensity to engage in the provision of collective goods than firms with an 
industry focus (i.e., business-to-business industries). Using this rationale, I conducted 
sub-sample tests dividing the data per the industry orientation.  
At the country level, total land area (km2) and total population may not only skew 
disaster risk, but also the size of market systems and the likelihood of donation. Hence, 
using data from the World Development Indicators (The World Bank, 2014), I controlled 
for the logs of these variables. Regarding event-specific controls, I used dummies for 
disaster type as some specific types may fuel public response and aid more effectively 
than others (Birkland, 1997). The impact of the disaster was also controlled using the 
relative magnitude of killed, number of affected, and associated economic damage (i.e., 
killed/total population, affected/total population, and economic damage/GDP PPP, 
respectively).29 Finally, to account for donor fatigue, 30 the geographical distribution of 
shocks, and the learning effects of disasters, I included controls for the number of 
                                                 
29 I obtained these data the EM-DAT, The World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (2014). Note 
that endogeneity may be an issue when regressing measures of disaster hardship. Arguably, hardship is 
endogenous to the characteristics of the philanthropic response. The following subsections explain the 
methods to account for this risk.  
30 Club members may face the situation of allocating scarce resources to multiple collective goods in 
the same fiscal exercise; early disasters may crowd out the response to subsequent shocks. 
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disasters by country and worldwide in a period of one year before the focal disaster 
date—both logged. Additionally, I accounted for the possibility that other major social, 
political, or economic events may have crowded out organizations’ attention and 
financial capacity to provide collective goods (Eisensee & Strömberg, 2007; Franks, 
2013). Newsworthy events is the average of “the median number of minutes a news 
broadcast devotes to the top three news segments in a day” over the forty days after the 
disaster.31  Table 3 summarizes the different constructs and variables and Table 4 and 5 
show descriptive statistics and correlations.  
  
                                                 
31 See Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) for an explanation of this indicator and a test of its effectiveness. 
The variable is calculated by Professor David Strömberg and is available at http://people.su.se/~dstro/.   
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Table 3. List of constructs and variables 
Construct Variable 
Dependent variable 
Donating Company Donated? (1=Yes) 
USD 
donated 
Donated Amount in USD 
Explanatory variable 
Economic 
reliance 
Share of affiliates in the disaster country adjusted by the relative value of the affiliate 
Moderators 
Exclusivity Dispersion of market share across firms within an affected country (sum of squares of the ratio of the 
of annual local sales of the largest five firms to the total sum of sales in a given country) 
Central 
intervention 
External Ratio of estimated damage to net official development assistance and official aid 
received  
Agency Ratio of estimated damage to gross national expenditure (current US$) 
Quality of 
governance 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development 
Standing Rank of the corporation by firm value (Capital IQ), lagged by a year related to the disaster date 
Controls 
Firm-
specific  
Primary industry, primary sector, total assets, consumer orientation, market capitalization, total 
revenue, R&D intensity, ROA % 
Country-
specific 
controls:  
total population, land area in squared kilometers, GDP, willingness to receive aid (aid appeal local 
government) 
Event-
specific 
controls:  
Disaster type, ratio of deaths=number of people killed/total population, proportion of affected 
population=(number of people displaced or injured)/total population, relative economic 
damage=associated economic damage/GPD PPP 
News pressure: the median number of minutes a news broadcast devotes to the top three news 
segments in a day” over the forty days after the disaster 
Donor fatigue: annual number of disasters by country and annual number of disasters at the 
international level 
Robustness 
Economic 
reliance 
Polynomial expansion in subsidiaries, market share, and proportion of total employees  
Central 
intervention 
Agency: 1=there was an official appeal for international aid reported by the United Nations. 
Internal= 1 when the local government explicitly commits to cover an at least 50 percent of the 
associated direct damage (i.e., amount of disaster cost covered by the government divided by total 
estimated cost) 
Social 
standing 
Count of regional and national newspapers articles that mention the name of the firm over a year 
before the disaster date in the affected country. It does not account for the sentiment of the discourse 
Physical 
Presence 
Binary variable indicating if the firm has an affiliate in the affected country   
Degree of 
Poverty 
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population) 
Employee-
driven 
Donation 
1= the employees initiated the donation (and not the top management) 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics  
VARIABLES  Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent variables 
Donating(Yes=1,No=0)  0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 
USD Donated                 1,697,227.00              11,900,000.00                  1000.00              350,000,000.00  
Explanatory variable 
Economic Reliance                              0.01                             0.09  0.00                                 1.00  
Moderators 
Exclusivity             0.08            0.15  0.00              1.00  
Agency Intervention  1.72 11.91 0.00 178.25 
External Intervention  1.54 6.87 0.00 115.36 
Government Effectiveness  53.31 27.27 0.00         99.51  
Regulatory Quality  51.65 28.02 0.00       100.00  
Social Standing          45.85        278.99            1.00      6,000.00  
  Controls    
  Firm    
Total Employees                      74,743.85                   120,956.29  0.00                 2,200,000.00  
Total Assets ($USDmm)                3,502,923.00              16,600,000.00  0.00             231,000,000.00  
Total Revenue ($USDmm)                1,980,828.92              10,276,140.44                  11.00              228,700,000.00  
Market Capitalization ($USDmm)                     34,156.95                     48,053.16                  16.50                     511,887.00  
Return on Assets (%)                             5.02                             4.49                  (7.82)                            38.21  
R&D Expenses ($USDmm)                     27,130.46                   433,537.26  0.00               14,319,402.00  
Net PP&E ($USDmm)                   898,893.00                5,439,931.00  0.00             124,000,000.00  
SG&A Expenses ($USDmm)                   260,636.50                1,649,753.00  0.00               38,900,000.00  
Total Enterprise Value ($USDmm)                1,671,652.00                9,995,316.00        (673,620.00)             231,000,000.00  
Consumer Orientation                             0.46                             0.50  0.00                              1.00  
  Country    
GDP ($USDmm)                2,751,000.00                4,559,000.00                296.00                16,770,000.00  
Land Area (SqKm)                2,605,036.15                3,733,879.02                200.00                16,381,390.00  
Population (Millions)                   244.40                   418.00               0.03                  1,357.00  
   Event     
Storm                             0.33                             0.47                   0.00                               1.00  
Flood                             0.49                             0.50  0.00                              1.00  
Earthquake                             0.10                             0.30  0.00                              1.00  
Mass Movement Dry                             0.00                             0.05  0.00                              1.00  
Mass Movement Wet                             0.06                             0.24  0.00                              1.00  
Volcano                             0.16                             0.13  0.00                              1.00  
 
30 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics  
VARIABLES  Mean SD Min Max 
People Affected                   364,080.72                2,459,571.30                   1.00                67,900,000.00  
People Killed                         392.61                      6,902.89                   1.00                     222,570.00  
Estimated Damage                       1,163.80                      8,171.50                   0.01                     210,000.00  
Annual Number of disasters (Country)                             7.58                             8.07  0.00                               35.00  
Annual Number of disasters (World)                         237.78                           16.71                213.00                           260.00  
Newsworthy events                             8.90                             2.57                   2.83                             29.25  
  Robustness    
Physical Presence            0.02            0.14  0.00              1.00  
Degree of Poverty          26.94          15.45            2.30          75.30  
Employee-driven Donation            0.01            0.08  0.00           1.00  
Local Aid Appeal            0.01           0.12  0.00           1.00  
External Aid (United Nations Appeal       0.03            0.18  0.00           1.00  
Table 5. Correlations 
  Variable Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Donating (Yes=1, No=0) 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 1.00 
           
2 USD Donated 1,697,227.00 11,900,000.00 1000.00 350,000,000.00 0.10 1.00 
          
3 Economic Reliance (Subsidiary) 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.01 1.00 
         
4 Economic Reliance (Employees) 0.03 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.01 0.72 1.00 
        
5 Economic Reliance (Sales) 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.01 0.69 0.97 1.00 
       
6 Economic Reliance (Polynomial) 0.03 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.01 0.69 0.99 0.98 1.00 
      
7 Exclusivity 0.08 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.30 0.48 0.08 1.00 
     
8 Agency Intervention 
1.72 11.91 0.00 178.25 
-0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 1.00 
    
9 External Intervention 
1.54 6.87 0.00 115.36 
0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.07 1.00 
   
10 Government Effectiveness 53.31 27.27 0.00 99.51 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.24 0.23 0.25 -0.05 -0.19 -0.02 1.00 
  
11 Regulatory Quality 51.65 28.02 0.00 100.00 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.24 0.23 0.25 -0.08 -0.18 -0.02 0.93 1.00 
 
12 Social Standing 45.85 278.99 1.00 6,000.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
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Methods 
I regressed the US dollar amount of giving using the following OLS specification: 
𝑈𝑆𝐷 𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 = 𝛼1(𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑟𝑎) + 𝛼2𝑎(𝑒𝑎 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛼2𝑏(𝑒𝑎 ∗
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛼2𝑐(𝑒𝑎 ∗ 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) + 𝛼2𝑑(𝑒𝑎 ∗ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔)+𝛼′(𝜃𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖       (2) 
where the vector 𝜃𝑖 has firm-, country-, and event-specific variables, and, in some 
specifications, fixed-effects for these three levels of analysis.  
Regarding the likelihood of donating, I interpret the process that firms follow when 
deciding to participate in collective-goods provision as an attempt to maximize utility. 
The business decision maker makes a marginal benefit-marginal cost calculation based 
on the utilities achieved by donating to a given event, by not donating (i.e., using the 
resources for something else), and by using the resources for another event. That is, firm 
i chooses to contribute to event j, j≠k, given that 𝑃𝑖𝑗=𝑃𝑟(𝑉𝑖𝑗 > 𝑉𝑖𝑘), where 𝑃𝑖𝑗 is the 
probability that the utility that it obtains for event j (𝑉𝑖𝑗) is higher than the utility for 
event k (𝑉𝑖𝑘). Hence, the specification should account for the characteristics of the 
affected community and the collective good. Formally: 
𝑋𝑖 = 𝛽1(𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽2.𝑑(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) 
𝑍𝑗 = 𝛽2.𝑎(𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛽2.𝑏(𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽2.𝑐(𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) 
The probability that firm i engages in provision of collective goods for event j is: 
(𝑃𝑖𝑗) = ∫∏𝑡=1
𝑇 ∏𝑗=1
𝐽 exp(𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑗𝑡+𝑍𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑗𝑡)
∑ exp(𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑗𝑡+𝑍𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑗𝑡)
𝐽
𝑘=1
𝑓(𝛽|Ɵ)𝑑𝛽                                               (3) 
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Notice that this model combines a multinomial logit (subscripted by firm-specific 
characteristics) and a conditional logit (examining the characteristics of the choice—i.e., 
the target country-disaster pair). I used random-effects with bootstrapped errors and 
firm-by-country fixed-effects.32  See next sub-sections for further robustness checks, 
including an additional strategy to address endogeneity concerns via matching, and the 
Appendix for a description of the process to address missingness.  
Results 
I found a positive association between the frequency and magnitude of engagement in 
disaster response with economic reliance, providing support for the baseline hypothesis. 
Ceteris paribus, an increase of one standard deviation in the degree of economic 
affiliation raises the contribution of the average firm by about 17 percent (Table 6, Model 
1). In probabilistic terms, sample firms are 27.5 times more likely to donate for every 
standard-deviation unit of increase in their economic reliance [0,1] to a given market. The 
main finding is robust to the inclusion of the different season-, event-, country-, and firm-
specific, time-variant and -invariant controls, including the moderating variables, and 
hold after CEM is implemented. Additionally, the Freedman-Lane semi-partialing 
method resulted in smaller standard errors than the mixed-conditional logit and linear 
models, which one may interpret as a conservative estimation of the original model. 
Moreover, it is important to reiterate that the explanatory variable does not consider 
sporadic commercial activity not captured by an affiliated in the affected country. 
                                                 
32 The p-value for the Hausman test (Hausman, Stock, & Yogo, 2005) was 0.1037 (Wooldridge, 2010). 
Consequently, I centered on models with random effects and used fixed-effects for robustness checks. 
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Table 6. The effect of economic reliance on corporate disaster giving 
 Model 1 (RE) Model 2 (MC Logit) Model 3 (FE) 
VARIABLES USD Donation (LN) Donation Frequency  USD Donation (LN) 
Economic Reliance 0.167 3.141 0.129 
 (0.003) (0.737) (0.013) 
Exclusivity x ER 0.116 1.133 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.135) (0.000) 
Agency Intervention x ER -0.571 -0.067 0.090 
 (0.017) (0.102) (0.044) 
External Intervention x ER 3.983 -0.048 2.761 
 (0.028) (0.149) (0.148) 
Government Effectiveness x ER -0.009 0.000 -0.019 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) 
Regulatory Quality x ER 0.008 -0.099 0.016 
 (0.001) (0.015) 0.000 
Social Standing x ER 0.001 0.073 (0.000) 
 (0.000) (0.012) 0.000 
Exclusivity (Market Concentration) 0.000 0.319 (0.000) 
 (0.000) (0.498) (0.276) 
Agency Intervention -0.010 4.419 -0.035 
 (0.002) (0.369) (0.006) 
External Intervention 0.060 -0.200 0.047 
 (0.002) (0.117) (0.005) 
Government Effectiveness -0.000 0.041 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) 
Regulatory Quality 0.000 -0.016 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) 
Social Standing 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CONTROLS    
Number of Employees 0.000 0.076 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) 
Total Revenue 0.000 -0.017 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.041) (0.001) 
Market Capitalization 0.006 -0.061 0.007 
 (0.000) (0.041) (0.001) 
Return on Assets  0.001 0.043 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
R&D 0.000 0.016 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.039) (0.000) 
Consumer Orientation 0.002 0.375 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.055) (0.003) 
GDP 0.002 0.392 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.134) (0.001) 
Area (Size) -0.001 -0.383 -0.003 
 (0.000) (0.110) (0.001) 
Population 0.002 0.133 -0.006 
 (0.000) (0.156) (0.011) 
Storm 0.008 0.119 0.004 
 (0.003) (1.121) (0.011) 
Flood 0.001 0.015 0.055 
 (0.002) (0.021) (0.011) 
Earthquake 0.029 1.215 -0.017 
 (0.003) (0.133) (0.036) 
Mass Movement Dry -0.005 0.006 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.000) (0.012) 
Mass Movement Wet -0.000 0.008 0.230 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.209) 
Deaths -0.044 -9.153 -0.001 
 (0.040) (42.272) (0.001) 
People Affected 0.000 -0.180 1,276.850 
 (0.000) (0.380) (811.887) 
Economic Cost 123.098 5.871 -0.000 
 (134.505) (0.414) (0.000) 
Annual Number of disasters (Country) -0.000 -0.043 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) 
Annual Number of disasters (World) -0.000 0.011 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) 
Newsworthy events 0.003 0.073 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.050) (0.001) 
Constant -0.098 -24.650 0.046 
 (0.008) (3.345) (0.039) 
Observations 1,713,250 1,713,250 1,713,250 
Number of events 3,115 3,115 3,115 
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 Model 1 (RE) Model 2 (MC Logit) Model 3 (FE) 
Country FE   YES 
Year FE   YES 
Month FE   YES 
Firm FE   YES 
Clustered-by-event bootstrapped errors in parentheses. Fixed-effects model with month-, year-, country-, and firm-by-country effects 
  
The results suggest that the level of market competition has an inverse effect in the 
willingness of business decision makers to opt into the provision of collective goods 
(Models 1 to 3). That is, being a member of exclusive markets, as measured by the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, is associated with a relatively high donation frequency and 
magnitude. An affiliated firm operating in a relatively concentrated market is 2.6 times 
more likely to engage in disaster giving than a similar firm operating in a market one 
standard deviation more fragmented. Likewise, its donation amount is expected to be 
11.6 percent bigger, which is in line with H2a. This finding not only contests the 
prediction of standard economic theory,33 but it is also inconsistent with empirical work 
in the management literature. Management scholars have suggested that the benefits of 
investing in corporate pro-social behavior are relatively large in competitive industries 
when such behavior acts as a signal of product quality (Fernández‐Kranz & Santaló, 
2010; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). 
With respect to H2b, the results suggest that the effect of central intervention on 
corporate giving depends on whether funding comes from inside or outside the market 
system. Models 1 to 3 show that affiliated firms reduce frequency and magnitude of 
provision of collective goods in proportion with increases in local government’s 
financing. An increase of one standard deviation in the degree of local government 
                                                 
33 See Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) for a discussion. 
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intervention is associated with a reduction of four percent in the average affiliated firm’s 
donation amount (model 1) and a drop in the donation frequency (model 2). A potential 
explanation is that firms see local government intervention as an expected function of the 
club agency—an argument that is tested in the following model. The observation of 
incomplete crowding-out opposes the prediction of neutrality of some social-preferences 
models (cf., Bénabou & Tirole, 2006). Additionally, the observed negative effect of local 
intervention contradicts strategic considerations models that predict foreign firms’ 
motivation to mimic the host country government’s response to obtain the favor of local 
policymakers (cf., Marquis & Qian, 2013; Zhang & Luo, 2013). On the other hand, 
foreign aid increases the donation magnitude of  affiliated sample firms by about 3.7 
percent (model 1), which challenges public-economics theories that external intervention 
crowds out local response (Cavallo & Daude, 2011).  
Regarding H2c, I found that different dimensions of the perception of national 
political and institutional development may have a divergent impact on the corporate 
provision of collective goods. On the one hand, improvements in local regulatory quality 
are associated with surges in affiliated firms’ donation size and frequency. Given that 
regulatory quality measures the public’s perception of the local government’s 
performance to regulate and promote the private sector’s development, it is expected that 
firms are willing to contribute to the agency when this perception is relatively high. In 
such cases, firms are able to satisfy the impact question of their giving. On the other 
hand, a one-standard deviation improvement in government effectiveness leads to 
reductions of 0.90 percent in the size of the donation (model 1) and 17 percent in the 
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probability of affiliated firms’ giving (model 2). Given the information that government 
effectiveness is aimed to capture, one interpretation is that firms that consider the agency 
a viable mechanism to manage public goods also see it as having a high capacity to 
manage shocks. Therefore, they prefer to allocate corporate resources in markets with 
greater levels of vulnerability where the risk of shortage of collective goods is higher.  
In agreement with H2d, the results suggest that social standing motivates the pro-
social behavior of economically affiliated firms. Affiliated firms are more likely to 
donate with every one-standard deviation increase in social standing. Additionally, an 
increase in the level of standing is associated with a greater donation (0.10 percent) vis-à-
vis a firm whose standing remained the same. This means that sample market systems 
rely on firms with high standing to cope with the scarcity of collective goods in the 
context of sudden systemic shocks.  
Robustness  
Further identification strategy with matching 
One concern in my study is that the decision to enter a market is endogenous to the 
likelihood of engaging in philanthropic disaster response. That is, given the geographical 
(and, thus, political, and socioeconomic) heterogeneity in the context of disaster risk, 
firms with a similar propensity to give self-select into specific market systems. The 
econometric problem here is that donating and economic reliance are both moving in the 
same direction as an unobserved factor (e.g., adversity to systemic risk), which prevents 
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an observation of the causal effect of economic reliance on the frequency and magnitude 
of giving.  
To mitigate the occurrence of this issue, I applied coarsened exact matching (CEM) 34 
(Iacus, King, & Porro, 2008, 2011) to balance the baseline propensity to engage in pro-
social behavior between the treatment (i.e., firms with at least one affiliate in the affected 
country) and the control groups (i.e., firms with no presence in the market). To conduct 
the match, I draw on the literature in philanthropy and, specifically, corporate disaster 
giving.35 CEM was carried out with no replacement using the following variables: 
primary industry, number of employees, market capitalization, market capitalization, 
headquarters country of ultimate parent, total revenue, and return on assets.36 Pre- and 
post-descriptive statistics were compared in the treatment and control groups for 
assessing quality. Additionally, I calculated measures of imbalance as suggested by Iacus 
et al., ( 2008). The main results hold in the matched sample, which I include in the 
Appendix in addition to the matching summary.  
Additionally, a plausible argument is that the effect of economic reliance on the 
provision of collective goods is heterogeneous across events. For some shocks, economic 
reliance may have relatively little effect because of the magnitude of news coverage 
(Stromberg, 2007). For instance, events such as Hurricane Katrina in the U.S. and the 
2010 earthquake in Haiti were certain to receive philanthropic giving irrespective of the 
                                                 
34 See (King, Nielsen, Coberley, Pope, & Wells, 2011)  for a comparative assessment of the 
effectiveness of matching methods.  
35 (cf., Crampton and Patten 2008, Marquis et al. 2007, Muller et al. 2014, Patten 2008, Tilcsik and 
Marquis 2013, Whiteman et al. 2005) 
36 I targeted a treatment-to-control ratio of 1:10, but tested up to 1:2 for robustness. 
 
38 
 
economic connection of the organization. Therefore, it is likely that the studied 
association is stronger for events whose probability of being in the news is relatively low. 
Thus, I followed Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) and conducted robustness analyses 
limiting the sample to disasters with a probability of being in the news of 50 percent and 
lower. I also run analyses including countries that never received donations from firms, 
which does not affect the estimates.  
Testing alternative explanations from social preferences and strategic considerations 
In this sub-section, I discuss several potential problems of identification and test the 
robustness of my approach to the inclusion of social-preferences and strategic-
considerations factors. On the one hand, social-preferences’ impure-altruism and 
neoinstitutionalism models advance three predictions regarding firms’ engagement in the 
provision of collective goods. First, because members of the firm are embedded in 
societal arrangements that foster their cognitive membership to communities (Berry, 
Guillén, & Zhou, 2010; Galaskiewicz, 1997; Marquis et al., 2007; Powell, 1991), a 
“normative pressure on the company” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Patten, 2008) exerts a 
particular influence in the pro-social behavior of the geographically proximate 
organization. This argument provides a simpler explanation to the main relationship of 
this study. Ceteris paribus, there exists a direct association between physical presence, or 
local embeddedness, and pro-social behavior.37 Hence, economic reliance would be a 
                                                 
37 According to Uzzi (1996) “organization networks operate on a logic of exchange which differs from 
the logic of markets. I refer to this exchange logic as "embeddedness" because ongoing social ties shape 
actors' expectations and opportunities in ways that differ from the economic logic of market behavior.”  
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second order measure that could be obviated because the effect of an economic firm-
market linkage is captured by differentiating firms based on geographic presence. I tested 
this argument with the binary variable physical presence that takes value “1” when the 
firm has any type of affiliate in the focal country. Such relationship resulted inverse as 
shown in Table 8, suggesting that the mechanism driving this form of corporate pro-
social behavior is more complex than geographic location or embeddedness alone and 
that the measure of economic reliance better captures such complexity. 
A second prediction suggests that inequity aversion drives pro-social behavior and, 
thus, affiliated firms will mostly give to economically underdeveloped markets (Fehr, 
Naef, & Schmidt, 2006; Jaramillo, Kempf, & Moizeau, 2003). To test this argument, I 
regressed an interaction of economic reliance and degree of poverty proxied by the 
poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (as a percentage of population).38 As 
shown in Table 9 in the Appendix, I found that sample firms donate in a lower magnitude 
to poorer countries than to higher-income countries. A third prediction suggests that 
employees of affiliated firms seek to satisfy their reciprocal preferences and this fuels the 
response from top managers (Camerer & Fehr, 2002; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Simpson 
& Willer, 2008). Using data from my dataset, I analyzed the interaction between the 
binary variable employee-driven donation and economic reliance. Table 10 shows that a 
negative coefficient suggests that employees’ social preferences crowd out the firm’s 
magnitude of pro-social behavior. 
                                                 
38 See Anand and Sen (1994 and 2000) for a discussion on this measurement.  
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On the other hand, the strategic-philanthropy literature offers another set of 
alternative predictions. First, the null hypothesis to H2a captures an argument built on the 
resource-based theory of the firm. If there is a market demand for corporate pro-social 
behavior that is discoverable for market competitors, some firms may engage in the 
provision of collective goods in the hope of achieving or sustaining a competitive 
advantage. Firms strive to capture socially responsible consumers by connecting the 
demand of their private goods to the provision of a collective good ( McWilliams and 
Siegel 2010, Bagnoli and Watts 2003). Monopolistic markets may entail lower incentives 
for firms to invest in reputational capital because the internalization of reputation 
spillovers is relatively low (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006). However, the analyses consistently 
reject such argument and suggest that monopolistic firms are the type of organization that 
frequently engages in this form of pro-social behavior and tend to give the largest 
amounts.  
A third prediction suggests that business organizations tend to construct their socially 
beneficial behavior in accordance with signals coming from central agencies such as the 
national government. Managers acting strategically invest in government transferences 
(e.g., operating privileges) to improve their market standing [i.e., rent-seeking and special 
interest groups may develop (Olson, 1971)] and the approval of the local community [i.e., 
a social license to operate (Boutilier & Thomson, 2011; Howard-Grenville, 2008; 
Wilburn & Wilburn, 2011)]. Therefore, firms increase donating in response to the 
intervention of government agencies. The null hypothesis to  
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Hypothesis 2.b (H2b): captures this argument, which was systematically rejected for 
the case of local government intervention. The results suggest that local government’s 
disaster financing crowds out affiliated firms’ giving.   
Lastly, strategic-philanthropy theories suggest that low-standing organizations are 
relatively likely to engage in the provision of collective goods because the marginal 
utility of reputational capital is higher for this type of firm than for high-standing firms 
(Crampton & Patten, 2008; Godfrey et al., 2009; Porter & Kramer, 2002). The several 
analyses, including the coarsened-exact matched models, provide evidence of the 
opposite argument.  
DISCUSSION  
This study investigates the mechanisms and conditions under which firms’ economic 
reliance to markets affects willingness to provide collective goods. Using arguably the 
largest dataset on disaster giving to date, I identified the existence of a causal process 
moderated by four main factors in line with the predictions of the theory of clubs 
(Berglas, 1976; Buchanan, 1965; Sandler, 2013).  The setting of business responses to 
global natural disasters allowed me to test and confirm the main relationship and the role 
of market exclusivity, firm standing, central intervention, and quality of governance 
across several organization-, industry-, home and host country-, and time-specific factors. 
In sum, my study evidences that integrating variation in firms-market economic reliance 
leads to a more accurate prediction of corporate engagement in collective-goods 
provision than theoretical arguments than do not account for such relationship. 
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Contributions to the non-market strategy literature  
Whereas much prior work in the CSR literature has focused on the internal and 
external determinants of pro-social behavior, my study uncovers a form of strategic 
consideration whose effect remains understudied (cf., Aguinis and Glavas, 2012; 
McWilliams, Siegel, and Wright, 2006; Mellahi et al., 2015). The effect of economic 
reliance is not explained by the traditional strategic considerations such as reputational 
capital with internal (Flammer & Luo, 2015) and external stakeholders (Muller & 
Kräussl, 2011), a social license to operate (Wilburn & Wilburn, 2011), an agency cost 
(Jia & Zhang, 2011), or institutional pressures (Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). Likewise, it is 
not captured by social-preference theories such as altruism (Batson & Powell, 2003), 
reciprocity (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006), fairness (Kahneman et al., 1986), or a warm glow 
(Andreoni, 1990).  Additionally, the explanatory power of economic reliance is not 
equaled by physical distance (Muller & Whiteman, 2008) or embeddedness (Jamali & 
Neville, 2011). 
The results suggest that a theory based on economic reliance provides a clear 
identification of the set of business decision-makers that are prone to behave pro-socially. 
The observation of pro-social behavior among firms with no clear economic reliance is, 
in fact, a test of the criterion of falsifiability (Popper, 1963). The frequency and 
magnitude of such behavior is better characterized by broader public-goods systems. That 
is, a corporation with no economic reliance may donate to a country affected by a 
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disaster, but the likelihood of not observing a donation (i.e., free riding) is relatively 
large.  
Additionally, my study advances the literature on global CSR. Both the theoretical 
and empirical literatures in CSR in an international context remain underdeveloped 
(Kitzmueller & Shimshack, 2012). Traditionally, pro-social behavior has been studied at 
the country level and, although there have been influential studies on corporate disaster 
giving using a multi-country setting, these limit to one event affecting several countries 
(Whiteman et al., 2005) or a few single-country events (Madsen & Rodgers, 2014). 
Furthermore, the literature has neglected the study of firms with an emerging country of 
origin, particularly when they give abroad. My dataset enables overcoming challenges of 
data quality and mitigates the risks of measurement error and omitted-variable bias that 
have been a concern regarding the findings of observational studies in developing 
countries (Mellahi et al., 2015).    
Contributions to other literatures 
My study also makes relevant contributions to the institutional, stakeholder literatures 
and industry self-regulation literatures. First, using this empirical setting to evaluate the 
role of sociopolitical dynamics is particularly valuable for the development of 
institutional and organizational theory. My findings suggest that the role of institutional 
quality on the willingness to give of economically reliant companies is more complex 
than it has been traditionally suggested in the extant literature. On the one hand, firms 
consider the general capacity of the government to implement policies and regulations 
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that assure the effective use of private giving and facilitate the maximization of its 
positive impact. This conclusion conforms with past work showing that institutional 
underdevelopment creates challenges for the establishment of CSR (Marquis & Qian, 
2013; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Conversely, a negative perception 
of the capacity of the local government raises the disaster giving of an average sample 
firm. Hence, taken together, my study offers a more nuanced understanding of the role of 
institutional forces in disciplining firms into a certain pro-social behavior than previous 
studies. 
Second, a contribution to stakeholder theory centers on the emphasis of my 
theoretical approach on the time and spatial distribution of firm-market linkages. My 
study informs about the mechanisms and conditions under which geographically located 
customers, competitors, and governments become salient stakeholders for the 
organization. The relative standing of the firm and the degree of market competition are 
two elements necessary to understand when and how power dependence, need for 
legitimacy, and urgency vary across firm-stakeholder relationships (Mitchell, Agle, & 
Wood, 1997).  
Scholars have shown how stakeholder attention explains competitive advantages out 
of corporate disaster giving (Crampton & Patten, 2008; Madsen & Rodgers, 2014). A 
promissory avenue of research is the investigation of the role of social standing in the 
ability of the firm to attract stakeholder attention and, more importantly, approval to its 
pro-social choices. For instance, does a firm with relatively high standing in a given 
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market need to invest significantly more in pro-social behavior than a lower-standing 
firm in order to capture rents? 
Additionally, the finding regarding the role of market competition poses an 
interesting paradox and challenges paradigms in public economics (Bénabou & Tirole, 
2006; Cowling & Mueller, 1978). My study suggests that monopolies act as stop-loss 
mechanisms in the presence of disruptive shocks that overwhelm the financial capacity of 
national governments. Given the worldwide interest on antitrust regulation (Woodruff, 
2006), an interesting research extension may target a more detailed estimate of the net 
social value of monopolies, taking into consideration both market and non-market 
dimensions of business strategy.      
Third, my findings provide scholars in the industry self-regulation a context to 
increase their understanding of the role of internationalization and country-specific 
factors on the industry-related factors that affect collective action. For instance, taken 
together, the frequency of exposure to systemic shocks that affect local industries is 
higher for multinational enterprises (MNEs) than for single-country firms. Accordingly, 
disasters are relatively likely to affect how industry dynamics impact the strategic 
trajectory of MNEs. In this sense, the study of global systemic shocks provides a good 
setting for the evaluation of cross-national heterogeneity in the predictions of industry 
self-regulation regarding pro-social behavior. Moreover, the effect of systemic shocks on 
the capacity of industry-based collectivities to overcome collective action problems 
remains understudied (Baron, 2001; Ostrom, 2003; Prakash & Potoski, 2007). In this 
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sense, scholars conducting single-country studies have made progress in the 
conceptualization of (geographically circumscribed) business communities (Tilcsik & 
Marquis, 2013). My study suggests a method to replicate such endeavor in a multi-
country setting.  
Additional limitations and boundary conditions of my study are associated with its 
focus on large, publicly traded firms. Although this type of organization accounted for 
nearly 90 percent of the recorded corporate donations the observed period (and, thus, 
selection bias is mitigated), smaller and/or private firms may follow unique mechanisms 
and conditions when behaving pro-socially. Future work based on case studies may better 
complete our understanding of private provision of collective goods by unpacking such 
factors. This effort also would provide a finer grained understanding of the relationship 
between economic reliance and the geographic distribution of club systems particularly in 
countries with large territories.  
Managerial and policy implications 
The practical implications of my study are related with the economic significance of 
the findings. The average contribution from sample firms to the relief and recovery fund 
of any given studied disaster is almost $1.6 million; more than the median annual 
contribution of $1.5 to higher education by the largest 271 companies worldwide in 2014 
(CECP, 2015). In any given year, the accumulated giving to disasters worldwide may 
account for more than the annual CSR budget of the corporation. The occurrence of a 
highly-devastated disaster in a country where the corporation has significant stake may 
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lead the firm to allocate to disaster aid more than the budget for all social areas for years 
to come. This finding corroborates the recurrent argument raised by the managers 
interviewed in preparation for this study. For example, Anglo American’s donation for 
the Chilean disaster in 2010 was greater than $10 million surpassing the mining 
company’s $8-million annual CSR budget in Chile, a market to which the company was 
highly reliant (0.49).39 Similarly, the $50 million that Cisco pledged in the aftermath of 
the 2008 Sichuan earthquake was worth more than three years of Cisco’s corporate social 
activity in China.40  
The social value of corporate disaster giving is likely to continue to rise. The 
inflation-adjusted costs of disasters have increased in the last four decades and the real 
value of the traditional public sources for financing such costs have dropped in the same 
period (United Nations, 2016). In the last 20 years, no other sector has increased its 
proportional participation in disaster response more than firms (Ballesteros & Useem, 
2015). Hence, information on the firm- and market-specific factors that foster corporate 
disaster giving may help managers in multilateral and national agencies to predict the 
influx of corporate giving to a disaster area and better plan requirements of public 
resources and issue aid appeals. This information would help better address an important 
public-policy issue by stimulating a structured and organized formal inclusion of 
corporate giving in disaster relief and recovery around the world.   
                                                 
39 Felipe Purcell, Vice President of Corporate Affairs in Chile, in interview with the author on 
10/19/2003.  
40 (Cisco, 2010). 
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APPENDIX 
Matching procedure 
I used no-replacement coarsened exact matched procedure in which I targeted a 
treatment-to-control ratio of 1:10, but tested up to 1:2 for robustness. To assess and 
mitigate the effect of spatial autocorrelation that may hamper econometrically efficient 
standard errors, I used the Freedman-Lane semi-partialing method (Dekker, Krackhardt, 
& Snijders, 2007) implemented as a linear probability model with fixed-effects for the 
treatment and control groups (Rogan & Sorenson, 2013). The sum of absolute differences 
across the multivariate histogram that has the following form: 𝐿(𝑡, 𝑐)
1
2𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘
𝑛|𝑡𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘 −
𝑐𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘|    . Where 𝑡𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘 is the relative frequency of the categorical variables for the firms in 
the treatment group and 𝑐𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘 is the correspondent number for the firms in the control 
group.41 A magnitude of 𝐿(𝑡, 𝑐)=0 means perfect balance while a magnitude of 1 
represents perfect separation.  
 
                                                 
41 The procedure to obtain the relative frequencies of the categorical variables is based on Iacus et al., 
(2008).   
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Table 7. The effect of economic reliance on corporate disaster giving (Coarsened-exact matching) 
VARIABLES Model 4 (RE)  
DV Amount (LN) 
Model 5 (MC Logit)  
DV: Donation Frequency 
Model 6 (FE) 
DV: Amount (LN) 
Economic Reliance 0.244 19.493 78.723 
 (0.054) (1.609) (22.327) 
Exclusivity x ER 0.126 0.557 -2.529 
 (0.005) (0.137) (1.572) 
Agency Intervention x ER -0.039 -0.531 -1.509 
 (0.002) (0.052) (0.396) 
External Intervention x ER 0.037 -0.072 -1.572 
 (0.002) (0.068) (0.716) 
Government Effectiveness x ER -0.005 -0.079 -0.502 
 (0.000) (0.014) (0.137) 
Regulatory Quality x ER 0.007 0.067 0.516 
 (0.000) (0.011) (0.128) 
Social Standing x ER 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exclusivity (Industry Concentration) 0.001 0.001 0.231 
 (0.001) (0.132) (0.276) 
Agency Intervention -0.002 -0.388 1.045 
 (0.001) (0.318) (0.383) 
External Intervention -0.001 -0.200 -0.028 
 (0.000) (0.117) (0.117) 
Government Effectiveness -0.000 0.039 -0.010 
 (0.000) (0.017) (0.017) 
Regulatory Quality 0.000 -0.017 -0.004 
 (0.000) (0.015) (0.015) 
Social Standing 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CONTROLS    
Number of Employees 0.001 0.078 -0.036 
 (0.000) (0.020) (0.038) 
Total Revenue -0.000 -0.011 0.049 
 (0.000) (0.041) (0.097) 
Market Capitalization -0.001 -0.066 -0.039 
 (0.001) (0.041) (0.103) 
Return on Assets 0.001 0.043 0.024 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.017) 
Consumer Orientation 0.005 0.419 0.209 
 (0.001) (0.056) (0.139) 
GDP 0.004 1.025 -0.573 
 (0.001) (0.386) (0.445) 
Area (Size) -0.001 -0.407 -0.294 
 (0.000) (0.121) (0.133) 
Population 0.003 -0.013 0.119 
 (0.000) (0.170) (0.198) 
Storm 0.011 3.609  
 (0.003) (1.173)  
Flood 0.002 3.373  
 (0.003) (1.154)  
Earthquake 0.035 6.095  
 (0.003) (1.172)  
Mass Movement Dry -0.006   
 (0.007)   
Mass Movement Wet 0.001   
 (0.003)   
Deaths 0.036 -32.824 202.022 
 (0.056) (42.089) (737.407) 
People Affected -0.000 -0.223 20.337 
 (0.000) (0.580) (6.168) 
Economic Cost 3,044.217 297,763.560 -9993698.328 
 (1,125.475) (792,109.162) (3907004.581) 
Annual Number of disasters (Country) -0.001 -0.049 -0.016 
 (0.000) (0.028) (0.041) 
Annual Number of disasters (World) -0.000 0.022 -0.018 
 (0.000) (0.009) (0.011) 
Newsworthy events 0.003 0.096 -0.116 
 (0.000) (0.051) (0.062) 
 (0.009) (4.062) (4.189) 
Observations 1,524,614 1,495,193 113,641 
Number of events 2,846 2,791 209 
Country FE   YES 
Year FE   YES 
Month Fes   YES 
Firm FE   YES 
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Table 8. Physical Presence and the Magnitude of Donation 
 Model 7 (RE) 
VARIABLES Dependent variable: USD Donation Amount (LN) 
  
Physical Presence -0.263 
 (0.033) 
Exclusivity x Presence -0.016 
 (0.006) 
External Int x Presence 0.002 
 (0.001) 
Agency Int x Presence 0.008 
 (0.001) 
Gov Effectiveness x Presence -0.001 
 (0.000) 
Reg Quality x Presence 0.001 
 (0.000) 
Standing x Presence 0.000 
 (0.000) 
Exclusivity (Industry Concentration) -0.001 
 (0.001) 
Agency Intervention -0.000 
 (0.001) 
External Intervention -0.001 
 (0.000) 
Social Standing 0.000 
 (0.000) 
Government Effectiveness -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Regulatory Quality -0.000 
 (0.000) 
CONTROLS  
Number of Employees 0.001 
 (0.000) 
Total Revenue -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Market Capitalization -0.001 
 (0.001) 
Return on Assets 0.000 
 (0.000) 
Consumer Orientation 0.005 
 (0.001) 
GDP 0.004 
 (0.001) 
Area (Size) -0.001 
 (0.000) 
Population -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Disaster Type -0.001 
People Killed 0.026 
 (0.020) 
People Affected -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Economic Cost 2,586.047 
 (236.313) 
Annual Number of disasters (Country) -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Annual Number of disasters (World) -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Newsworthy events 0.004 
 (0.000) 
Constant -0.062 
 (0.009) 
  
Observations 1,524,614 
Number of events 2,846 
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Clustered-by-event bootstrapped errors in parentheses.  
 
Table 9. Moderating Effect of Poverty  
 Model 9 (RE) 
VARIABLES Dependent variable: USD Donation Amount (LN) 
  
Economic Reliance 0.135 
 (0.015) 
Poverty x Economic Reliance -0.001 
 (0.000) 
Degree of Poverty 0.000 
 (0.000) 
Number of Employees 0.001 
 (0.000) 
Total Revenue -0.001 
 (0.000) 
Market Capitalization -0.001 
 (0.001) 
Return on Assets 0.001 
 (0.000) 
Consumer Orientation 0.004 
 (0.001) 
GDP 0.002 
 (0.000) 
Area (Size) -0.001 
 (0.000) 
Population 0.002 
 (0.000) 
Disaster Type -0.000 
 (0.000) 
People Killed 0.078 
 (0.020) 
People Affected/Population -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Economic Cost/GDP 2,408.327 
 (180.395) 
Annual Number of disasters (Country) -0.001 
 (0.000) 
Annual Number of disasters (World) -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Newsworthy events 0.004 
 (0.000) 
Constant -0.076 
 (0.009) 
  
Observations 1,524,614 
Number of events 2,846 
Clustered-by-event bootstrapped errors in parentheses with month and year dummies 
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Table 10. Moderating Effect of Employee-Initiated Giving  
VARIABLES Model 10 (MC Logit) 
Dependent variable: Donation 
Frequency  
Economic reliance  5.356 
 (0.420) 
Economic reliance x Employee Giving  -5.619 
 (1.556) 
Employee Giving 7.299 
 (1.064) 
Return on Assets % 0.012 
 (0.037) 
Consumer Orientation 0.689 
 (0.358) 
Industry -0.002 
 (0.011) 
Number of Employees 0.175 
 (0.170) 
Market Capitalization 0.348 
 (0.144) 
Population 0.338 
 (0.158) 
Area (Size) -0.506 
 (0.171) 
Annual Number of disasters (World) 1.198 
 (0.283) 
Annual Number of disasters (Country) 0.055 
 (0.227) 
Affected Population -0.367 
 (0.070) 
Economic Damage (USD Million) 0.061 
 (0.073) 
Deaths 0.413 
 (0.058) 
Storm 0.618 
 0.426 
Flood (1.182) 
 1.432 
Earthquake (1.148) 
 0.934 
Constant -19.249 
 (2.994) 
Observations 1,524,614.00 
Number of Events 2,846 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Firm-by-country fixed-effects. GDP-controlled 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The strategy literature has reached theoretical consensus that the decision to move 
first, imitate or deviate from the first mover’s choices is often associated with 
performance advantages (Fosfuri et al., 2013; Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013). Yet, the 
empirical work on the performance consequences of imitating or deviating is 
comparatively scarce (Posen et al., 2013). Furthermore, the theoretical literature on 
timing strategy has become progressively equivocal and some of its key predictions are 
often not supported in practice (Fosfuri et al., 2013; Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013). 
Consider the cases of the high performer Samsung leading the business response to 
the 2008 Sichuan earthquake and the much less profitable Nokia and Panasonic donating 
an identical amount as Samsung in the next couple of days. The responses spurred public 
backlash in the following weeks, including consumer boycotts decrying them as “a drop 
in the bucket”. Subsequently, Samsung’s choice was associated with losses not explained 
by its market operation, which defies the prediction that firms that perform well tend to 
accrue first-mover rents (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998). Moreover, it was not 
imitating the high-performing first mover which resulted in follower benefits (Gaba & 
Terlaak, 2013), but deviating from it. Such a decision paid off for firms like Sony, a late 
mover that accrued performance advantages despite giving an amount 50% smaller than 
Samsung’s (Xinhua News Agency, 2008). In contrast, in the aftermath of the 2010 
earthquake and tsunami in Chile, imitating the first mover Anglo American arguably paid 
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off for the higher-performing BHP Billiton. The Anglo American and its imitators 
realized performance benefits, while firms than deviated from Anglo American’s choice, 
such as Rio Tinto, faced performance losses.  
These examples suggest that the main predictions of the timing strategy literature may 
not apply in the case of non-market settings such as corporate disaster giving. A setting 
where informational and time constraints are pervasive (Kunreuther et al., 2002). 
Additionally, the literature on non-market strategy has shown that the performance 
consequences of pro-social behavior may depend on external stakeholder perceptions of 
contextual appropriateness of corporate behavior. That is, the degree firms’ choices 
satisfy their expectations and follow norms, rules, and customs (Madsen & Rodgers, 
2014; Marquis & Battilana, 2009; Marquis & Tilcsik, 2016). 
The fact that the literature on timing strategy has understudied the role of 
stakeholders (Fosfuri et al., 2013; Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013) is relevant because 
the measures that firms use to perceive the contextual appropriateness of business action 
may differ from the those used by stakeholders. For instance, Samsung’s high 
performance might have influenced Panasonic to imitate this first mover, as previous 
research suggests (Anderson, 2010; Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; Posen et al., 2013). 
Instead, customers in China might have focused on the accusations of unethical labor 
practices that Samsung was facing and other indications of its preexisting reputation 
when evaluating its donation.  
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I explore this intuition with a framework that enriches the effect of economic reliance 
on corporate disaster giving, explored in Chapter 1, with insights from institutional 
theory. My theoretical stance is that the performance consequences of moving first or 
following are frequently socially constructed under conditions of high environmental 
uncertainty, causal ambiguity, and time pressure. I ground my theoretical argumentation 
in the microfoundations of institutionalization (Powell & Colyvas, 2008) and particularly 
on the role of sensemaking: the process decision-makers use to generate an appropriate 
mental model of behavior that facilitate information processing and action (Weick, 1996). 
Under conditions of high informational and time constraints, situational awareness relies 
on cognitive referents—i.e., prominent and easy to collect firm-specific features that are 
not necessarily associated with the focal good or decision (Whiteman & Cooper, 2011). 
Cognitive referents signal a firm’s likelihood to select goods whose means and ends are 
contextually appropriate to replace objective measures of past performance on a focal 
decision (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Wry et al., 2014). 
I identify media reputation as a cognitive referent that external stakeholders 
recurrently use to form beliefs about a firm’s capacity and willingness to meet their 
expectations. Thus, reputable first movers are prone to gain first-mover advantages. The 
legitimization of their choices influences, for instance, consumers to increase willingness 
to pay for the firm’s goods (Sirsly & Lamertz, 2007) or investors to facilitate access to 
financing (Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014). Conversely, stakeholders perceive the 
choices of firms with preexisting bad reputations as symbolic or socially prejudicial 
(Cuypers et al., 2015). These firms are thus prone to suffer performance shortfalls. 
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The influence of a first mover’s reputation then spills over to impact followers. 
Imitating reputable firms generates legitimization for the follower that can override a bad 
reputation. For instance, despite facing allegations of damaging environmental practices a 
year before the 2010 disaster in Chile (KPMG, 2009), BHP Billiton gained rents by 
arguably imitating Anglo American that had been publicly recognized for its work with 
small farms. Similarly, imitating a first mover with a negative reputation is likely to result 
in spillover harm (Barnett & King, 2008). This explains why Panasonic obtained 
associated losses despite their good reputation as illustrated by its receipt of a 
sustainability award in 2007.  
Firms err frequently in their timing and imitation choices due to the salience of 
cognitive referents when making fast strategic decisions under high uncertainty and 
ambiguity (Kunreuther et al., 2002; Pahnke et al., 2015). Followers thus find difficult to 
divert from the choices of high-performing first movers (Henisz & Delios, 2001). They 
believe that high performers are comparatively successful in identifying stakeholder 
expectations (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013) and abiding by institutions (Rindova & 
Fombrun, 1999). This institutional pressure thus exacerbates the negative consequences 
of the divergence in cognitive referents between firms and stakeholders because firms 
with bad reputations see moving first as a chance to accumulate reputational capital 
(Muller & Kräussl, 2011). Hence, imitation bandwagons often lead to systemic 
performance losses. 
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The setting of corporate disaster giving offers several benefits for the study of timing 
advantages. First, it is subject to fewer of the endogeneity concerns that constrain the 
development of the literature on timing advantages. For example, the exogenous nature of 
the disaster mitigates the risk of reverse causality between the organizational choice and 
firm performance. Second, it allows me to overcome some of the measurement problems 
that are common in the empirical literature on imitation  (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; 
Posen et al., 2013). The financial value and the timing of the donation are unambiguous 
and measurable under objective criteria in my setting. Third, high informational 
constraints and time pressure are pervasive for firms and stakeholders (Camerer & 
Kunreuther, 1989; Lampel et al., 2009). Almost 84% of corporate donations are pledged 
within one month of the disaster date, when information about the impact to the firm and 
the market, stakeholder needs, and the material consequences of donations is scarce. As 
expected, imitation is a recurrent phenomenon worldwide with the companies donating 
the same amount as the first mover in 64% of the events with corporate responses. 
Finally, the vastly increasing role that business intervention is playing in disaster 
response represents a novel phenomenon for societies worldwide, limiting the ability of 
stakeholders to objectively predict the efficiency of corporate giving (Ballesteros et al., 
2017). 
The main identification strategy relies on the implementation of a quasi-experimental 
technique: the synthetic control method (SCM) (Abadie, Diamond, & Hainmueller, 
2015). SCM is similar to matching techniques but, instead of unit-by-unit matching, it 
uses an algorithm to generate a weighted combination of multiple control entities: a 
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synthetic control. SCM is efficient for empirical settings where the focus is on aggregate 
entities (e.g., organizations) and the pool of potential controls (e.g., first donors) is small. 
Furthermore, SCM accounts for unobserved time-variant heterogeneity in panel data that 
traditional quasi-experimental designs, such as differences-in-differences, cannot (Abadie 
et al., 2015).    
My findings suggest that the divergence in cognitive referents between firms and 
stakeholders is enduring even when the degrees of uncertainty and ambiguity subside. 
The effects of financial performance and reputation on business and stakeholder decision-
making, respectively, are robust across firms, industries, countries, events, and time. The 
fact that using concepts from prior research alone cannot solve the puzzle of why timing 
choices based on financial standing have varying material consequences suggests that 
theoretically distinguishing between the referents used by firms and stakeholders 
contributes to the literature on timing strategy. By merging the idea of economic reliance 
based on club-goods theory from Chapter 1 with insight from institutional theory, my 
study offers a method to better predict first-mover rents. Additionally, it adds to the scant 
scholarship on the efficiency of imitation.  
My findings also contribute to the literature on the performance consequences of 
corporate pro-social behavior. The results show that disaster giving is a non-market area 
where firm choices are not strongly correlated with the social need, yet this variance is 
not directly proportional to the scale of the rents received: firms may accrue rents despite 
their donation being socially suboptimal. This proposes that the rents generated in 
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institutional contexts, like the aftermath of disasters, are more a function of the perceived 
contextual appropriateness of the corporate response than a function of its objective 
social value. 
THEORY  
Timing advantages 
The timing of choosing or implementing a high-stakes decision is an important factor 
in the relationship between strategy and firm performance, and scholars in the strategy 
(Mitchell, 1991), organizational theory (Hannan & Freeman, 1993), marketing (Kerin, 
Varadarajan, & Peterson, 1992), and innovation literatures (Foster, 1988) have long 
reached that consensus.42 However, the performance consequences of moving first or 
leading vis-à-vis delaying a response or following remains the source of a theoretical 
debate, and its verification an open empirical question (Fosfuri et al., 2013; Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 2013).  Moreover, the scope of the work has largely been focused upon 
market entry and, particularly, new-market entry, a highly consequential but rare business 
decision (Klingebiel & Joseph, 2015). 
Despite such active debate and limitations, the literature has achieved strong 
agreement on the conceptual frameworks around the association between timing and 
competitive advantages, and there are two ubiquitous and largely accepted arguments 
                                                 
42 The study of timing advantages has spanned a wide range of topics such as market barriers in 
industrial-organization economics (von Weizsacker, 1980), product innovation in business strategy 
(Agarwal & Gort, 2001), consumer-preference formation in marketing (Carpenter & Nakamoto, 1988), and 
legitimacy in institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
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(Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013). First, decision-making under uncertainty and time 
constraints entails a trade-off between learning and seizing a market opportunity. 
Delaying or deferring a response mitigates the risk of erring by allowing time to obtain 
relevant information on stakeholder expectations and the institutional environment  
(Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). At the same time, competitive advantages have, by nature, a 
narrow window of opportunity (Suarez, Grodal, & Gotsopoulos, 2015). The second 
argument is that resolving the tradeoff between learning and acting to choose the optimal 
timing is associated with the possession of strategic resources whose unequal distribution 
across firms explains the creation, allocation, and sustainability of market rents (Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2015). 
 
Gaining timing advantages by responding to disasters 
Engaging in disaster relief and recovery by donating cash, products or services, or 
taking active roles in post-disaster logistics is not a new societal function for firms, as 
reports date back to the late 1800s (Alessi, 1975). In recent years, however, corporate 
disaster giving has reached a new scale in the non-market repertoire worldwide. For 
instance, the proportion of the 3,000 largest firms at the international level that engage in 
disaster giving went from 34% in 1990 to over 91% in 2015. Most of this growth has 
occurred in the last 10 years, when the real average disaster donation grew 10 times to 
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reach $1.6 million.43 For some disasters in the past six years, corporate giving surpassed 
the combined donations from foreign governments, multilateral agencies, NGOs, and 
individual charity (Ballesteros et al., 2017). In any given year, the accumulated donation 
to disaster relief and recovery may be larger than the annual social budget of the 
corporation and firms often reduce other expenditure to allocate resources to these 
unpredictable phenomena (Ballesteros, 2015; Useem et al., 2015).  
Studies usefully have shown in the context of their samples that corporate donors aim 
to accumulate reputational capital (Muller & Kräussl, 2011), restore strategic club goods 
(Ballesteros, 2015), and respond to institutional forces (Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013; Zhang 
& Luo, 2013). 44  By doing so, donors often accrue rents (Crampton & Patten, 2008; 
Madsen & Rodgers, 2014). The analyses in this nascent literature, however, lack 
consideration of the role that the timing of the corporate engagement may have in this 
process.  
For most accounts, this process occurs in stable institutional contexts with clear 
referents for what constitutes appropriateness in corporate behavior (Thornton, Ocasio, & 
Lounsbury, 2012). Particularly, the institutional literature proposes that firms encounter 
and follow enduring geographically located pressures (Marquis & Battilana, 2009). Firms 
are fungible entities of the geographical market, and the timing of making high-stakes 
decisions is an extension of customs, norms, and laws (Marquis & Qian, 2013; Zhang & 
                                                 
43 As a reference, the median annual contribution to secondary education of companies worldwide 
went from $1.8 to $1.5 million during the same period (CECP, 2015). 
44 In addition to the referred reports, the author conducted interviews with managers of corporations 
donating to the 2010 earthquake and tsunami in Chile and the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan. 
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Luo, 2013). Decision-makers are either “cultural dopes” that align to institutional logics 
or “change agents” that disrupt the status quo with institutional entrepreneurship (Tracey, 
Philips, & Jarvis, 2010; Wry, Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2011). Thus, a normative pressure 
should drive the timing of giving (Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991; Marquis et al., 2013). 
Under this approach, timing benefits arise when a firm’s decision to give first or defer 
their response better meets the model of contextual appropriateness than do the choices of 
competitors. 
However, studies in economics (Andreoni, 2006), social psychology (Simonsohn & 
Ariely, 2008), and institutional theory (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015; Marquis & Lee, 2013) 
suggest that under extreme environmental uncertainty, ambiguity, and time constraints, 
the institutional assimilation of new phenomena is more complex than the extant 
literature has portrayed. The availability of institutional tools to navigate informational 
and time constraints has been “taken-for-granted” (Powell & Colyvas, 2008) and the 
argument that revealed stakeholder expectations govern corporate action is difficult to 
support in chaotic contexts such as the aftermath of disasters.   
Environmental uncertainty 
Responding to disasters poses a “formidable challenge” not only to naïve decision-
makers, but also to users of logic and probability (Kunreuther et al., 2002). Firms are 
increasingly exposed to suffer the negative effects of disasters due to economic 
interdependencies and the internationalization of the business activity (Oh & Oetzel, 
2011). These material and human impacts to the firm and the market are often difficult to 
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estimate. Hence, managers may make decisions that conflict with the logics of market 
operation (Lampel et al., 2009). The chief risk officer of a U.S. firm, a donor to the 2011 
disaster in East Japan, recalls one part of this struggle: 
 “… “We have two large plants in Japan…The east coast plant was damaged, and it took 
our capacity offline for months. And that had a significant impact on our earnings and 
ability to supply parts so we lost significant market share during that period. It has taken 
us 18 to 24 months to regain the share that we lost.”45 
In addition, unlike other non-market areas, information on the social need is often 
unavailable or inaccurate for months. Firms are rarely provided with a description of the 
damage, what aid is needed, by whom, and where (Fritz, 2004). Therefore, when firms 
make donation decisions they sometimes use referents not necessarily associated with the 
emergency. For example, Anglo American considered its annual social budget in Chile as 
a referent for its donation and, in this way, the firm could respond quickly becoming the 
first corporate donor.46  
Causal ambiguity  
Although a consensus in the specialized literature is that disaster giving is associated 
with market rents (e.g., Crampton & Patten, 2008; Madsen & Rodgers, 2014; Muller & 
Kräussl, 2011), a normative assessment of the characteristics of the donation that 
maximizes the expected benefits is a complex task for the average decision-maker 
(Kunreuther et al., 2002). Corporate disaster giving is an infrequent and unstructured 
activity for most firms (Ballesteros, 2015). Unlike other areas, a projection in the annual 
                                                 
45 (Kunreuther, Michel-Kerjan, & Useem, n.d.). 
46 VP of Corporate Affairs in interview with the author.  
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financial plan is uncharacteristic and a cost-benefit assessment of different donation 
choices is rare.  
Furthermore, the uniqueness of disasters in terms of their frequency and effects 
constrains the value of experience. Firms often have to deal with temporal institutional 
arrangements and societal contexts for which they lack information (Klinenberg, 2003). 
They are involved with myriad non-traditional stakeholders whose strategic role is 
difficult to discern. Moreover, these stakeholders commonly lack the resources to assess 
the social value of the corporate response (Useem et al., 2015). Is $10 million too much 
or too little from the social standpoint?  
Time pressure 
Firms face a decisive tradeoff when they engage in disaster giving. Waiting can bring 
relevant data to mitigate causal ambiguity. Laggards will have a richer understanding of 
the association between corporate responses and stakeholder reactions than early movers 
had. Yet, traditionally, all corporate aid comes within the first two post-disaster months. 
This suggests that the opportunity of making a move to capture rents has a shorter 
timespan than other strategic areas. The longer the organization waits to respond, the 
lower the likelihood of realizing performance benefits. In such conditions of urgency, 
decision makers cannot engage in lengthy processes of exploration (Kaplan, 2008).  
In response to the concerns regarding the ability of the extant literature to capture the 
role that extreme informational constraints and time pressure plays in the antecedents and 
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consequences of organizational decision-making, recent scholarship has brought attention 
to the microfoundations of institutionalization (Powell & Colyvas, 2008). Its proponents 
contend the need for a more nuanced characterization of the role of decision-makers in 
institutional evolution, not only passively behaving, but also choosing; not only aligning, 
but also creating to institutional referents (Powell & Colyvas, 2008).  
This scholarship suggests the existence of environmental contexts where decision-
makers confront a unique experience with no reference to probability estimates (Lampel 
et al., 2009). Normative mechanisms like legislation are often nonexistent and replaced 
by learning, benchmarking, and voluntarism (Lepoutre, Dentchev, & Heene, 2007). A 
pertinent question of the microfoundations of institutionalization is how expectations 
regarding contextual appropriateness emerge in the first place. In addition to the 
theoretical gap, applying this inquiry to the studied setting has important practical 
implications. The global salience of disasters give corporate responders high visibility 
that exacerbates the material consequences of their choices (Eisensee & Strömberg, 2007; 
Franks, 2013): given the fast-paced decision making, how peer firms and stakeholders 
solve uncertainty and ambiguity to identify responses that meet stakeholder expectations?  
Economic Reliance and Rents 
Disasters are most likely to link with a strategic value for the firm when they diminish 
or disrupt market welfare and, consequently, their firms’ performance (Hoffman & 
Ocasio, 2001; Lampel et al., 2009). The larger the share of a company’s income from a 
given market, the larger the importance of an event disrupting the market’s status quo 
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(Ballesteros, 2015). Consequently, the economic consequences of responding to a given 
disaster should be directly proportional on their firms’ economic reliance on disaster-
exposed market (Gavetti, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2007). 
This focus of business managers on a market’s recovery is in line with a theoretical 
expectation that pro-social behavior becomes strategic when it not only helps society but 
also the company itself, reducing the real cost of corporate giving (cf., Godfrey, 2005; 
Porter & Kramer, 2002; Saiia et al., 2003; Wokutch et al., 2013). In other words, 
although corporate disaster giving may be driven by social preferences, such as altruism 
and reciprocity (Muller, Pfarrer, & Little, 2014), business managers strategically are 
likely to focus their pro-social behavior in disaster-affected nations where the direct and 
indirect business implications for the firms are greatest (Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2009; 
Sandler, 2013). The self-interested premise that a firm’s performance may be weakened if 
the market is not soon restored may thus have the unintended effect of driving a firm to 
invest private resources where the gap in international aid is largest. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The likelihood of obtaining performance benefits from corporate 
disaster giving is directly proportional with the firm’s economic reliance with the 
affected market.  
At the same time, some business decision makers are prone to lead or follow because 
they the perceived cost-benefit of this strategy is associated with their reliance to the 
affected market. I argue that the motives of acting are particularly salient for 
organizations with a significant economic affiliation to the market system. Market-related 
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sunk costs drive the firm to participate in economic processes that are relevant for firm 
performance (Ordanini, Rubera, & DeFillippi, 2008). Recent studies show, for instance, 
that the share of an organization’s income dependent on a given market is a predictor of 
its willingness to contribute to that market’s recovery in the aftermath of systemic shocks 
(e.g., Ballesteros, 2015; Muller & Whiteman, 2008). Furthermore, an economic 
affiliation provides an institutional pressure that legitimates making a material 
commitment regarding a high-stake decision (i.e., leading) a more socially accepted 
alternative than deferring the response (Zhang & Luo, 2013).  
A spokesperson for the pharmaceutical company GSK captured this argument when 
explaining why the firm had donated a large amount in the aftermath of an earthquake in 
China in 2008, “We have a lot of business in vaccines and consumer health care goods in 
China. Our donation reflects…our commitment to the Chinese people,” she said.47 
Consequently, firms with little economic affiliation in the market are, on average, 
more likely to defer decisions whose pay-offs are highly ambiguous (Ballesteros, 2015). 
The potential costs of the decision outweigh the uncertain material rewards. Following 
this argument, I suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a (H1. a). The degree of economic reliance to the affected country is 
inversely proportional to the timing of the donation  
Sensemaking under Uncertainty and Ambiguity  
                                                 
47 (Associated Press, 2008). 
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The chaotic context generated by disasters is associated with a collapse in the mental 
processes that facilitate deliberative thinking (Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989; Weick, 
1996). In the face of high informational and time constraints, the micro-processes behind 
the generation of institutions are simple and aimed at interpretation (Weick, 1996; Wry et 
al., 2014). Firms and stakeholders undertake processes aimed at constructivism and focus 
on prominent and widely available signals whose gathering entails a low transactional 
cost (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). These cognitive referents are the basis of measures of 
appropriateness that are valid in a specific socioeconomic context where decisions and 
exchanges of goods take place and help decision-makers interpret the potential 
consequences of behavior (Bitektine, 2011).  
Sensemaking has implications on the microlevel outcomes behind stakeholders 
punishing or rewarding firms for their choices (Whiteman & Cooper, 2011). Cognitive 
referents enable firms and stakeholders to stratify, rank, and classify potential suppliers 
per their perceived capacity to satisfy stakeholder expectations while aligning to 
institutions. Sensemaking is triggered when decision-makers “bracket” firms and their 
choices according to specific idiosyncrasies (Wry et al., 2014).  
In settings where the scale of private participation has no contextual precedent and 
experiential learning is rare, decision-makers find cognitive referents in the 
characteristics of early behavior. Specifically, first movers are often the actors that 
institutionalize standards for private intervention. Stakeholders and firms draw on the 
characteristics of first responses to construct beliefs of what the corporate provision may 
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or should be. This process does not involve a comparative analysis of efficiency. Rather, 
responses of certain type of early movers are enacted through their strategic salience in an 
environment of informational scarcity and urgency (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006).  
If firms and stakeholders adopted the same cognitive referents, their beliefs on what is 
a contextually appropriate response would be aligned and errors made by firms would be 
infrequent (i.e., stakeholders would reward more frequently than punish firms’ choices; 
Chase & Simon, 1973). I argue that the divergence in cognitive referents, as discussed 
below, is precisely what determines that the performance consequences of the decision 
timing often do not follow the predictions of the extant literature. 
Using financial standing to make sense of organizational imitation 
The literature has long assumed that imitation is a prominent phenomenon under 
context of environmental uncertainty and causal ambiguity (Cyert & March, 1963; Gaba 
& Terlaak, 2013; Henisz & Delios, 2001; Rivkin, 2000). Through strategic imitation 
followers learn clues to resolve the ambiguity of unexplored options (Guillén, 2002; 
Henisz & Delios, 2001), understand institutions and stakeholder dynamics (Howard-
Grenville, 2008; Nikolaeva, 2014) and achieve legitimization in market systems 
(Deephouse, 1996). Organizations, for example, imitate market entry and expansion 
choices (Belderbos, Olffen, & Zou, 2011; Guillén, 2002; Haveman, 1993; Hsieh & 
Vermeulen, 2014), labor practices, production standards, or technology (Kogut & Zander, 
1992; Ritchie & Melnyk, 2012; Yeung, Lo, & Cheng, 2011), or philanthropic patterns 
(Galaskiewicz, 1997; Marquis et al., 2007; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013).  
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Because the firm’s objective function centers on the generation of profits (Sundaram 
& Inkpen, 2004), managers focus on the financial standing of the first mover to form 
beliefs of its capacities in interpreting institutional and stakeholder dynamics (Posen et 
al., 2013). For them, financial standing connotes credibility (Pahnke et al., 2015) and 
goodwill (Douty, 1972) in the market. Managers thus perceive high performers as firms 
that are likely to understand what constitutes appropriate behavior within the norms, 
customs, and laws of the market system (Thornton et al., 2012). Therefore, financial 
standing becomes the main informational mechanism to mitigate ambiguity and forecast 
stakeholder reactions to specific characteristics of firm choices (Servaes & Tamayo, 
2013). 
Follower firms thus use financial standing as a cognitive referent to choose whether 
to imitate or deviate from the first mover’s donation. Because few firms solve the 
learning-opportunity tradeoff by waiting too long, mimicry is a recurrent strategy in the 
market of disaster public goods. Particularly, firms will imitate high-performing first 
movers because managers believe that these organizations give them high chances to 
sanction their choices (Deephouse, 1996). In this sense, deviating from a first move 
perceived as aligned with relevant stakeholder preferences and institutions is a risky 
choice in the eyes of the manager of the follower firm (Kopel, 2009). Hence, imitation 
will be frequent among firms of the same institutional group (e.g., industry) that share 
strategies, stakeholders, and institutions (Deephouse, 1999). 
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In consequence, high-performing first movers create long lasting isomorphic 
bandwagons and their donation size is a strong predictor of the average corporate giving 
for a specific disaster. First movers with low performance exert a weaker and less 
sustainable scale of influence (Deephouse & Heugens, 2009). They generate fleeting 
imitation and cognitive referents that deviating firms adjust more drastically. 
Because several firms set their giving as a function of the choices of early donors, 
which have comparatively very little objective data on the size of the hardship, the 
aggregate business response is often uncorrelated with the underlying characteristics of 
the social need. That is, I expect that the share of corporate giving for a specific disaster 
will be either too large or too little in relation to variables such as the number of victims. 
Putting these arguments together, I predict the following: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The first responses in the industry when first movers are high 
performers explain the average amount of corporate aid more than objective measures of 
the social need  
Using media reputation to make sense of stakeholders punishing or rewarding 
organizational choices 
Consumers, governments, and other stakeholders directly or indirectly affected by the 
disaster deal with the uncertainty of firms efficiently helping restore social welfare 
(Ballesteros et al., 2017). Media reputation, i.e., a general and short-term perception of an 
organization’s attitudes and aptitudes based on stakeholder inferences from its recent 
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behavior in different market and non-market domains, functions as this signaling 
mechanism (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Kuhnen & Niessen-Ruenzi, 2011; Wry, 
Deephouse, & McNamara, 2006). This perception is created by the several micro-
encounters that the firm has had with members of society in the recent past (Bitektine, 
2011). Replacing the most permanent and focused influence of a history of supplying 
disaster goods, media reputation finds its main source in mass outlets (Deephouse & 
Carter, 2005). 
As such, different disciplines have documented the power of media to influence the 
social construction of socioeconomic processes (Deephouse, 2000). In a market system, 
the pre-event media coverage sentiment score influences stakeholder beliefs of the firm’s 
intentions and capacities to increase or hamper social welfare with its aid. Media 
communications mitigate information asymmetry among local stakeholders that have no 
objective data on the performance of the corporation in the focal action  (Weigelt & 
Camerer, 1988).  
A positive reputation translates to the time of the focal choice and situates the firm as 
a reliable actor whose provision is socially desirable. The firm thus achieves moral 
legitimacy and stakeholders perceive its behavior to be contextually appropriate. For 
instance, they believe that the firm’s choices will likely meet social needs and will be in 
line with relevant norms, customs, and rules (Deephouse & Carter, 2005). In contrast, 
stakeholders perceive that the intervention of firms with negative preexisting reputation 
will be less socially beneficial. The underlying motives of low-reputation donors are 
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likely to be perceived as less altruistic or sincere and more instrumental and symbolic 
(Cuypers et al., 2015).  
The main consequence of this constructivism is the propensity of reputable first 
donors to realize competitive benefits. A firm whose choices achieve legitimization by 
way of its preexisting reputation has a comparatively high likelihood of gaining different 
forms of stakeholder support. For instance, the local government may favor the firm 
when distributing operational rights (Wilburn & Wilburn, 2011), investors may facilitate 
access to financial resources (Cheng et al., 2014), and customers may increase their 
willingness to pay or their demand for the firm’s market goods (Servaes & Tamayo, 
2013). Additionally, internal stakeholders such as workers may perceive an intrinsic pay 
through an emotional connection with the organization and increase productivity 
(Flammer & Luo, 2015), and other external stakeholders may provide goodwill that 
functions as informal insurance for future calamities (Minor & Morgan, 2011). A positive 
reputation thus becomes a strategic resource for value creation (Barnett, 2007; 
Deephouse, 2000). 
In sum, I argue that the main determinants of performance benefits associated with 
timing choices are not the de facto capacities of the firm to choose the optimal 
characteristics of its choices or the firm-specific financial or physical resources, but the 
perceived efficiency of the corporate response. Formally, I hypothesize that: 
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Hypothesis 3 (H3). On average, first movers with a positive preexisting reputation 
will realize performance advantages more often than first movers with a negative 
preexisting reputation 
 
 
The Construction of Follower Rents 
Whether strategic isomorphism confers performance benefits to the corporate donor 
depends mainly on the target of imitation. Ideally, a follower will mimic a first donor 
with a positive reputation, but the institutional pressures previously described will lead 
several followers to err. Because first donors with bad reputations often move first in the 
hopes of improving the public image of the organization some firms will imitate its 
donation (Muller & Kräussl, 2011). 
Mimicking first donors with negative pre-disaster reputation may carry a financial 
cost because firms adopt responses that stakeholders perceive as contextually 
inappropriate. Once the manager has set her imitation target, adjusting her behavior to 
deviate significantly from the first mover’s donation is a complex task. Such donation 
amount is a legitimized choice and if the imitator searches additional information, it 
centers such effort on the data that suit the first move (Asch, 1955; Simonsohn & Ariely, 
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2008). Therefore, organizations mimic attributes that the market evaluates as contextually 
inappropriate.48 
On the other hand, imitating leaders that stakeholders perceive positively often results 
in performance benefits. Imitators capture positive reputational spillovers and legitimize 
their behavior as suppliers of disaster aid (Deephouse, 1996; Howard-Grenville, 2008; 
Nikolaeva, 2014; Salomon & Wu, 2012). Particularly, firms with large informational 
gaps benefit from savings in the costs of learning (Lee, Smith, Grimm, & Schomburg, 
2000; Nikolaeva, 2014; Pingle, 1995; Posen et al., 2013). They economize in collecting 
and transforming data into relevant information (Levitt & March, 1988).  
Rational mimickers thus free ride on early movers’ endeavors that absorb the risks 
and costs of social experimentation. By capturing legitimization spillovers, external 
stakeholders consider the follower’s choices as contextually appropriate. Hence, 
performance benefits arise due to material savings in the costs of decision-making, and a 
fit with the institutional environment (Deephouse & Carter, 2005). 
It follows from these arguments that if stakeholders judge first donations as 
contextually suboptimal, due to the perceived inefficiency of the first donor, followers 
have more opportunities to capture rents by donating a significantly different amount than 
by engaging in imitation. In other words: 
                                                 
48 In other settings, follower organizations may err in entry by expanding to crowded markets with 
declining life cycles; or they may adopt soon-to-be obsolete technology only because it has surpassed a 
tipping point of users in a reference group (Haveman, 1993). 
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Hypothesis 4 (H4). Imitating a first mover’s choice is more likely to gain rents than 
deviating when the first mover has a positive preexisting reputation  
Hypothesis 5 (H5). Deviating from the first mover’s choice is more likely to gain 
rents than imitating when the first mover has a negative preexisting reputation 
Variance in Uncertainty and Ambiguity and the Use of Cognitive Referents 
The heterogeneity in the relative importance of cognitive referents vis-à-vis 
deliberative or controlled thinking is fundamental in a theory of the social construction of 
timing advantages. The cognitive capabilities to make choices or evaluate the social value 
of these choices should vary across firms (e.g., some have more experience in the specific 
market and understand the institutional context better than others do) and across societies 
(i.e., some have been more exposed to private supply than others have) (Henisz & Delios, 
2001; Zollo, 2009). 
Additionally, some choices entail more time for decision-making or their higher 
frequency enables iterated choices under relatively similar stakeholder and institutional 
dynamics. Firms in disaster-prone areas, for instance, where the occurrence of these 
phenomena is seasonal (e.g., tornados in the U.S. Midwest) have more data to mitigate 
causal ambiguity (Henisz & Delios, 2004). Conversely, seismic activity is highly 
uncertain even in countries frequently hit by earthquakes such as Japan and China (Baker 
& Bloom, 2013). Moreover, they are associated with a wide range of socioeconomic 
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impacts, which hampers predictability of the social need and the organizational ability to 
respond (Anbarci, Escaleras, & Register, 2005).  
Therefore, all else being equal, the higher the frequency of the corporate decision and 
the existing history providing such good are, the larger the opportunities for learning 
(Christianson, Farkas, Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2009; Oetzel & Oh, 2014; Rerup, 2009). 
Learning mitigates the distorting effect of beliefs in ambiguous contexts (Kahneman, 
2011) and facilitates the mental association between timing and stakeholder expectations 
(Starbuck, 2009; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Additionally, firms accumulate context-specific 
knowledge that help meet internal and external pressures (Beck & Plowman, 2009; Helfat 
& Peteraf, 2015; Henisz & Delios, 2002).  
On the other hand, experiential learning enables stakeholders to make informed 
assessments of the social consequences of corporate aid. Government stakeholders, for 
instance, may be more able to identify cases where the participation of the business 
community or specific firms is more desirable than the intervention of other entities 
(Ballesteros et al., 2017). Thus, learning helps transforming environmental uncertainty 
and causal ambiguity into risk. I summarize these arguments in the following moderating 
prediction: 
Hypothesis 6 (H6). The effect of cognitive referents in the generation of follower rents 
is directly proportional to the degree of uncertainty and ambiguity  
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Data 
I tested the value of my theoretical argumentation with a dataset that covers the 
population of major natural disasters worldwide from 2003 to 2015, as reported in the 
International Disaster Database (EM-DAT) from the Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters. Although EM-DAT records all 5,237 major disasters,49 I 
focused on sudden disasters, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, which have a clear 
triggering event, immediate disruption, and peak impacts within 30 days. I did not 
consider slowly emerging disasters, such as famines, because impacts unfold over a long 
period and it is difficult to identify the total magnitude and timing of aid. I also excluded 
manmade disasters, such as 9/11, as these often involve sociopolitical factors affecting 
aid and its consequences (Birkland, 1997; Klinenberg, 2003; Platt, 2012). Finally, I 
dropped events with missing data on or imprecise dates. The final list comprises 4,637 
disasters that affected 177 countries. 
For corporate disaster giving, I used the propriety dataset described in the Preface. 
The Annex contains a detailed description of the procedures to monetize in-kind giving, 
convert to U.S. dollars, and assess measurement error and data quality using third-party 
sources. After merging this dataset with the several datasets described below on firm-
specific data from Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliates, Capital IQ, and tracking media 
                                                 
49 According to EM-DAT, these are events associated with 10 or more people killed, 100 or more 
people affected, a declaration of a state of emergency, or a call for international assistance, 
http://www.emdat.be/.  
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reputation using Factiva, and country-specific data from the World Bank and the United 
Nations Development Program, the study covers 5,845 multinational firms from 74 
headquarters-countries and 19,958 donations. 
Method 
My argumentation focuses on how the perception of the contextual appropriateness of 
corporate disaster giving, driven by media reputation and corporate financial standing, 
affects donations decisions and performance benefits. Testing these associations is a 
complex task because reputation, financial standing, and donation choices are likely 
endogenous to firm performance. Isolating causality requires an approach that compares 
performance variables among firms that donated with different timing and magnitude, 
and have different levels of media reputation and financial standing, but are otherwise 
similar with regard to underlying attributes. The assumption of heterogeneity in these 
characteristics but homogeneity in everything else is difficult to satisfy and poses an 
estimation challenge for conventional panel-data techniques. The risk of documenting a 
spurious relationship is particularly high since financial performance and pro-social 
behavior are likely moving in the same direction as unobserved factors such as 
managerial capabilities and risk aversion. 
Tools such as fixed-effects and control variables partially address these issues, but 
they impose the assumption that ex ante disaster trends extrapolate to ex post conditions, 
which is often not the case (Ballesteros et al., 2017). Large sample matching techniques 
like coarsened-exact matching are inefficient in contexts where the potential control pool 
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is limited (e.g., first movers with good/bad reputation and high/low financial 
performance) and efficient single comparisons often do not exist (Abadie et al., 2010, 
2015). 
Given the impossibility of a clean experiment that randomly allocates firms into 
groups with different donation- and firm-specific characteristics, I used the second-best 
econometric tool for causal inference: a quasi-experimental design. Traditional quasi-
experimental designs, such as differences-in-differences, allow for the inclusion of 
unobserved confounding influences. This heterogeneity must be time-invariant, though, 
so that the temporal method can address it. Instead, I chose the synthetic control method 
(SCM), which mitigates the issues described above and allows the effects of unobserved 
heterogeneity to vary overtime (Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). 
Synthetic control method. As with other matching techniques, SCM matches a focal 
(treated) entity with a control that is statistically similar for a set of relevant predictors, 
but different with regard to a focal independent variable (the treatment). Comparison 
units are selected to reproduce the counterfactual for the focal entity, and thus isolate how 
treatment affects the outcome of interest. SCM is unique, though, in that controls are a 
combination of multiple potential comparators, rather than single entities.  
The approach works by using an algorithm that, first, evaluates the capacity of every 
firm not affected by an intervention to emulate pre-treatment characteristics of the treated 
entity. From this, weights are assigned to multiple control firms, which are then 
combined to form a synthetic comparator that closely resembles the treated firm, except 
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for the presence of the intervention (see Abadie et al., 2010, 2015 for detailed 
discussions). The approach is also capable of matching entities over a long pre-treatment 
time-period. As Abadie et al. (2015: 498) note, this effectively controls for unobserved 
variance, as “only units that are alike in observed and unobserved [factors]…should 
produce similar trajectories on the outcome variable over extended periods of time.” In 
my study, this means that SCM matches each treated firm with a combination of carefully 
selected firms in the control group: a synthetically created organization. For instance, no 
one firm approximates Anglo American in the years leading up to the 2010 earthquake 
and tsunami. However, features of Rio Tinto, Antofagasta, Tek, Bifox, and Codelco are 
combined in different proportions to form a synthetic Anglo American that closely 
matches features that predict performance.  
The efficiency of SCM centers on the capacity of the algorithm to minimize, for each 
pre-treatment period, the distance between treated firms and each of the synthetic 
counterfactuals on a case-by-case basis. As a result, SCM does not compute significance 
levels as in traditional panel-data techniques, and effect sizes are interpreted directly as 
the difference between the values for treated versus control entities on the outcome of 
interest (Abadie et al., 2015). The statistical likelihood that observed outcomes are the 
result of treatment versus chance is calculated using placebo tests. The approach works 
by telling the SCM algorithm that entities in the control group have received treatment 
(even though they have not). These ‘placebo’ entities are then matched with synthetic 
counterparts, and outcomes of interest are assessed. Repeating this analysis for all non-
treated entities creates a distribution of outcomes that are essentially observed by chance. 
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This distribution of false treatment effects is then used to compare with the actual 
treatment effects and generate p-values (see Abadie et al., 2015). The Appendix has a 
mathematical description of SCM and how statistical inference is conducted.  
Variables 
Outcome variable. Calculating performance effects associated with the response to 
country-localized disasters requires a measure that is sensitive to changes in performance 
at the national level. Therefore, I use annual revenue at the subsidiary level. Revenue is 
the income that a corporate subsidiary has from its market activities, usually the sale of 
products or services to external or internal customers. Previous studies have relied on 
similar measures to analyze performance of multinational companies (Rangan & Sengul, 
2009). 
The outcome variable is the probability of off-trend revenue, which is the likelihood 
that a donor firm has of accruing income that it is not explained by the historic trajectory 
of the determinants of market income at the subsidiary level. To estimate this measure, I 
use exact inferential techniques as suggested by Abadie et al., (2010), using the predictor 
variables described below. For each treated firm, I construct a synthetic control based on 
five years of pre-disaster data at the subsidiary level using the predictors also described 
below. Then I use revenue one year after the disaster. Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations 
and Capital IQ are the data sources. Negative values of the probability of off-trend 
revenue means that the firm is, on average, likely to obtain losses associated with its 
donation. 
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Local revenue facilitates the evaluation of the main relationship of interest in a way 
that other variables of financial performance commonly used in the extant literature 
cannot (Lev, Petrovits, & Radhakrishnan, 2010; Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013). For 
instance, cumulative measures using stock prices in international markets may be affected 
by factors that are beyond the subsidiary’s control (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012). Furthermore, 
the impact of giving on consumer behavior may be observed faster via revenue than other 
economic consequences of strategic philanthropy, such as increases in employee 
productivity (Lev et al., 2010).  
Predictor variables. In my setting, I analyze what would have happened to the 
generation of off-trend revenue associated with the timing of one specific donation in the 
absence of a given level of media reputation and/or financial standing. I followed a 
rigorous data-driven procedure to construct efficient comparison groups that have 
statistically similar characteristics to the treatment units. Particularly important are the 
characteristics strongly associated with financial performance as reflected in a 
voluminous literature on firm resources and capabilities (e.g., Amit & Schoemaker, 
1993; Barney, 1991; Du et al., 2011; Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013) and those 
associated with pro-social behavior (e.g., Marquis et al. 2007, Muller and Kräussl 2011, 
Servaes and Tamayo 2013). Using I use 1) performance proxied by annual revenue, 
market capitalization, and return on assets; 2) industry is the four-digit SIC code; 3) size 
proxied by number of employees and total assets; and 4) innovation proxied by the dollar 
amount of research and development. The sources of these data are Capital IQ and 
Corporate Affiliates.  
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Additionally, I include in the matching logarithm country variables (GDP, life 
expectancy, inflation rate, trade openness, and government effectiveness) and event-
specific variables (human hardship and media visibility), following previous work 
investigating the effect of institutional development (Volberda, van der Weerdt, Verwaal, 
Stienstra, & Verdu, 2012) and the development implications of disasters (Kousky, 2013). 
My approach, hence, isolates the effect of the potential sources of public opinion from 
several context-based factors that may also contribute to the generation and evolution of 
performance advantages.  
Treatment variables. For hypothesis 1, given that the distribution for economic 
reliance is symmetric, the mean and standard deviation are efficient indicators of location 
in the distribution. I thus divided the dataset into three equally sized groups using the 
33.3 and 66.6 percentiles as cutoff points: firms with low economic reliance; firms with 
medium levels of economic reliance; and firms with high levels of economic reliance. 
For hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 the treatment variable is net pre-event media coverage 
sentiment score. Considering limitations, biases, and measurement error, the argument 
that media captures corporate reputation has been established in several lines of research 
(Deephouse, 1996). The tone or sentiment of media is the surrogate of unambiguous and 
objective measures of a firm’s attention to (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001) and engagement in 
(Henisz et al., 2013) social issues, its predisposition to risky market behavior (Sitkin & 
Weingart, 1995), its conformity to social norms (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 
2012) and regulation (Marquis & Qian, 2013), among other features. Media reports are an 
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imperfect substitute of primary data collected through surveys, but the second best 
available proxy of public opinion (Kuhnen & Niessen-Ruenzi, 2011). 
I calculate media reputation by analyzing media reports on the business organization 
one year before and after the official date of the disaster. The measure uses computer 
linguistic software, as implemented by Factiva, which quantifies the tone (i.e., sentiment) 
of each report. I followed work that calculates and ranks organizations based on their 
media-sourced reputation (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Carroll & Hannan, 1989; 
Deephouse, 1996) and used the Janis-Fadner coefficient of imbalance (JCE).50 The JCE is 
calculated as follows: 
𝐽𝐹𝐶 =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑒2 − 𝑒𝑐
𝑡2
 𝑖𝑓 𝑒 > 𝑐
𝑒𝑐 − 𝑐2
𝑡2
 𝑖𝑓 𝑐 > 𝑒
 
         0       otherwise
      
Where, e=annual number of positive media reports on the firm; c =annual number of 
negative media reports on the firm; and t=e+c 
In hypothesis 1 I test the argument that peer firms use financial standing as their main 
cognitive referent of appropriateness and a driving factor of their proneness to imitate. In 
this case, I use the rank of the corporation by firm value, lagged by a year related to the 
disaster date. Several studies have shown in the context of their samples that firm value is 
an efficient proxy of performance and the measure is widely accepted in the strategy 
                                                 
50 For an analysis of the reliability of this measure to capture the comparative media reputation of a 
firm see Bansal & Clelland (2004). 
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literature and particularly in studies evaluating the performance effects of CSR (Cuypers 
et al., 2015; Flammer, 2015; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). See Hansen and Wernerfelt 
(Hansen & Wernerfelt, 1989) for a thorough discussion.   
To capture the timing of the choice, I use the log of the number of minutes between 
the official disaster time, as reported in EM-DAT, and the announcement of the 
organizational decision to donate based on the earliest media report. In cases of finding 
the same timing between two or more reports (2.75 percent of cases), I considered 
seconds as the deciding measure. Additionally, for robustness purposes, I construct 
categorical variables to denote order groups: D1=1, if the firm is the first mover; D2=1, 
an imitator; D3=1, a deviator. The exclusion case is abstention.  
Regarding the amount of donation and timing, I coded four options: 0) abstention, 
there is no reported donation, p, for organization i, pi=0; 1); first mover, organization i is 
the first reported donor from institutional group A, ti< tj, when i, j, ∈A; 2); imitation, there 
is at least one other organization, h, that reported the same cash or in-kind USD amount 
of donation prior to organization i in institutional group A, th< ti, when h and i ∈ A; 3); 
deviation, organization i reported a donation amount significantly different than those of 
previous organizations, 1…h, in institutional group A; that is, ti< th when i and h ∈ A.51 I 
use two types of classification continuously referred in the literature as sources of 
                                                 
51 The organizational behavior is studied as an intended decision. Business decision makers choose the 
timing of donation, and, if following, they choose to replicate other organizations’ responses (i.e., donate 
the same amount, with the same form—in-kind or cash, and to the same target area), to donate differently, 
or to abstain (i.e., not to donate). Followers face no ambiguity: imitation is not tacit or complex (Lieberman 
& Asaba, 2006). Followers know the methods used by leader organizations to pledge a donation.   
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institutional pressures for managerial decision-making under uncertainty: the industry 
(i.e., four-digit Standard Industrial Classification) (Ethiraj & Zhu, 2008), and the country 
of headquarters (i.e., country where the organization was founded) (Marquis & Battilana, 
2009).  
RESULTS 
Consistent with earlier studies, the exploratory analyses show that the measure of 
firm performance (i.e., revenue) correlates positively with a firm’s disaster giving, 
providing preliminary evidence that consumers value such behavior favorably.  
Economic Reliance and Rents (Hypothesis 1) 
Table 11 shows results for hypothesis 1 predicting that firms with high economic 
reliance in the affected market are comparatively likely to obtain performance benefits 
out of corporate disaster giving. I find that while firms with mean economic reliance 
(0.49) are, on average, unlikely to obtain off-trend revenue associated with their donation, 
firms with high economic reliance are 16.6 percentage points more likely to realize 
performance benefits than firms with low economic reliance. However, when taken 
together, corporate donors are more likely to suffer performance losses than benefits.  
To assess the capacity of economic reliance to predict donation timing, I run an OLS 
specification with fixed-effects where the dependent variable is the expected donation 
timing (greater values represent later donations) and the explanatory variable is the 
degree of economic reliance (greater values represent higher reliance on the affected 
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country). To assess and mitigate the effect of spatial autocorrelation that hampering 
econometrically efficient standard errors, I used the Freedman-Lane semi-partialing 
method (Dekker et al., 2007) implemented as a linear probability model with fixed-
effects (Rogan & Sorenson, 2013).   
Table 11. The effect of economic reliance on the probability of obtaining off-trend revenue  
 
Economic Reliance 
Model 2 Low Model 3 Medium Model 4 High 
Firm-Specific Variables    
Total Revenue (USDmm ln) 9.74 9.76 9.97 
Market Capitalization (USDmm ln)  9.55 9.64 9.69 
Return on Assets % 5.96 4.17 4.05 
Primary Industry (ln) 8.51 8.39 8.30 
Number of Employees (ln) 10.56 10.67 11.07 
Total Assets (USDmm ln) 14.91 15.13 15.15 
R&D Expenses (USDmm ln) 9.80 10.12 10.52 
Context-Specific Variables    
Human Hardship (ln) 12.63 11.97 8.92 
Economic Cost (USDmm ln) 6.36 7.47 9.37 
Media Coverage (ln) 9.67 10.35 11.34 
Number of Disasters (Nation, ln) 2.17 2.10 2.04 
Number of Disasters (Global, ln) 5.49 5.52 5.53 
Newsworthy Events 8.69 7.96 7.15 
Openness to Aid 0.89 0.75 0.62 
Outcome Variable    
Probability of off-trend revenue (9.42) 0.07 7.17 
The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases only as a reference—the 
synthetic control study algorithm minimizes the distance between potential control firms and the treated 
firm on a case by case basis. Control is firms that did not donate to disasters. 
Economic Reliance as a Predictor of Donation Timing (Hypothesis 1a) 
Table 12 report the results of the panel fixed-effects estimation that suggest that firms 
with relatively high economic reliance to the disaster-stricken country tend to donate 
earlier than firms with relatively low economic reliance. 
First Moves and Social Influence (Hypothesis 2) 
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Table 12 shows results for hypothesis 2, which predicts that the average amount of 
corporate aid for a given disaster will be more a function of the donation amount of first 
movers with high financial standing than measures of the social need. Using an OLS 
model with CEM data, I find that an increase of one standard deviation in financial 
standing is associated with an increase of almost three times in the average donation 
(Model 4). On the other hand, the coefficients of total number of deaths and affected 
population are statistically insignificant.  
 
Table 12. The effect of economic reliance on donation timing 
VARIABLES Timing of the donation 
Corporate disaster giving (Yes/No) -19.493*** 
 (1.609) 
CONTROLS  
Number of Employees 0.078*** 
 (0.020) 
Total Revenue -0.011 
 (0.041) 
Market Capitalization -0.066 
 (0.041) 
Return on Assets  0.043*** 
 (0.006) 
R&D 0.016 
 (0.039) 
Consumer Orientation 0.419*** 
 (0.056) 
GDP 1.025*** 
 (0.386) 
Area (Size) -0.407*** 
 (0.121) 
Population -0.013 
 (0.170) 
Storm 3.609*** 
 (1.173) 
Flood 6.095*** 
 (1.172) 
Earthquake 1.215 
 (0.133) 
Mass Movement Dry 0.006 
 (0.000) 
Mass Movement Wet 0.008 
 (0.000) 
Deaths -32.824 
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VARIABLES Timing of the donation 
 (42.089) 
People Affected -0.223 
 (0.580) 
Economic Cost 297,763.560 
 (792,109.162) 
Annual Number of disasters (Country) -0.049* 
 (0.028) 
Annual Number of disasters (World) 0.022** 
 (0.009) 
Newsworthy events 0.096* 
 (0.051) 
Constant -31.404*** 
 (4.062) 
Observations 14,142,850.00 
Number of Events 4,637 
Country FE YES 
Year FE YES 
Month FE YES 
Firm FE YES 
Clustered-by-event bootstrapped errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * <0.1). 
 
Media Reputation and First Mover Rents (Hypothesis 3) 
This hypothesis suggests that a pre-disaster positive reputation is a necessary 
condition for the generation of first-mover rents. In line with this argument, first movers 
realize performance benefits only when they receive a positive net pre-event media 
coverage sentiment score. In probabilistic terms, knowledgeable and experienced leaders 
are about four times more likely to realize FMAs than statistically similar leaders that, 
however, lack one or both cognitive resources as seen in Table 14. 
Follower Rents 
Imitation (Hypothesis 4). The findings are consistent with the interpretation that early 
movers generate mental anchors among peer organizations and consumers. Table 
15Error! Reference source not found. indicates that imitation is a beneficial strategy 
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when organizations mimic first movers with positive media reputations, which supports 
H4. In fact, for organizations that have negative reputations, following pays off better 
than leading. Conversely, when the leader has, on average, a negative media reputation, 
imitation is a costly choice.  
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Table 13. The Effect of the First-Mover’s Financial Standing on the Average Corporate Donation 
VARIABLES Model 3 
Dependent variable: Average 
Corporate Donation (RE) 
Model 4 
 Dependent variable: Average 
Corporate Donation (FE) 
Financial Standing (First Mover) 6.121*** 2.706** 
 (3.151) (3.022) 
Number of Deaths -0.164 -0.142 
 (0.530) (0.701) 
Affected Population  0.789 2.972 
 (3.355) (3.810) 
CONTROLS   
Return on Assets % 0.069 0.017 
 (0.043) (0.098) 
Consumer Orientation 0.705  
 (0.437)  
Industry 0.026**  
 (0.013)  
Employees 0.096 -1.742 
 (0.207) (1.114) 
Market Capitalization 0.272 -0.191 
 (0.176) (0.428) 
Population -0.089 -0.003 
 (0.276) (0.296) 
Land Area -1.133***  
 (0.341)  
Number of Disasters (Global) 0.743 1.834*** 
 (0.522) (0.495) 
Number of Disasters (Country) 0.216 -1.166*** 
 (0.495) (0.395) 
Affected Population -0.350*** -0.328*** 
 (0.107) (0.125) 
GDP Million 0.238** 0.088 
 (0.114) (0.109) 
Economic Damage (USD)  0.233* 0.316** 
 (0.127) (0.131) 
International Aid 0.153 -0.097 
 (0.208) (0.200) 
Storm 4.582** 4.348** 
 (1.884) (1.969) 
Flood 3.133 2.762 
 (1.969) (1.969) 
Earthquake 4.066** 4.391** 
 (1.955) (1.884) 
Constant -21.848***  
 (4.017)  
Country FE  YES 
Year FE  YES 
Month FE  YES 
Firm FE  YES 
Clustered-by-event standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Fixed-effects 
model has robust standard errors, month-, year-, country-, and firm-effects. 
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Table 14. Predictor of Probability of Off-trend Revenue (Leading) 
Dependent variable: Probability of Off-trend Revenue  
VARIABLES First-Mover with 
Positive Reputation  
First-Mover with 
Negative Reputation 
Predictor Variables  
Revenue (logged) 3.73 3.75 
Market capitalization (logged)  4.53 4.33 
Return on assets 5.02 5.11 
Industry 4.50 4.50 
Number of employees (logged) 4.87 4.93 
Total assets (logged) 6.54 6.49 
R&D expenses (logged) 4.43 4.56 
Context-Based Variables   
GDP (logged) 6.92 6.97 
Life expectancy 57.32 57.49 
Inflation rate 9.15 9.14 
Trade openness 57.33 57.48 
Government effectiveness 53.98 54.01 
Salience 14.35 14.33 
Human hardship 380.58 422.13 
Outcome Variable   
Probability of off-trend revenue 42.49 (0.32) 
The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases only as a 
reference—the synthetic control study algorithm minimizes the distance between potential 
control firms and the treated firm on a case by case basis. Actual is leading firms with 
positive pre-disaster media reputation. Control is leading firms with negative net pre-event 
media coverage sentiment score. 
 
 
 
 
Table 15. Predictor of Probability of Off-trend Revenue (Imitation) 
Dependent variable: Probability of Off-Trend Revenue  
VARIABLES Treatment  Control 
Predictor Variables  
Revenue (logged) 3.83 3.21 
Market capitalization (logged)  4.97 4.62 
Return on assets 5.89 5.88 
Industry 4.32 4.32 
Number of employees (logged) 4.21 4.49 
Total assets (logged) 6.42 6.93 
R&D expenses (logged) 4.62 4.51 
Media reputation .02 .02 
Context-Based Variables   
GDP (logged) 6.93 6.98 
Life expectancy 57.37 57.54 
Inflation rate 9.16 9.15 
Trade openness 57.38 57.53 
Government effectiveness 54.03 54.06 
Salience 14.36 14.34 
Human hardship 380.91 422.50 
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VARIABLES Treatment  Control 
Outcome Variable   
Probability of off-trend revenue 38.56 (15.89) 
The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases only as a 
reference—the synthetic control study algorithm minimizes the distance between potential 
control firms and the treated firm on a case by case basis. Actual is following firms that 
imitate first movers with positive media reputation (i.e., net pre-event media coverage 
sentiment score.). Control is imitators of first movers with bad media reputation. 
Deviation (Hypothesis 5). I do not find support for the argument that divergence from 
naïve leaders is an efficient choice. Table 16 shows a statistically insignificant difference 
between firms that deviate from leaders with bad reputation and firms that deviate from 
reputable leaders. However, one should consider that deviants make an additional choice 
in comparison with mimickers, which affects the evaluation of the efficiency of 
deviation. When a follower organization deviates, the next key decision is whether its 
giving will be smaller or greater than the first donation in the industry (i.e., the first 
move). As per the discussion in the theory section, the likelihood that the deviator accrues 
rents depends on consumers’ perceived contextual appropriateness of its choice. In turn, 
this perception may depend on the follower’s financial standing relative to the first 
mover’s standing (Alessi, 1975).  
Therefore, a deviant organization will be more likely to seize off-trend positive 
revenue when the difference between its giving and the first move is proportional with 
the difference in standing between the first mover and the follower. Holding everything 
else constant, if the follower organization has lower standing than does the first mover, it 
will be more likely to gain rents when the size of its donation is smaller than the first 
move. Conversely, when the follower has greater standing than does the first mover, its 
donation must be bigger than the first move. 
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Table 16. Predictor of Probability of Off-trend Revenue (Deviation) 
Dependent variable: Probability of Off-Trend Revenue 
VARIABLES Treatment  Control 
Predictor Variables  
Revenue (logged) 3.87 3.25 
Market capitalization (logged)  5.03 4.67 
Return on assets 5.96 5.96 
Industry 4.37 4.37 
Number of employees (logged) 4.26 4.54 
Total assets (logged) 6.49 7.01 
R&D expenses (logged) 4.67 4.56 
Media reputation .01 .00 
Context-Based Variables   
GDP (logged) 7.01 7.06 
Life expectancy 58.03 58.20 
Inflation rate 9.26 9.25 
Trade openness 58.04 58.19 
Government effectiveness 54.65 54.68 
Salience 14.52 14.50 
Human hardship 380.91 422.50 
Outcome Variable   
Probability of off-trend revenue 7.90 7.36 
The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases only as a 
reference—the synthetic control study algorithm minimizes the distance between 
potential control firms and the treated firm on a case by case basis. Actual is following 
firms that deviate from first movers with bad reputation (i.e., net pre-event media 
coverage sentiment score). Control is deviance of first movers with positive reputation. 
To test this argument, I use firm value (Capital IQ) as a proxy of financial standing. 
Table 16 shows the results of a coarsened-exact matched, mixed-conditional logit, which 
suggest that a follower with higher financial standing than the first mover must make a 
greater donation than the latter to have a probability of off-trend revenue. This offers 
further evidence that early movers’ choices define a cognitive referent that stakeholders 
use to make a comparative evaluation of subsequent responses from peer organizations.  
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Learning, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity (Hypothesis 6) 
This last hypothesis suggests that experiential learning mitigates uncertainty and 
ambiguity and thus the strategic value of cognitive referents. To measure the degree of 
causal ambiguity that a firm faces when donating to a specific disaster, I proxied 
experience donating to disasters with the cumulative number of donations to natural 
disasters that the corporation has done before the focal disaster. Additionally, I used the 
cumulative number of industry-years of operation in the disaster country based on the 
first subsidiary operating in such country as a proxy of knowledge of the market. As the 
distribution for these variables is normal, I used the mean (2.9 of experience donating and 
7.8 of market knowledge) and +/- one standard deviation to divide the data into three 
groups. 
Table 17. Probability of Off-Trend Revenue (Deviants) 
VARIABLES Probability of Off-Trend  Revenue 
Excess of Donation over First Move x Financial Standing 78.723*** 
 (22.327) 
Excess of Donation over First Move 1.045*** 
 (0.383) 
Financial Standing 0.000*** 
 (0.000) 
CONTROLS  
Number of Employees -0.036 
 (0.038) 
Total Revenue 0.049 
 (0.097) 
Market Capitalization -0.039 
 (0.103) 
Return on Assets 0.024 
 (0.017) 
Consumer Orientation 0.209 
 (0.139) 
GDP -0.573 
 (0.445) 
Area (Size) -0.294** 
 (0.133) 
Population 0.119 
 (0.198) 
Deaths 202.022 
 (737.407) 
Economic Cost -9993698.328** 
 (3907004.581) 
Annual Number of disasters (Country) -0.016 
 (0.041) 
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VARIABLES Probability of Off-Trend  Revenue 
Annual Number of disasters (World) -0.018* 
 (0.011) 
Newsworthy events -0.116* 
 (0.062) 
Constant -3.119 
 (4.189) 
Country FE YES 
Year FE YES 
Month FE YES 
Firm FE YES 
Clustered-by-event bootstrapped errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 I found that the expected benefit of imitating a reputable first mover and deviating 
from firm with bad reputation falls as the follower acquires market knowledge and issue 
experience. However, Table 18 shows that the variation for a standard-deviation unit 
increase is not significantly different52 from average levels suggesting that the social 
constructivism of disaster giving often outstrips deductive reasoning even for 
knowledgeable and experienced firms.  
Table 18. Learning and Causal Ambiguity 
Treatment 
Levels 
- Standard Deviation Mean + Standard Deviation 
Difference in 
the 
probability of 
off-trend 
revenue 
between 
treatment  
and control 
Market 
Knowledge 
Experience 
Donating 
Market 
Knowledge 
Experience 
Donating 
Market 
Knowledge 
Experience 
Donating 
Imitati
ng 
Deviat
ing 
Imitati
ng 
Deviat
ing 
Imitati
ng 
Deviat
ing 
Imitati
ng 
Deviat
ing 
Imitati
ng 
Deviat
ing 
Imitati
ng 
Deviat
ing 
42.16 19.97 33.19 17.11 39.96 17.86 30.16 16.89 31.29 15.25 29.81 17.37 
The table shows the degree of causal ambiguity that a sample firm is likely to face when engaging in 
giving to a focal disaster. Market knowledge is the cumulative number of industry-years of operation in 
the disaster country based on the first subsidiary operating in such country and experience in disaster 
giving is the cumulative number of donations to natural disasters that the corporation has done before the 
focal disaster. Treated are firms that imitate reputable first movers or deviate from first movers with bad 
reputation. The cutoff levels of market knowledge and experience are defined around the mean of 7.8 and 
standard deviation of 2.9. 
To measure environmental uncertainty, I used the World Risk Index from the 
Environment and Human Security53 that indicates the country vulnerability to different 
                                                 
52 The Appendix has a description of statistical inference and the calculation of significance levels 
using the synthetic control method.  
53 https://ehs.unu.edu/.  
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types of disasters. The distribution of this variable that goes from 0.01% to 36.45% of 
disaster vulnerability is highly skewed because a few countries are highly prone to large 
disasters, which means that the mean value and standard deviation do not provide 
adequate cutoff points for categorizing the data. Instead, I use the 50th (6.6% of disaster 
vulnerability), 90th (12.7%), and 99th (27.7%) percentiles as levels. Table 19 illustrates 
that the positive spillovers of imitating reputable organizations radically increases in the 
level of environmental uncertainty whereas the change in the value of deviating from first 
movers with bad reputation is marginal.  
Table 19. Learning and Environmental Uncertainty 
Levels 50th Percentile 90th Percentile 99th Percentile 
Difference in the 
probability of off-
trend revenue 
between treated 
firms and synthetic 
controls (%) 
Imitating Deviating Imitating Deviating Imitating Deviating 
24.95 2.53 48.35 2.56 156.19 3.10 
The table shows variance in environmental uncertainty proxied by country vulnerability, which ranges from 
0.01% to 36.45%. Treated are firms that imitate reputable first movers or deviate from first movers with 
bad reputation. The cutoff percentile levels are 6.6%, 12.7%, and 27.7% of country vulnerability to 
disasters. 
Robustness and Supplementary Analyses  
In this subsection, I focus on five tests to assess the robustness and provide boundary 
conditions of the results. The Appendix has additional tests and supplementary analyses. 
Institutional development and the effect of cognitive referents 
It may be possible that the social constructivism influencing corporate disaster giving 
and its consequences is only relevant in contexts of relatively underdeveloped 
institutions. Countries with high institutional development may have in place the policy 
 
99 
 
instruments (e.g., tax benefits) enabling the strategic value of disaster aid, which could 
affect the frequency of imitation of high-performance firms and the use of reputation as 
cognitive referent.  
Although the SCM algorithm matched on several institutional variables, I took an 
additional step to evaluate the potential influence of local institutions. I stratified the 
application of the algorithm by government effectiveness—a measure from the World 
Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators that reflects perceptions about the quality of 
public services, the civil service and its independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies—using the 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles as cutoff values. 
As shown in Table 20, I did not find significant differences in the effect of cognitive 
referents on the off-trend revenue associated with disaster giving. 
 
Table 20. Institutional Development and Rents 
Treatment Levels 50th Percentile 90th Percentile 99th Percentile 
Difference in the 
probability of off-
trend revenue 
between treated 
firms and 
synthetic controls 
(%) 
Imitating Deviating Imitating Deviating Imitating Deviating 
34.69 6.53 33.97 7.11 41.82 5.87 
The table shows variance in institutional development proxied by the estimate of government effectiveness 
calculated by the World Bank that ranges from -2.5 to 2.5. Treated are firms that imitate reputable first 
movers or deviate from first movers with bad reputation. The cutoff percentiles levels are -.08, 1.46, and 
1.92. 
Is pre-disaster media reputation a sufficient driver of rents?  
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The extant literature offers an alternative prediction regarding the role of reputation as 
a strategic resource that sufficiently predicts the generation of rents (Weigelt & Camerer, 
1988). The pre-disaster firm-specific actions associated with accumulating reputation per 
se may drive off-trend revenue. Reputable firms thus gain rents regardless of their 
philanthropic engagement. For instance, government stakeholders may ally with or 
support high reputation firms and these cooperative behaviors determine post-event 
revenue growth (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011). To test this argument, I restricted the SCM 
algorithm to firms with positive media reputation (JFC>0) and used the binary variable 
donating taking value “1” when the firm gave to the disaster as treatment. In this case, the 
algorithm also matches on the categorical variable of timing.  
I found that reputable firms are 31% more likely to gain rents by engaging in disaster 
giving than reputable non-donors (Table 21). This supports the central argument of the 
study that reputation functions as public tool for perceiving the contextual value of 
corporate action.  
Table 21. Predictor of Probability of Off-trend Revenue (Donor versus non-donor) 
Dependent variable: Probability of Off-Trend Revenue  
VARIABLES Reputable donors  Reputable non-donors 
Predictor Variables  
Revenue (logged) 3.51 3.39 
Number of employees (logged) 3.98 3.94 
Total assets (logged) 5.23 5.39 
Market capitalization (logged)  4.11 4.13 
R&D expenses (logged) 3.97 3.45 
Primary industry 2.87 2.65 
Return on assets 3.15 3.83 
Reputation .84 .88 
Timing (categorical) 2.98 2.94 
Context-Based Variables   
GDP (logged) 6.11 6.34 
Life expectancy 63.12 61.14 
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VARIABLES Reputable donors  Reputable non-donors 
Inflation rate 5.14 6.12 
Trade openness 61.98 58.13 
Government effectiveness 61.10 62.35 
Salience 15.34 15.99 
Human hardship 134.67 123.63 
Outcome Variable   
Probability of off-trend revenue 31.73 0.02 
The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases only as a reference—the 
synthetic control study algorithm minimizes the distance between potential control firms and the treated 
firm on a case by case basis. Actual are donor firms with positive media reputation (i.e., net pre-event 
media coverage sentiment score.). Control are non-donor firms with positive media reputation. 
Is the substantiveness of giving what matters? 
Recent research suggests that substantive philanthropy is more likely to result in 
performance benefits than symbolic giving (Cuypers et al., 2015; Madsen & Rodgers, 
2014; Marquis & Qian, 2013). For instance, stakeholders perceive in-kind giving as more 
sincere, altruistic, and generous. To test this argument, in Table 22 I split the sample 
between in-kind and cash donors and integrate the categorical variable of timing of the 
donation, reputation, and financial standing in the SCM logarithm. I found no 
significance in the difference between the two groups. 
Table 22. Predictor of Probability of Off-Trend Revenue (Substantive versus Symbolic Giving) 
Dependent variable: Probability of Off-Trend Revenue  
VARIABLES In-Kind Donors  Cash Donors 
Predictor Variables  
Revenue (logged) 2.31 2.32 
Number of employees (logged) 2.85 2.87 
Total assets (logged) 3.99 3.84 
Market capitalization (logged)  3.11 3.85 
R&D expenses (logged) 2.11 2.45 
Primary industry 2.23 2.23 
Return on assets 2.84 2.94 
Reputation .00 .00 
Timing (categorical) 2.36 2.32 
Context-Based Variables   
GDP (logged) 3.29 3.11 
Life expectancy 58.45 54.58 
Inflation rate 7.11 8.09 
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VARIABLES In-Kind Donors  Cash Donors 
Trade openness 58.76 61.87 
Government effectiveness 54.20 59.52 
Salience 12.34 13.56 
Human hardship 249.09 284.56 
Outcome Variable   
Probability of off-trend revenue 0.09 0.18 
   
The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases only as a reference—the 
synthetic control study algorithm minimizes the distance between potential control firms and the treated 
firm on a case by case basis. Treated are donors of in-kind giving, control are cash donors. 
Is the size of the donation what matters? 
Studies have found that giving relatively large amounts is more likely to be associated 
with higher rewards than giving relatively low (Madsen & Rodgers, 2014). For instance, 
stakeholders give more attention to large donors because they believe that these firms 
will give more attention to their claims in the future. To test this alternative explanation, 
Table 23 compares firms that gave that at least one standard deviation more than the 
mean with firms that gave less or one standard deviation less than the mean. As in the 
previous test, the SCM algorithm matches firms the categorical variable of timing of the 
donation, reputation, and financial standing in the SCM logarithm. The probability of 
gaining off-trend revenue was not significantly different.  
Table 23. Predictor of Probability of Off-Trend Revenue (Big versus Small Donations) 
Dependent variable: Probability of Off-Trend Revenue  
VARIABLES Big Donations (+SD) Small Donations (-1SD) 
Predictor Variables  
Revenue (logged) 2.34 2.38 
Number of employees (logged) 2.84 2.88 
Total assets (logged) 3.78 3.87 
Market capitalization (logged)  3.02 3.15 
R&D expenses (logged) 2.45 2.78 
Primary industry 2.14 2.31 
Return on assets 2.78 2.83 
Reputation .01 .00 
Timing (categorical) 1.98 2.84 
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VARIABLES Big Donations (+SD) Small Donations (-1SD) 
Context-Based Variables   
GDP (logged) 3.27 3.74 
Life expectancy 58.33 58.45 
Inflation rate 7.26 8.34 
Trade openness 57.89 58.24 
Government effectiveness 54.23 55.28 
Salience 11.98 12.03 
Human hardship 275.33 285.20 
Outcome Variable   
Probability of off-trend revenue 0.98 0.03 
   
The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases only as a reference—the 
synthetic control study algorithm minimizes the distance between potential control firms and the treated 
firm on a case by case basis. Treated are donor firms of large amounts (+1 standard deviation), control are 
donors of small amounts (-1 standard deviation). 
Does the appropriation of rents vary across industries? 
Until this point, I have considered the primary industry as a predictor variable to 
construct the trajectories of revenue. Counterfactual firms thus match the pre-disaster 
characteristics of treatment firms from the same industry. It may be possible, however, 
that the performance consequences of corporate disaster giving varies across industries. 
This is because strategic stakeholder fields vary by industry (Freeman, 2010) and the 
potential mechanisms behind the financial consequences of disaster giving are, arguably, 
associated with specific types of stakeholders, as illustrated in Figure 2. For instance, 
industry demands predominantly formed by individual consumers (i.e., business to 
consumers) may be more sensitive to changes in the pro-social behavior of the supply 
than demands formed by businesses (i.e., business to business industries). This is 
because the effect of pro-social behavior in willingness to pay may be faster than in 
other stakeholder goods, such as social licenses to operate (Howard-Grenville, 2008). In 
turn, revenue may be comparatively elastic to willingness to pay. 
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Additionally, studies suggest that consumers in industries such as personal services 
and consumer goods tend to have different degrees of awareness of the supply’s pro-
social behavior than consumers in industries such as business services and capital goods 
(Du et al., 2011; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). 
Figure 2. The mechanisms behind the performance consequences of corporate disaster 
giving 
 
Given these arguments, I expect the average effect of corporate disaster giving on 
financial performance to be comparatively strong among firms that operate in industries 
whose demand are predominantly individual consumers than other businesses. To test 
this hypothesis, I split the sample between firms operating industries with a customer 
focus and firms operating industries with an business focus using a classification by Lev 
et al  (2010). The categories, which use the four-digit Standard Industrial Classification 
code, have been used before in studies on the effect of disasters on non-market behavior 
(Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). 
Consumers
Suppliers
Government
Investors
(workers)  
may increase 
productivity 
(Flammer & 
Luo, 2015)
may favor the firm distributing operational rights (Wilburn & 
Wilburn, 2011)
may facilitate 
access to 
financing 
(Cheng, 
Ioannou, & 
Serafeim, 2014)
may increase their willingness to pay (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013) 
Corporate Donors
 
105 
 
After running placebo tests to calculate the synthetic p-test following the procedure 
described in the Annex, I do not find sizeable differences in the likelihood of obtaining 
off-trend revenue associated with corporate disaster giving between firms operating in 
industries with a customer focus and firms operating in industries with a business focus 
(Table 24). Despite being apparently counterintuitive, the findings are consistent with 
previous research (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013).   
Table 24. Predictor of Probability of Off-Trend Revenue (Industries with Consumer Focus) 
Dependent variable: Probability of Post-Event Off-Trend Revenue  
VARIABLES Costumer Focus Business Focus 
Predictor Variables  
Revenue (LN) 14.34 16.69 
Number of employees (LN) 10.89 11.14 
Total assets (LN) 14.89 15.85 
Market capitalization (LN)  9.89 10.84 
R&D expenses (LN) 7.68 12.58 
Return on assets 1.85 1.84 
Reputation .01 .00 
Timing (categorical) 2.01 2.01 
Context-Based Variables   
GDP (LN) 13.27 13.48 
Life expectancy 68.14 68.23 
Inflation rate 6.71 6.12 
Trade openness 61.28 63.71 
Government effectiveness 78.11 74.36 
Salience 12.15 12.17 
Human hardship (LN) 13.74 13.74 
Outcome Variable   
Probability of off-trend revenue 0.02 0.01 
The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases only as a reference—the 
synthetic control study algorithm minimizes the distance between potential control firms and the treated 
firm on a case by case basis. Treated are donor firms in industries with a customer focus, control are 
firms in industries with a business focus. 
 
DISCUSSION 
My theoretical argumentation and empirical analysis point to the enduring effects of 
institutional factors in the likelihood that a firm gains performance benefits by moving 
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first, imitating, or deviating from the first mover’s choices. In the analyzed dataset of 
5,845 firms and 4,637 natural disasters affecting the world from 2003 to 2015, due to 
processes of sensemaking based on cognitive referents, strategic choices and their 
consequences are often socially constructed and diffused. To research these conclusion, 
the analyses apply constructs and measures whose internal validity has been carefully 
tested either here or in other studies; data and a quasi-experimental method that mitigate 
endogeneity concerns that have affected empirical research; and, in the aggregate, a 
research design that facilitates replication. 
The findings suggest that constructivist processes whereby decision-makers find 
measures of contextual appropriateness drive corporate behavior and its consequences in 
settings similar to responses to disasters where environmental uncertainty, causal 
ambiguity, and time pressure are pervasive and comparatively high (Baker & Bloom, 
2013). I have suggested a structural mechanism behind the social construction of 
performance advantages. When the business intervention in a specific market setting is a 
relatively novel phenomenon, decision-makers cope with uncertainty and ambiguity by 
focusing on prominent, easy-to-collect signals. Cognitive referents replace formal 
institutions and objective mechanisms based on probability estimates.  
I have offered evidence that a divergence in the cognitive referents that firms and 
stakeholders use characterizes the antecedents and, more relevant for the goal of this 
chapter, the consequences of corporate behavior. On the one hand, firms focus on 
financial standing to make their decisions of when and who to imitate. High-performing 
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first movers generate imitation bandwagons because followers believe that these 
organizations know how to navigate the stakeholder and institutional complexities of the 
market. Early donations from these firms are thus strong predictors of the average 
corporate response, even more than the underlying characteristics of stakeholder needs. 
On the other hand, customers, investors and other stakeholders focus on firms’ media 
reputations to form beliefs of the organization’s capabilities and willingness to meet their 
expectations. Therefore, I find that imitating a small, but reputable first mover is more 
likely to gain rents than imitating a large corporation with a negative reputation. 
Additionally, imitation bandwagons often lead to performance losses because business 
decision-makers focus on large corporations and firms with bad reputations tend to be 
early donors.  
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Implications for the literature on timing strategy 
My study sheds light on the conditions and mechanisms under which the sources of 
timing advantages are a perception of contextual appropriateness rather than firm-, 
industry-, or market-specific measures of efficiency, innovation, or physical resource 
concentration. This proposes a context where the material consequences of timing 
choices are not explained by the traditional four types of rents advanced by the extant 
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literature: monopolistic, efficiency, quasi-, and Schumpeterian (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 
2011; Teece et al., 1997).54  
Hence, I provide evidence that incorporating insights from institutional theory can 
enrich and enhance the predictive power of the timing strategy literature as recent studies 
have claimed and called for (cf., Fosfuri et al., 2013). Unlike the traditional approach in 
strategy research that suggests that institutions shape corporate action (Marquis & 
Battilana, 2009; Marquis et al., 2013; Zhang & Luo, 2013), my study supports the 
argument that such action may be a source of new institutional referents (Santos & 
Eisenhardt, 2009; Tracey et al., 2010). This has allowed me to make theoretically 
informed predictions about the explanatory power of cognitive referents in the generation 
and allocation of rents associated with the timing choices. 
That the findings are robust to several country-, time-, and event-specific variables 
provides a contribution to the scarce scholarship on timing advantages at the international 
level. Neo-institutionalism (Powell, 1991) and new institutional economics  (North, 1990; 
Williamson, 1991) suggest that realization of competitive advantages depends on the 
level of institutional development. My findings suggest that the type of performance 
advantages that I observe may be affected by the quality of national institutions, but such 
influence is secondary to the sociological determinants that my study unpacks. Thus, the 
causal role of a public perception of contextual appropriateness is arguably active across 
                                                 
54 To be clear, I am not suggesting that, for instance, a donor’s material resources are unimportant to 
generate and sustain competitive advantages, but rather that empirical settings such as the aftermath of 
disasters enable the influence of constructivist processes in off-trend revenue in a unique fashion. 
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socioeconomic and demographic contexts. The hypothesis that the allocation of rents is 
socially constructed regardless of how dependable, predictable, and stable country 
institutions are cannot be rejected in the context of my sample. 
In sum, my study responds to the call for systematic evaluations of the conditions and 
mechanisms that make some timing choices likely to generate rents. Arguably, this 
endeavor is a more fruitful path for the advancement of the literature on timing strategy, 
which includes research on imitation and first-mover advantage, than the identification of 
“an elusive timing-performance relationship” (Klingebiel & Joseph, 2015; Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 2013). 
Implications for the literature on non-market strategy   
My study contributes to the literature on corporate social responsibility that has 
lacked theory and evaluation of the role of timing on the material consequences of pro-
social behavior (Mellahi et al., 2015). Traditionally, this literature has approached the 
study of the association between financial performance and corporate social performance 
as a comparative evaluation of pro-social versus non-pro-social firms when these choices 
are made in stable conditions (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012). Hence, how organizations 
navigate environmental uncertainty and causal ambiguity in fast-paced environments has 
remained an open empirical question. 
By bringing attention to informational constraints and time pressure, I present an 
alternative explanation to the paradox of why the possession of comparatively large 
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physical and financial resources (Godfrey et al., 2009) or the donation of relatively large 
gifts (Madsen & Rodgers, 2014) do not increase the probability of realizing performance 
benefits. In fact, I show that a symbolic gift may be a contextually more appropriate 
choice in the eyes of stakeholders than a substantive gift—a contradiction of previous 
studies (cf., Marquis & Qian, 2013). An important consequence of this finding is that 
stakeholders often reward or punish firms by using measurements that are detached from 
the underlying characteristics of their needs. 
Implications for managerial practice 
In 2015, an average large corporation was 300% more likely to engage in disaster 
giving than 10 years before. Because the money allocated to disaster aid often surpasses a 
corporation’s total annual social budget (Ballesteros et al., 2017), and several studies 
suggest that disaster giving is a high-stakes decision often associated with competitive 
advantages (Madsen & Rodgers, 2014; Muller & Kräussl, 2011; Patten, 2008), the timing 
of donating is an important managerial question.  
My findings suggest that firms are making inefficient decisions regarding their 
engagement in disaster giving. In my sample, I found that 43% of first corporate 
responders obtained negative off-trend losses. Furthermore, almost 51% of the time, 
firms engaging in this behavior obtained negative performance consequences that were 
significantly larger than the size of their donations. Therefore, understanding the 
conditions and mechanisms that affect the relationship between corporate disaster giving 
and firm performance is of increasing strategic value for managers. My study offers an 
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unambiguous and objective method to calculate the relative probability of accruing off-
trend revenue when leading the business community, imitating, or deviating from the first 
donation. Finally, it identifies the firm-, industry-, and country-specific factors that 
managers need to consider when choosing to engage in disaster giving. Attention to these 
pieces of information may increase the strategic value of such response. 
Limitations and Future Work 
My study points to fruitful avenues of future research combining the literatures on 
institutional theory and timing strategy. For instance, the findings indicate that early 
behavior creates a longstanding impression on decision-makers in a way that subsequent 
responses are evaluated based on their relative rather than their absolute value. Early 
movers thus influence the value that the market assigns to different attributes of the good, 
an argument that has been proposed by studies on anchoring and preference formation  
(Carpenter & Nakamoto, 1989; Hysenbelli, Rubaltelli, & Rumiati, 2013). The analyses 
illuminate some of the psychological factors affecting stakeholder expectations and their 
decisions to reward or punish organizational choices, which have been identified mostly 
in laboratory settings (Hysenbelli et al., 2013). This suggests that my findings extend 
beyond the immediate conditions associated with disaster responses. Accordingly, my 
study may be a framework that facilitates theory building on the constructivism of 
competitive advantages more generally.  
My findings present a call for further evaluation of the material consequences of 
strategic choices under volatile environmental conditions. The diminished capacity of the 
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government to meet increasingly complex and fast-changing societal needs associated 
with complex social issues has fueled systematic attacks to the traditional supply scheme 
of public goods (Besley & Ghatak, 2007; Lepoutre et al., 2007). In consequence, business 
organizations have seen a growing number of calls to intervene in areas that historically 
have been a role of other entities (Ballesteros et al., 2017). Manufacturing companies are 
running elementary schools in India, banks are setting up telemedicine facilities in 
Nigeria, consumer-products firms have engaged in rebuilding rebuilt roads in the 
aftermath of Japan’s 2011 disaster, and technology firms are investing in community 
centers in Mexico. In many cases, this activity is a new phenomenon for both firms and 
external stakeholders. Given this increasing societal role, I expect future research will 
expand the examination of the association between timing choices and financial 
performance under high uncertainty and causal ambiguity, and will develop context-
specific predictions. Such efforts will be critical for a more theoretically nuanced 
understanding of the role that the microfoundations of institutionalization may play in the 
generation and sustainability of competitive advantages.  
Finally, future work may analyze the argument that the influence of cognitive 
referents and social constructivism decline as stakeholders and firms accumulate relevant 
information. This type of analysis may give important insights into the relationship 
between experiential learning and the performance impacts of timing choices. In the 
setting of disaster aid, imitation fosters a rapid and greater accumulation of valuable 
social resources. As organizational learning and more calculated choices replace 
cognitive referents, will the benefit to disaster-stricken societies grow or shrink?  
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CONCLUSION 
This study highlights the relevance of institutional factors affecting timing decisions 
and their consequences at the international level. My findings suggest that the insight in 
the extant literature that imitating high-performing first movers or moving first with a 
substantive action is more likely to realize rents than imitating low-performing firms or 
move late with a small action is not supported in settings like corporate responses to 
disasters. As such, I offer evidence of the factors that managers should consider when 
choosing to lead, imitate, or deviate from the first mover under conditions of high 
informational and time constraints. Additionally, I show in the context of my sample that 
firms and stakeholders follow different signals to manage uncertainty and ambiguity in a 
fast-paced environment. I hope that this initial endeavor fosters research focusing on this 
divergence in order to enlarge our understanding of the performance consequences of 
timing choices.  
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APPENDIX 
Supplementary Analyses 
I run panel-data estimations as robustness tests. These estimations include firm, 
country, event, month, and year fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant 
factors. I include year dummy variables to account for potential yearly trends in the 
availability of disaster giving and risk. In addition to this, I use month dummies because 
some types of disasters such as tornados show seasonal patterns in their frequency and 
magnitude. 
Regarding other time-variant factors at the firm level, I control for industry (four-digit 
SIC code), and one-year lags of longevity (logged number of years), logged values of the 
number of employees, revenue, market capitalization, advertising expenditure, and R&D 
intensity (in USD). Research has suggested these variables correlate with philanthropic 
behavior (e.g., Marquis et al. 2007, Muller and Kräussl 2011, Servaes and Tamayo 2013). 
Additionally, I control for customer orientation because firms with an end-user focus 
(i.e., business-to-individual industries) may have a different propensity to engage in the 
provision of collective goods than firms with an industry focus (i.e., business-to-business 
industries). I also conduct sub-sample tests dividing the data according to the industry 
orientation. Concerning disaster-specifics, I control for the number of disasters by year, 
as this number may impact the response of the corporate community to the focal event. 
For instance, the 2010 earthquake in Chile, that occurred five weeks after the earthquake 
that stroke Port-au-Prince and caused an estimated financial damage three times larger, 
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might have diverted the attention of the international community from the relief efforts in 
Haiti. The source was the CRED database. Additionally, I include a binary variable to 
account for whether a major sports event (e.g., Summer Olympics, FIFA World Cup) 
occurred in the analyzed year (1=a major sport event occurred) and a continuous variable 
for a number of other newsworthy events by year. Scholars have shown that the 
availability of other newsworthy material may crowd out international catastrophe aid 
(Eisensee & Strömberg, 2007; Stromberg, 2007). For country-specific factors, I control 
for the logged values of total country population and total area (km2) as country size may 
be associated with the exposure to shocks, ability to cope with the impact of catastrophes, 
and prominence at the international level—and consequently, proneness to receive 
international aid. 
The opportunity cost of waiting 
To analyze if a reputable organization faces an opportunity cost for deferring their 
donation (i.e., being a follower instead of a first mover), I apply coarsened exact 
matching (CEM; Iacus, King, & Porro, 2008, 2011) using the binary variable affiliation 
(i.e., the firm has a subsidiary in the affected country) as treatment. CEM is carried out 
with no replacement using the following matching variables: primary industry, number of 
employees, market capitalization, headquarters country of ultimate parent, total revenue, 
and return on assets. Such variables are chosen in accordance with literature in 
philanthropy and particularly on corporate disaster giving (cf., Crampton and Patten 
2008, Marquis et al. 2007, Muller et al. 2014, Patten 2008, Tilcsik and Marquis 2013, 
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Whiteman et al. 2005). Pre- and post-descriptive statistics are compared in the treatment, 
and control groups for assessing quality and measures of imbalance are calculated as 
suggested by Iacus et al., (2008; see the Appendix). To assess and mitigate the effect of 
spatial autocorrelation that may hamper econometrically efficient standard errors, I use 
the Freedman-Lane semi-partialing method (Dekker et al., 2007) implemented as a linear 
probability model with fixed-effects for the treatment and control groups (Rogan & 
Sorenson, 2013). I regressed the US dollar amount of giving using an OLS specification. 
I find that a knowledgeable and experienced organization faces a significant 
opportunity cost for every minute that it delays a donation—specifically; the firm loses 
more than $5,000 per minute in off-trend revenue (Table 25). This means that when the 
firm possesses a good reputation, leading pays off more than following or abstaining. The 
main finding is robust to the inclusion of the different season-, event-, country-, and firm-
specific, time-variant and -invariant controls. 
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Table 25. Opportunity Cost of Waiting for a Reputable Organization 
VARIABLES Model 2 
Off-Trend Revenue 
  
Donation Timing -.0000507** 
 (.0000156) 
Total Employees Corporate 0.000000567*** 
 (0.000000105) 
Return on Assets Corporate -.0381162*** 
 (.0022641) 
Total Revenue Corporate 0.000000097 
 (0.000000403) 
Market Capitalization Corporate .0000104 *** 
 (0.000000244) 
Primary Industry -.0114321*** 
 (.0004695) 
People Killed .0003531** 
 (.0001017) 
Total #People Affected 0.00000000772** 
 (0.00000000225) 
Estimated Damage -0.00000129 
 (0.000000864) 
Constant 2.692903*** 
 (.162687) 
Observations 14,142,850.00 
Number of Events 4,637 
Country FE YES 
Year FE YES 
Month FE YES 
Firm FE YES 
Clustered-by-event bootstrapped errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
Case: organization has positive net pre-event media coverage sentiment score. 
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CHAPTER 3 
(with Michael Useem and Tyler Wry) 
INTRODUCTION 
Globalization and the advance of neoliberal economic policies have made it more 
difficult for nations to regulate their economies and provide for their citizens, while 
bolstering the power and influence of corporations therein (Matten & Crane, 2005; 
Palazzo & Scherer, 2008). One consequence of this is that firms are being relied upon to 
adopt responsibilities that have traditionally fallen to governments, aid agencies, and non-
governmental organizations. Industry self-regulation increasingly substitutes for 
standards that governments are unable or unwilling to enforce (Ostrom, 2000; Potoski & 
Prakash, 2005); companies provide public goods by building hospitals, schools, and 
community projects (Palazzo & Scherer, 2008); and many firms contribute to 
infrastructure reconstruction efforts after natural disasters (Wassenhove et al., 2008). 
Scholars have begun to examine when and why firms engage in these unique forms of 
social responsibility (CSR) (Crilly, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011) and how they might 
benefit from doing so (Henisz et al., 2013; Madsen & Rodgers, 2014). Yet, as with the 
broader CSR literature, we know little about societal outcomes and opinions are divided 
as to whether social welfare benefits should be expected.  
Proponents view CSR as intrinsically good for society. This can be seen in studies 
that recognize firms may be strategic with their CSR (McWilliams & Siegel, 2011), but 
consider it positive they are expanding their social responsibility repertoires to include 
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the creation of public goods (see Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). However, this work stops 
short of assessing the extent to which these practices benefit society. Industry self-
regulation studies have adopted a similar focus, examining how standards are created 
(Bartley, 2007) and when they lead to better corporate environmental performance (King 
& Lenox, 2000; Potoski & Prakash, 2005). Yet this work is limited to harm reduction, 
versus welfare enhancement, and ecological outcomes are assumed rather than shown.         
Taking another view, critics have argued that these forms of CSR do little to benefit 
society because firms use them primarily to secure government favors, forestall activism, 
and mollify local communities (Banerjee, 2008). This is supported by evidence that CSR 
is often symbolic or political, and that firms make little effort to understand or effectively 
respond to social and environmental problems (Marquis & Qian, 2013; Mellahi et al., 
2015). As a result, CSR initiatives may be suboptimal, or even counterproductive, from a 
societal perspective (Cavallo & Daude, 2011). For instance, a study of resource-
extraction firms in the developing world found that more than $500m of CSR spending 
yielded almost no social welfare benefits (Frynas, 2005). Similar anecdotes have led 
some to argue that, while companies have the potential to contribute to social welfare 
based on their resources and influence, this work is best left to organizations such as 
governments and aid agencies that specialize in these activities and can be held 
accountable for their pursuit (Frynas, 2005; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004).   
In short, we know little about the societal effects of CSR initiatives—particularly 
those related to the provision of public goods—and what we do know raises questions 
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about the effectiveness of their contribution to social welfare. We also lack theory to 
predict when and why a firm’s actions will create meaningful social welfare benefits, or 
the conditions under which businesses might be better-able than other types of 
organizations to deliver such benefits. To this end, we suggest it is useful to consider the 
unique capabilities of corporations vis-à-vis other types of organizations, and the 
situations where these capabilities are likely to be deployed in ways that yield positive 
outcomes for society. We argue that disaster responses are one such area, and that the 
speed of emergency relief and the level of a nation's recovery will be greater when 
economically-reliant corporations account for a greater portion of aid.  
Responding effectively to natural disasters is a grand and growing challenge 
worldwide. The inflation-adjusted cost of a typical disaster has sextupled in the last 40 
years, but the level of aid from traditional responders such as governments and aid 
agencies has been stagnant (Becerra et al., 2014). Firms are increasingly called upon to 
address this gap, and have emerged in the past 25 years as a large contributor to disaster 
relief (White & Lang, 2012). While these contributions undoubtedly supplement the 
efforts of traditional aid providers, we argue that corporate involvement may also create 
unique benefits for a disaster-afflicted country.   
To account for this, we develop a theoretical model based on insights from the 
dynamic capabilities literature (Teece et al., 1997). Studies in this milieu examine how 
firms sense threats in the external environment, seize response opportunities, and 
reconfigure routines and resources to do so (Teece, 2007). Typically, this is used to 
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explain firm-level performance differences. However, there is also evidence that 
dynamic capabilities differ systemically among organizations with different forms 
(Rindova & Kotha, 2001). Recent research has discussed the dynamic capabilities that 
allow firms to sense external stakeholder expectations and seize opportunities to “win 
their hearts and minds” (Henisz, 2016). 
Building on this, we argue that corporations that are economically reliant to market 
systems (i.e., those firms that sell, buy, or rent raw materials, final products, or services, 
or hire human capital to/from a given market)—as compared to other types of 
organizations that give disaster aid—have dynamic capabilities that enable them to more 
effectively sense areas of critical need following a disaster, make fast decisions, and 
reconfigure resources for efficient responses. As such, we predict that aid will arrive 
more quickly, and a nation will recover more fully, when economically-reliant firms 
account for a larger share of disaster aid. We further argue that these outcomes will be 
enhanced when disaster giving leverages firm-specific routines and resources. 
We test our arguments with a proprietary dataset comprising all reported 
contributions from firms, governments, and aid agencies to relief efforts following every 
major natural disaster in the world from 2003 to 2013. To isolate the effect of corporate 
aid on our outcomes of interest, we use the synthetic control method (SCM) (Abadie et 
al., 2015). The method is similar to other matching techniques often used in 
organizational research. Rather than matching treated entities with a single member of 
the control group, though, SCM constructs comparison units based on a combination of 
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multiple entities: a synthetic control. The approach can thus be applied in contexts where 
it is hard to find suitable single comparisons, either because analysis focuses on 
aggregate entities like nations, or because the pool of potential controls is small (Abadie 
et al., 2010). This is useful for us because our analysis requires a comparison of nations 
that have similar attributes and are afflicted by similar disasters, but receive different 
levels of corporate aid. 
Results support our hypotheses and suggest that disaster aid from economically-
reliant firms is not only socially beneficial, but also creates value beyond that provided 
by other entities. As such, we demonstrate societal benefits of CSR and identify factors 
that generate and enhance positive outcomes. This addresses a weak spot in the CSR 
literature (McWilliams & Siegel, 2011). The social impact of CSR is also a metric that is 
increasingly demanded by stakeholders such as customers and governments (Eccles, 
Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014); we provide a way to show this using unambiguous 
measures. Our study also has policy implications. Disaster costs have grown at a pace 
that far exceeds the real value of traditional relief funding. Closing the gap is not only a 
matter of giving more, but giving more efficiently (United Nations, 2015; 2016). We 
illuminate conditions and mechanisms under which the business community can 
contribute to this goal in disaster responses. 
THEORY  
Disasters and the Rise of Corporate Responses  
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Nations face significant challenges in the aftermath of disasters. Earthquakes, floods, 
hurricanes and other calamities destroy infrastructure, cause human suffering, and are a 
source of negative economic growth that can take years to recover from (von Peter et al., 
2012). A typical large disaster causes a 20% reduction in national GDP (Barro, 2007), 
and the annual inflation-adjusted loss from even average disasters has grown from $54 
billion in 1980 to over $314 billion in 2015 (United Nations, 2016). Disasters are also 
underinsured, even in developed nations (Bevere, Orwig, & Sharan, 2015). As a result, 
there is a growing gap between the scale of disasters and the capacity of traditional aid 
providers, such as governments and multilateral agencies, to undertake effective 
responses (United Nations, 2016). 
As with other areas of CSR, the diminished capacity of traditional actors has led to 
growing calls for firms to be involved in disaster relief and recovery (Matten & Crane, 
2005; Twigg, 2001; United Nations, 2015). Reflecting this, there has been a significant 
increase in corporate disaster giving over the past 15 years. More than 90 percent of the 
world’s 2000 largest firms now participate in relief efforts each year, and their average 
inflation-adjusted donation has grown by over 10 times to $1.6 million (Ballesteros, 
2015).55 Corporate giving also comprises a growing share of all disaster aid, and in some 
cases exceeds the contributions of traditional providers (Ballesteros, 2015; White & 
Lang, 2012). For instance, in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake and tsunami in Chile, 
                                                 
55 The recent rise of corporate disaster giving is an expected consequence of firms’ strategic behavior. 
During the last thirty years, the number of firms with multinational operations and the number of foreign 
affiliates among the world’s largest companies grew three-fold and 10-fold, respectively. Given that 
exposure to disasters is higher for the average MNE than for single-country firms, the internationalization 
of economic activity has likely increased management attention to disaster risk.  
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55.4% of aid was from corporations; more than the combined amount provided by 
foreign governments and multilateral aid agencies. Similarly, 68.3% of the aid that Japan 
received after the 2011 tsunami was from firms, as was 51.7% of aid received by the 
Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan (OCHA, 2016). 
Although corporate giving undoubtedly helps to address disaster funding gaps, we 
argue that such efforts are more than a supplement for traditional aid. We base this on the 
fact that the effectiveness of a disaster response is related to not just the quantity of aid, 
but also to the speed with which it arrives and the extent to which it addresses areas of 
critical need (Cutter et al., 2009; Klinenberg, 2003; Wassenhove et al., 2008). Following 
a disaster, resources can be directed to many different areas, with the implication that 
allocations may create logistical clogs in the disaster zone, not match the emergency at 
hand, or focus in areas that do not contribute to a nation’s long-run recovery. There is 
also evidence that the damage and suffering caused by a disaster is inversely related to 
the speed that aid reaches beneficiaries (DeLeo, 2013; Wassenhove et al., 2008). To wit, 
disaster recovery is significantly affected by the fast delivery of essential resources, such 
as food, water, and medicine, as well as the quick restoration of communication and 
transportation infrastructure (Day, Junglas, & Silva, 2009; Day, Melnyk, Larson, Davis, 
& Whybark, 2012). The slow response to Hurricane Katrina is a case in point: harm from 
the storm’s physical destruction was greatly compounded by the inability of Federal and 
local officials to respond quickly and adequately (Horowitz, 2008).  
 
125 
 
In what follows, we develop a theoretical framework which predicts that corporations 
that have an active economic presence in a disaster-affected nation are uniquely well-
suited to undertake fast and effective responses, and that their involvement thus 
contributes to more socially beneficial relief and recovery efforts.56 
Dynamic Capabilities and the Comparative Advantage of Economically-Reliant 
Firms in Disaster Response 
Our approach for theorizing about the social value of corporate disaster giving is 
based on the dynamic capabilities literature. This research studies how organizations 
identify threats and opportunities in the external environment and reconfigure their 
routines and resources to undertake strategic responses (Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997). 
The core insight is that performance differences—especially in rapidly changing and 
uncertain environments—arise from the varied dynamic capabilities of different 
organizations (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Recent work has also used this approach to 
explain variance in the strategic CSR of different companies (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). 
While most studies have been at the firm-level, there is also evidence that dynamic 
capabilities differ systematically among organizational forms, which are groups of 
entities that share common distinguishing features (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; 
Romanelli, 1991). This has been shown in cross-sectional research on firms with 
different governance structures (Hedlund, 1994), and in studies that examine how 
strategic behavior changes when a company switches forms (Lampel & Shamsie, 2003; 
                                                 
56 We define local presence based on a company having an affiliate or subsidiary that creates products 
or performs services in a focal nation. 
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Rindova & Kotha, 2001). Studies have also observed systematic differences in the 
governance structures, goals, and decision-making processes of businesses, charities, and 
government agencies as distinct organization forms (Cobb, Wry, & Zhao, 2016; Lee, 
Battilana, & Wang, 2014).  
Building on this, we argue that corporations—as compared to other organizational 
forms such as government agencies and multilateral aid providers—are likely to have 
capabilities that enable fast and effective disaster responses. Following Teece (2007), we 
decompose dynamic capabilities into sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring components, 
and argue that firms with a presence in a disaster-afflicted nation are well suited to 1) 
sense threats and diagnose areas of critical need following a disaster, 2) seize upon 
opportunities to respond, and 3) quickly reconfigure routines and resources to do so 
effectively. We suggest that, collectively, these factors will lead to a nation receiving aid 
more quickly, and recovering more completely, when economically-reliant firms account 
for a greater share of total disaster relief.  
Sensing areas of need 
 As with rapidly changing competitive environments, the aftermath of a disaster is 
characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and urgency (Baker & Bloom, 2013; Day et 
al., 2012). In such contexts, the first step for organizations in determining how to 
respond is to sense and interpret the situation at hand (Lampel et al., 2009; Teece et al., 
1997). This entails scanning the environment and gathering data that can be used to 
inform strategic decision-making. In this regard, effective sensing capabilities yield 
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diverse, accurate, and nuanced information, and thus support a robust understanding of 
threats and opportunities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015).  
The most immediate way that a firm is likely to sense a disaster is through its effects 
on local operations. The destruction of physical infrastructure directly affects the 
production and distribution of goods, while the human toll of a disaster affects 
employees and the functioning of local markets. Firms that have a economic reliance are 
likely to be sensitive to such disruptions because they are experienced directly, and 
interpret them as areas of need because they have obvious financial implications 
(Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). Indeed, studies have shown that 
in the aftermath of a disaster, economically-reliant firms often rebuild transportation 
infrastructure to restore distribution and supply channels, construct housing and health 
facilities to bring normalcy to customers and employees, and make direct transfers to 
disaster victims to restore purchasing power (Ballesteros, 2015). This aligns with 
strategic CSR arguments that predict companies will act in the public good when doing 
so serves their own interests (McWilliams & Siegel, 2011). Broadly speaking, firms are 
likely to sense disaster impacts that threaten their market performance and view these as 
requiring immediate responses (Horwitz, 2009). Discussing this, a Coca-Cola manager 
explained her firm’s response to the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan by saying: 
“We are part of a system. If the government cannot [respond effectively], we need to 
rebuild. We need the market to recover.”57 
                                                 
57 Manager, International Public Affairs, Coca-Cola Company: interview with the first author.  
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Further, to the extent that decisions about how to respond to market disruptions are 
best made when informed by nuanced and diverse information (Teece et al., 1997), 
companies are likely to benefit from relationships developed through their operations in 
a country. There is evidence that firms utilize local grass-roots relationships, affiliate 
networks, and partner organizations to help assess the damages caused by a disaster and 
to determine where aid is most urgently needed and will have the greatest impact (Useem 
et al., 2015). Having employees and other stakeholders present in the disaster zone may 
also enable a firm to gather to contextualized information about disaster impacts, and 
understand the needs and preferences of local communities (Horowitz, 2008). Thus, just 
as having ‘boots on the ground’ aids a firm in making sense of complex and uncertain 
competitive environments (Teece et al., 1997), local operations offer a close-up look at 
the nature and scale of disaster impacts, and can thus help with sensing areas of critical 
need.  
By comparison, non-local governments and multilateral aid agencies usually do not 
have  significant established infrastructure or contact networks in a disaster zone (Cohen 
& Werker, 2008). Thus, the information that guides response planning for these 
organizations is more likely to be second-hand and from fewer sources. This may create 
challenges for sensing disaster impacts as well as confusion about how and where to best 
intervene. Indeed, a lack of local understanding has been cited as a key factor in the 
insufficient and misguided response from FEMA and other Washington, D.C. based aid 
providers following Hurricane Katrina (Horwitz, 2009). The same issue is made vivid in 
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the account of a municipal official in Chile’s Maule region, which was devastated in 
2010 by an earthquake and tsunami:  
The government disappeared… and when they arrived, they did not know exactly 
what to do, how to coordinate the aid, what functions to perform… we coped with it with 
our own resources and with a lot of help from the private sector.” (Polanco, 2012).  
There is also evidence that, whereas a firm’s fiduciary interests contribute to a focus 
on economically relevant disaster impacts (Ballesteros, 2015), traditional aid providers 
often confront multiple pressures and preferences that shape how they interpret 
information coming from a disaster zone. For governments, decisions about how to 
intervene following a disaster may be guided by political factors (Reeves, 2011). Indeed, 
studies have shown that up to 50 percent of the variance in disaster relief allocations is 
explained by electoral considerations (Garrett & Sobel, 2004). Foreign governments also 
tend to be more attuned to disasters that affect political allies, culturally similar nations, 
and oil-exporting countries (Fink & Redaelli, 2011). There is also evidence that the 
amount of aid pledged by governments, NGOs, and multilateral agencies is influenced 
by the level of media coverage that a disaster receives, irrespective of its actual impacts 
(Eisensee & Strömberg, 2007; Franks, 2013). In sum, the capability of these 
organizations to sense areas of critical need following a disaster is often constrained by 
political considerations and special-interest pressures, rather than being guided by 
assessments of need and impact alone (Cohen & Werker, 2008; Platt, 2012).  
The above considerations support the argument that economically-reliant companies 
are more likely than traditional aid providers to sense and accurately interpret 
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information about disaster impacts that relate to a nation’s economic functioning. In turn, 
this should motivate responses that focus on rebuilding key infrastructure and restoring 
the market status quo. Importantly, there is evidence that such initiatives have a positive 
effect on national growth and social welfare: in comparison, the less focused and 
politically motivated initiatives undertaken by governments and aid agencies have been 
shown to generate less social surplus (Cavallo & Daude, 2008; Khan & Kumar, 1997; 
Robinson & Torvik, 2005). For instance, in a sample of 24 countires, Khan and Reinhart 
(1990) found that public investments had an overall negative influence on economic 
growth, whereas private investment had a significant positive effect.   
Seizing opportunities to act 
 Once an organization has sensed disaster impacts and come to an understanding of 
where to intervene, the next step is to seize the opportunity to act (Teece, 2007). As with 
other strategic decisions, the speed with which action takes place has significant 
implications for the effectiveness of disaster relief and recovery (Day et al., 2012; 
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). In this regard, dynamic capabilities research shows that 
local autonomy and decentralized decision-making enhance the speed and effectiveness 
with which a firm can respond to threats and opportunities in the external environment 
(Teece et al., 1997). Extending this to disaster relief, we argue that economically-reliant 
companies will likely have a speed advantage over other types of aid providers.  
When a firm is motivated to restore market functioning in a nation, it can delegate 
decisions about aid allocation to managers whose local knowledge and situational 
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proximity are conducive to the agility and improvisation required for quick and effective 
action in complex environments (Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007). In comparison, 
governments and multilateral aid agencies often have centralized, bureaucratic decision-
making processes which can impede rapid action (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Hence, 
when a disaster requires donors to swiftly ramp-up their engagement, firms likely face 
fewer decision-making constraints than other aid providers (White & Lang, 2012). For 
example, following the 2010 Chile disaster, multi-national mining firm, Anglo 
American, relied on local managers to assess damages and lead its response. Just hours 
after the earthquake, the company’s London-based headquarters was briefed on the 
destruction and authorized managers to respond. The result was one of the first major 
relief and recovery donations from any source (Useem et al., 2015).  
Reconfiguring and the effective provision of aid 
In addition to decision-making speed, economically-reliant companies are also likely 
to have resources and routines that can be quickly reconfigured for disaster relief (Teece, 
2007). With regard to resources, the cash position of most large firms allows them to 
purchase response goods or transfer money to victims (Matten & Crane, 2005). 
Productive assets within an affected country can also be repurposed to address disaster 
needs, such as when Anglo American rapidly dispatched heavy equipment from its 
mining operations to gather debris and remove rockslides after the Chile earthquake 
(Useem et al., 2015). Similarly, following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, handset 
manufacturer, Ericsson, moved quickly to provide mobile phones to help disaster 
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responders. Large firms also have the ability to smoothly redeploy resources from across 
their network of corporate affiliates (Teece, 2014). This contributes to a broader and 
more diverse resource base that can be deployed at speed to support relief efforts. For 
instance, Wal-Mart and other large retailers were able to mobilize inventory from across 
their subsidiary networks to bolster the supply of medicines, food, and clean-up supplies 
following Hurricane Katrina (Horwitz, 2009).  
Routines and competencies that a company has developed for business purposes can 
also be utilized to implement fast, effective relief efforts (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). 
Following the Indian Ocean tsunami, for example, industrial companies helped rebuild 
schools by drawing on their experience with large-scale engineering projects. These 
firms had no history building schools, but ample expertise with construction materials 
and methods. Coordinating with makers of mobile buildings, they quickly built state-of-
the-art, earthquake-proof schoolhouse structures (Fernando, 2010). In another example, 
the logistics company, TNT, assisted the United Nations in designing relief warehouses 
in Italy by using its expertize to help optimize warehouse storage and to train personnel 
in inventory management: the result was an estimated $450,000 reduction in annual 
operating costs (Wassenhove et al., 2008).   
In comparison, the centralization and bureaucracy that often slows decision-making 
in governments and multilateral agencies can create barriers to efficient and effective aid 
deployment. Unlike companies that already have resources in a nation, these 
organizations typically need to marshal resources and put local infrastructure into place 
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before a response can begin (Cohen & Werker, 2008; Lipscy & Takinami, 2013). In 
addition to slowing the flow of aid, it is costly to create new structures and routines, and 
there are often kinks to be worked out before operations become smooth (Raffaelli & 
Glynn, 2014; Teece et al., 1997). The need to navigate layers of bureaucracy may also 
contribute to bottlenecks that slow the dispersion of disaster relief (Fritz, 2004). Indeed, 
nearly 40% of the aid pledged by foreign governments and aid agencies following the 
2010 Haiti earthquake was still outstanding in 2013, whereas all corporate aid had been 
distributed (Ballesteros, 2015; Becerra, Cavallo, & Noy, 2013).  
Without discounting the importance of traditional aid providers for effective disaster 
relief, our collected arguments suggest that firms have capabilities that are uniquely well-
suited to fast and effective responses. In turn, this should contribute to positive outcomes 
for afflicted nations when corporations account for a larger share of disaster relief. 
Formally, we predict:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The speed with which aid is provided to a disaster-affected nation 
will be faster when economically-reliant corporations account for a greater share of total 
disaster aid  
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The long-term recovery of a disaster-affected nation will be 
greater when economically-reliant corporations account for a greater share of total 
disaster aid   
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The value of firm-specific versus general resources 
While we expect that corporations as an organizational form have a comparative 
advantage in delivering fast and effective aid following a disaster, there is undoubtedly 
variance in the degree to which responses fit with the need being addressed (Kogut & 
Zander, 1992). For instance, even at a high level of analysis, there is likely to be a 
difference in the speed and effectiveness of responses that draw on firm specific versus 
general routines and resources. According to the dynamic capabilities literature, firms 
work to develop areas of core expertise around co-specialized routines and resources, 
which they then look to deploy in response to environmental shifts (Kogut & Zander, 
1992; Teece, 2014). Mirroring the general finding that firms perform better when they 
are able to leverage such competencies, research on strategic CSR has shown that 
companies are more disciplined with their giving when it is consistent with business 
objectives (Porter & Kramer, 2002; Saiia et al., 2003), and that CSR that is related to 
core business competencies is more likely to produce financial benefits for the firm 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). Extending this to societal outcomes, Kaul and Luo 
(forthcoming) developed a theoretical proof that suggests related CSR contributes to 
social welfare more efficiently than comparable government or charity initiatives.   
Applied to disaster response, this points to a distinction between firms that respond 
with general resources—such as donating money to relief efforts—versus those that 
respond by reconfiguring areas of core expertise. Financial donations undoubtedly make 
a valuable contribution to disaster relief, but they also insert a layer between the firm and 
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aid implementation, while offering little additive value beyond the cash infusion. This 
may contribute to a relatively slower and less effective response. In comparison, 
leveraging areas of expertise has the potential to add unique value that contributes to the 
effectiveness of a relief effort without imposing major transactional or operational costs. 
Such efforts can also be undertaken quickly, as they draw on existing products or 
services and generally don’t require intermediaries for implementation.  
For instance, it stands to reason that the impact of disaster giving will be greater 
when a firm contributes resources that are similar to those it has expertise producing for 
private sale. For the firm, the marginal cost of providing such goods is relatively low, as 
significantly new skills and routines are not required for their production. Quality and 
speed of delivery should also be high, given the firm’s production competencies. In 
comparison, it will likely be costly for other entities—corporate or otherwise— to 
provide similar goods if they lack the relevant capabilities (Besley & Ghatak, 2007). The 
implication is that related CSR should be more efficient, cost effective, and high quality 
than other options.  
Illustrating this, in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, Coca-Cola 
converted soft-drink production lines in Sri Lanka to bottle water, and used its own 
trucks to distribute the water to victims. In so doing, Coke was able to quickly produce 
and distribute an essential good in a cost efficient and effective manner (Fritz, 2004). 
Supporting this argument with formal models, Kotchen (2006) compared the provision 
of public goods that firms produced jointly with private goods, versus those that they 
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produced separately. Results suggested there are greater social welfare impacts in the 
first example because production integrates capabilities that are used to produce the 
private good: this affects the equilibrium provision of the public good. This effect is 
absent for unrelated giving, however, such as when a transport company donates food or 
a fraction of sales to disaster relief.  
Company-specific knowledge and routines may also be germane to disaster relief 
efforts. The types of expertise required for many aspects of disaster response—for 
instance, logistics, construction, and planning—have analogs in business (Wassenhove et 
al., 2008). Firms incur little cost when they contribute such expertise, yet this can have a 
meaningful effect on the speed with which aid reaches beneficiaries, as well as the 
effectiveness of a disaster response (Horwitz, 2009). The actions of express delivery 
firm, DHL, offer a case in point. DHL often assumes a lead role in coordinating the 
reception and distribution of relief supplies after a disaster. By drawing on its 
competencies in rapid dispatch and inventory control, DHL’s involvement in disaster 
logistics regularly contributes to fewer donated goods going to waste and less airport 
congestion in the disaster-affected nation (Wassenhove et al., 2008). Similar outcomes 
were apparent when FedEx took a lead role coordinating the delivery of relief goods 
following the 2008 floods in Mexico (Ballesteros, 2013). As such, we predict: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Aid from economically-reliant corporations will have a greater 
effect on the speed with which aid is provided to a disaster-affected nation when this 
giving leverages firm-specific routines and resources    
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Hypothesis 4 (H4). Aid from economically-reliant corporations will have a greater 
effect on a nation’s recovery from disaster when this giving leverages firm-specific 
routines and resources    
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
We tested our hypotheses with a dataset that covers every major natural disaster in 
the world from 2003 to 2013, as reported in the International Disaster Database (EM-
DAT) from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters.58 We followed the 
same strategy as Chapter 1 and 2 and restricted our analysis to sudden disasters, such as 
earthquakes and hurricanes, which have a clear triggering event, immediate disruption, 
and peak impacts within 30 days. We excluded slowly-emerging disasters, such as 
famines, because impacts unfold over a long period and it is difficult to identify the 
magnitude and timing of disaster responses. We also excluded human-caused disasters, 
such as 9/11, as these are often accompanied by social and political factors that affect the 
likelihood of receiving aid (Birkland, 1997; Klinenberg, 2003).  
Overall, there were 3,523 disaster-nation pairs in our analysis period (i.e., instances 
where a country was affected by a sudden natural disaster). Of these, we dropped 119 
where the start- and end-dates of the disaster were imprecise, as well as 191 where peak 
impacts occurred outside of 30 days. We gathered information on the economic and 
human toll of each disaster using data provided by the company, Swiss Re, which tracks 
                                                 
58 To register an event in the International Disaster Database, at least one of the following criteria must 
be fulfilled: 10 or more people killed, 100 or more people affected, a declaration of a state of emergency, or 
a call for international assistance. Further information can be accessed at http://www.emdat.be/.  
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insured and uninsured disaster losses (Sigma, 2014), and from international-aid data 
provided by the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Data 
on these variables were missing or incomplete for 1,031 of the records in our dataset, 
which were dropped from our analysis. This left us with 2,084 discrete disaster-nation 
events that we used to test our predictions about the speed of aid provision (H1 and H3). 
For our analysis of post-disaster recovery (H2 and H4), we considered that a nation may 
be affected by multiple disasters in the same year. In such cases, we added the damages 
for each disaster to create a collective annual disaster. This resulted in 464 country-year 
disasters. Collectively, the disasters in our analysis affected over 836 million people in 
129 countries and caused over $1.3 trillion in damage.  
For disaster aid, we built a propriety dataset with information on every donation that 
a nation received for 12 months following a disaster, and from what source (i.e., 
corporations, governments, and multilateral agencies). To do this, we began by searching 
Factiva and Lexis Nexis for media reports with headlines that featured a combination of 
the affected country, the type of disaster, and—where relevant—the name of the disaster 
(e.g., Typhoon Haiyan).59 We then narrowed our sample to reports that contained 
information on disaster giving by searching for a Boolean combination of the term 
‘donate’ as well as various derivations and synonyms. In total, this yielded over 
2,310,000 items which formed the core of our analysis. We then used an automated 
coding process to search within each report for details about the type, financial value, 
                                                 
59 These databases cover newspapers, trade publications, magazines, newswires, press releases, 
television and radio transcripts, digital video and audio clips, corporate websites and reports, institutional 
websites and reports, and government websites and reports, among other sources. 
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date, and source of each donation. This yielded information on over 73,000 donations 
from more than 34,000 corporations. For each donation, we coded those that were 
coming from corporations with local affiliates as reflected in the Lexis Nexis Corporate 
Affiliations database. For each in-kind donation, we recorded the characteristics of the 
product or service in question and converted this to a monetary figure based on current 
prices in the affected nation, the monetary value reported by the donor, or the reported 
value of similar donations from other organizations. Donations were converted into U.S. 
dollars using the exchange rate on the date the gift was made. We elaborate on our search 
strategy, coding procedures, and validity checks in the Annex.  
Methods 
Our hypotheses focus on how corporate disaster giving affects the speed of aid 
provision and the level of disaster recovery in a nation following a sudden natural 
disaster. Given the impossibility of a clean experimental design where disaster-affected 
nations are randomly allocated into groups with different levels of corporate disaster 
giving and donation relatedness, we aim for the second-best econometric tool for causal 
inference: a quasi-experimental design. For our analysis, isolating causality requires an 
approach that compares relief and recovery among nations that receive different levels of 
corporate aid, but are otherwise similar regarding underlying attributes and disaster 
impacts. The assumption of heterogeneity in corporate disaster giving, but homogeneity 
in everything else, is difficult to satisfy and poses an estimation challenge for 
conventional panel-data techniques. To wit, nations may have capacities that are 
 
140 
 
independent of corporate giving, but difficult to empirically isolate, such as variance in 
their ability to care for citizens and manage disaster responses. Failing to take these 
factors into account may lead to biased, inefficient estimates, or spurious causation.  
Tools such as country-specific fixed-effects and control variables can be used to help 
address these issues, but this imposes the assumption that ex ante disaster trends 
extrapolate to ex post conditions, which is often not the case, particularly over long time 
periods (E. Cavallo et al., 2013). In comparison, traditional quasi-experimental designs, 
such as differences-in-differences, allow for the inclusion of unobserved confounding 
influences. These effects must be time-invariant, though, so that the temporal differences 
method can address them. Large sample inferential techniques like coarsened-exact 
matching are another way to deal with this issue. It is difficult to apply these techniques 
in contexts such as ours, however, because suitable single comparisons often do not exist 
for aggregate entities like nations (Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). The challenge is amplified 
when the number of potential control units or sample periods is small (E. Cavallo et al., 
2013).  
Synthetic control method. Based on these considerations, we chose the synthetic 
control method (SCM) for our analysis, which is a quasi-experimental technique that 
overcomes some of the limitations of traditional matching approaches (Abadie et al., 
2010, 2015). As with other matching techniques, SCM matches a focal (treated) entity 
with a control that is statistically similar for a set of relevant predictors, but different 
regarding a focal independent variable (the treatment). Comparison units are selected to 
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reproduce the counterfactual for the focal entity, and thus isolate how treatment affects 
the outcome of interest. SCM is unique, though, in that controls are a combination of 
multiple potential comparators, rather than single entities.  
The approach works by using an algorithm that, first, evaluates the capacity of every 
entity not affected by an intervention to emulate pre-treatment characteristics of the 
treated entity. From this, weights are assigned to multiple control entities, which are then 
combined to form a synthetic comparator that closely resembles the treated entity, except 
for the presence of the intervention (see Abadie et al., 2010, 2015 for detailed 
discussions). The approach is also capable of matching entities over a long pre-treatment 
time-period. As Abadie et al. (2015: 498) note, this effectively controls for unobserved 
variance, as “only units that are alike in observed and unobserved [factors]…should 
produce similar trajectories on the outcome variable over extended periods of time.” As 
applied to our analysis, this means that SCM matches each treated nation with a 
combination of carefully selected countries in the control group: a synthetically created 
nation. For instance, no one country approximates Chile in the years leading up to the 
2010 earthquake and tsunami. However, features of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Paraguay, Brazil, Mexico, and the United States can be integrated in different 
proportions to form a synthetic Chile that is a close match on features that predict the 
speed of disaster relief as well as the nation’s historical levels of social welfare.60  
                                                 
60 Our online appendix shows how the SCM algorithm combines features of these nations to 
approximate 2010 Chile. See https://disastergiving.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/synthetic-control-
method.pdf. 
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The efficiency of SCM centers on the capacity of the algorithm to minimize, for each 
pre-treatment period, the distance between treated entities and each of the control entities 
on a case-by-case basis. Thus, significance levels are not computed as in traditional 
panel-data techniques, and effect sizes are interpreted directly as the difference between 
the values for treated versus control entities on the outcome of interest (Abadie et al., 
2015). The statistical likelihood that observed outcomes are the result of treatment versus 
chance is calculated using placebo tests. The approach works by telling the SCM 
algorithm that entities in the control group have received treatment (even though they 
have not). These ‘placebo’ entities are then matched with synthetic counterparts, and 
outcomes of interest are assessed. Repeating this analysis for all non-treated entities 
creates a distribution of outcomes that are essentially observed by chance. This 
distribution of false treatment effects is then used to compare with the actual treatment 
effects and generate p-values (see Abadie et al., 2015).  
 
Variables 
Outcome variables. Our analysis features two outcome variables: the speed of aid 
provision, and; a nation’s disaster recovery. As with previous studies of disaster 
management, we used the portion of total disaster aid provided in the four weeks 
following a disaster as a proxy for the speed of aid provision (Day et al., 2012; 
O’Donnell, 2009). We analyze a nation’s recovery from disaster based on the annual 
growth rate of its Human Development Index (HDI) score, which is a measure of 
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aggregate social welfare (Anand & Sen, 1994). HDI is calculated annually by the United 
Nations Development Program and tracks a nation’s level of health and longevity, 
knowledge and education, and standard of living.   
Treatment variables and levels. For hypotheses 1 and 2, our treatment variable is the 
share of aid from economically-reliant firms. We used the Lexis Nexis Directory of 
Corporate Affiliates to determine which firms were located, or had a subsidiary, in an 
affected country and were thus ‘economically-reliant’. Our variable is the amount of aid 
from these firms divided by the total amount of aid received by a nation in the year 
following a disaster. To test our hypotheses, we analyzed three levels of treatment. The 
distribution of corporate giving is highly skewed, which means that is not an efficient 
strategy to select treatment levels based on the mean value and standard deviations. 
Instead, we use the 75th (7.7% of aid is from economically-reliant firms), 95th (24.5%), 
and 99th (44.4%) percentiles as treatment levels (see Cavallo et al., 2013 for a similar 
approach).   
For hypotheses 3 and 4 we developed a measure of related giving that reflects the 
degree to which disaster aid leverages firm-specific routines or resources. To calculate 
this, we began by using a firm’s four-digit SIC code to identify its key business 
activities. We coded the dollar number of in-kind donations that aligned with these 
activities as related [i.e., products, services, or activities that are relevant to the firm’s 
market operation (e.g., Bayer providing medicines in response to Typhoon Haiyan)]. 
Details about how we coded related versus unrelated giving can be found in the Annex. 
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Our specific variable is the value of related aid divided by the total value of disaster aid 
from economically-reliant firms. Again, we used three treatment levels in our analysis. 
As the distribution for relatedness is relatively normal, we used the mean (26.9% of 
corporate aid is in the form of related giving) and +/- one standard deviation (11.5% and 
42.4%) for treatment indicators.  
Predictor variables. We created a synthetic counterpart for each treated nation using 
the STATA algorithm developed by Abadie et al. (2010). For all matching, we included 
a variable for the economic hardship caused by a disaster, as reflected in USD amount of 
damage to property, crops, and livestock reported by Swiss Re and EM-DAT. Beyond 
this, however, different predictors are relevant for the speed of aid provision versus a 
nation’s recovery from disaster (Day et al., 2012; Ray, 1998; Wassenhove et al., 2008). 
As such, we added different matching variables for these two analyses. 
Speed of aid provision. Studies of disaster management and corporate disaster giving 
have suggested that key predictors for aid speed include the size of a nation’s economy, 
it’s openness to aid, and the prominence of a disaster (Eisensee & Strömberg, 2007; 
Stromberg, 2007). To this end, we used the following predictors in our matching: 1) size 
of the economy, measured as the natural logarithm of a country’s pre-disaster GDP per 
capita (PPP); 2) human hardship, which is the natural logarithm of either the number of 
people killed or number of people affected, as reported by EM-DAT; 3) salience, 
measured with the natural logarithm of (one plus) the count of news articles in Factiva 
and Lexis Nexis that referred to the event in the 48 hours after its occurrence; 4) 
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newsworthy events, defined as the average of the median number of minutes that a news 
broadcast devotes to the top three news segments in a day over the forty days after the 
disaster (see Eisensee & Strömberg (2007) for an explanation of this indicator and a test 
of its effectiveness); 5) number of disasters at the country and 6) at the international 
level, which speaks to other events that may dilute the attention paid to a focal disaster 
and; 7) openness to aid, which is a binary variable indicating the national government’s 
consent to receive foreign aid, as coded from articles in Factiva and Lexis Nexis.   
Disaster recovery. We chose predictors of disaster recovery based on their relevance 
to HDI as reflected in a voluminous literature on economic development and the social 
costs of disaster (Barro, 2007; E. Cavallo et al., 2013; Kousky, 2013). These are: 1) 
schooling measured by secondary education attainment; 2) life expectancy at birth; 3) 
inflation rate as reflected in the annual percentage change for consumer prices; 4) trade 
openness proxied by real exports plus real imports as a percentage of real GDP; 5) 
investment rate, which is the ratio of real domestic private and public investment to real 
GDP. Data for these variables is from World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI). For each treated nation, we constructed a synthetic control based on 15 years of 
pre-disaster data. For calculating disaster recovery, we followed nations for 10 years and, 
thus, in some cases use forecast values for 2016 to 2023 as reported in the WDI.61  Table 
26 shows descriptive statistics while table 27 shows correlations.  
                                                 
61 Some country-specific data were missing from the WDI, in such case, we applied the multiple-input 
bootstrapping algorithm for time-series-cross-sectional data as explained by Honaker et al. (2011).  
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RESULTS 
The Effect of Corporate Aid on Response Speed and Recovery from Disaster 
Table 28 shows results for hypothesis 1, which predicted that the speed of aid 
provision will be faster when economically-reliant corporations account for a greater 
share of disaster aid. Models 1-3 reflect the 7.7%, 24.5%, and 44.4% levels of the 
treatment variable, respectively. We observe similar average values for treatment and 
control groups on each predictor variable, which shows that our matching was effective. 
P-values were calculated using the placebo method discussed above.62 Results show that 
there is no significant difference in the speed of aid provision at 7.7% share of corporate 
giving in total aid. However, the size of this effect increases dramatically as corporations 
comprise progressively larger shares of disaster giving. At the 24.5%, treated nations 
received 121% more aid during the first month as compared to synthetic counterfactuals. 
The effect is even greater when the share of corporate giving is above 44.4% of aid. 
                                                 
62 The online appendix https://disastergiving.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/inference-with-placebo-
exercises.pdf provides details on the placebo tests that were used to support our analysis.  
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Table 26. Descriptive Statistics on the Economic Value of Disaster Giving 
VARIABLES mean sd min max 
Donation Amount (US Million) 907.09 46.26 .014 189,857.45 
GDP (PPP per capita) 13,730.17 14,179.09 388.20 62,571.35 
Human Development Index 0.31 0.35 0.00 0.94 
Human Hardship (deaths) 392.61 6,904.36 1.00 222,570.00 
Life Expectancy at Birth, total (years) 70.37 8.10 42.15 83.33 
Annual Number of Disasters (Nation) 7.45 7.90 0.00 33.00 
Annual Number of Disasters (Global) 237.78 16.71 213.00 260.00 
Newsworthy Events 8.90 2.57 2.83 29.25 
Salience  18.83 17.32 0.18 50.00 
Openness to Aid 35.37 18.16 0.12 137.97 
Estimated Damage (US Million) 1,163.80 8,175.15 0.01 385,000.00 
School Enrollment, Secondary, (% net) 70.19 21.12 6.92 99.84 
Total Investment (ratio of total investment to GDP) 26.31 8.92 6.59 61.47 
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Table 27. Correlations on the Economic Value of Disaster Giving 
  VARIABLES 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 
Donation Amount (US Million) 1.00             
2 
GDP (PPP per capita) 0.09 1.00            
3 
Human Development Index 0.10 0.19 1.00           
4 
Human Hardship (deaths) 0.20 -0.05 -0.03 1.00          
5 
Life Expectancy at Birth, total (years) 0.05 0.79 0.24 -0.05 1.00         
6 
Annual Number of Disasters (Nation) 0.05 0.27 -0.17 0.05 -0.03 1.00        
7 
Annual Number of Disasters (Global) 0.01 -0.08 -0.20 -0.04 -0.09 0.02 1.00       
8 
Newsworthy Events 0.17 0.10 0.15 0.04 0.10 -0.01 -0.08 1.00      
9 
Salience 0.07 0.51 0.10 0.01 0.33 0.37 0.09 0.04 1.00     
10 
Openness to Aid 0.07 0.57 0.07 0.02 0.44 0.41 0.08 0.01 0.93 1.00    
11 
Estimated Damage (US Million) 0.58 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.03 -0.07 0.27 -0.11 0.12 1.00   
12 
School Enrollment, Secondary, (% net) 0.05 0.74 0.21 -0.06 0.85 -0.01 -0.06 0.11 -0.25 0.31 0.13 1.00  
13 
Total Investment (ratio of total investment to GDP) 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.06 0.11 -0.12 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.04 -0.03 0.07 1.00 
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Here, treated nations received more than twice the aid of synthetic control nations by 
the end of the fourth post-disaster week. Thus, while corporate giving has negligible 
effect on the speed of aid provision for most disasters (because firms comprise a 
relatively small share of aid in these instances), we observe that prominent levels of 
giving have a strong and significant effect that is consistent with our prediction in H1. 
Table 28 and Error! Reference source not found. show the average and the trajectory 
of the accumulated donation each post-disaster week for treatment and synthetic control 
groups.  
Table 28. The Effect of Giving from Economically-Reliant Firms on Speed of Aid 
  
 Share of Aid from 
Economically-Reliant Firms 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
7.7% 24.5% 44.4% 
Predictors Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control 
Size of the Economy 10782.72 11074.42 11677.95 11680.89 22236.14 22311.46 
Human Hardship  418.47 438.71 397.28 394.78 7515.66 6872.36 
Salience 15.07 16.33 17.12 17.24 25.21 23.89 
Disasters (Nation) 8.75 8.95 7.24 7.31 8.46 8.69 
Disasters (Global) 241.11 237.44 240.37 239.98 239.61 241.28 
Newsworthy Events 8.69 8.87 8.11 8.36 7.15 7.58 
Openness to Aid 0.79 0.82 0.89 0.86 0.68 0.71 
Estimated Damage  811.74 810.83 1025.42 1017.85 117176.74 99815.27 
Outcome Variable 
% of disaster aid 4 weeks  17.5 14.6 43.1 19.5 58.3 18.4 
p-value 0.234 0.006 0.000 
Note: The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases and the magnitude of 
the disaster response for the analyzed period only as a reference—the synthetic control algorithm 
minimizes the distance between potential control disaster countries and the treated disaster country on a 
case by case basis. Treated are disaster countries with a substantial share of disaster giving coming from 
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firms economically active in the affected country (as defined by the 7.7%. 24.5% and 44.4% cutoff 
points). The total sample of country disasters in the period 2003-2013 is 2,084. 
Figure 3. The Effect of Giving from Economically-Reliant Firms on Speed of Aid 
 
Note: The outcome variable is the accumulated amount of disaster aid. Treated are disaster countries with 
a substantial share of disaster giving coming from firms economically active in the affected country (as 
defined by the 7.7%. 24.5% and 44.4% cutoff points). The total sample of country disasters in the period 
2003-2013 is 2,084. 
Table 29 shows results for hypothesis 2, which predicted that the overall recovery of 
a nation will be greater when economically-reliant corporations account for a larger share 
of disaster aid. Again, models reflect different levels of the treatment variable, and report 
average values for treatment and control groups on each predictor. The outcome variable 
is the annual growth rate of HDI 10 post-disaster years. We observe a significant 
difference between HDI growth rate for treatment and control groups when 
economically-relaint firms account for more than 24.5% of disaster aid. The result is 
stronger when firms contribute more than 44.4% of all aid. However, we do not observe a 
significant effect on social welfare when the share of corporate disaster aid equals, or is 
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lower than, 7.7%, suggesting that positive effects only become apparent when 
corporations play an outsized role in a disaster response.     
Table 29. The Effect of Giving from Economically-Reliant Firms on Disaster Recovery 
Share of Aid from 
Economically-Reliant Firms 
Model 4 
7.7% 
Model 5  
24.5% 
Model 6  
44.4% 
Predictors Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control 
School Enrollment 70.24 70.39 89.12 84.68 82.75 83.33 
Life Expectancy  70.11 71.25 80.44 79.98 76.95 75.48 
Inflation rate 2.58 3.15 1.99 2.01 1.44 2.54 
Trade openness 31.48 31.25 49.91 48.71 46.96 47.91 
Total Investment  23.14 24.19 20.74 21.14 19.66 19.84 
Estimated Damage 810.14 790.36 1008.74 1000.79 117176.74 98815.27 
Outcome Variable (10th post-disaster year) 
% of annual HDI growth  0.95 0.84 0.48 0.25 0.54 0.22 
p-value  0.239 0.007 0.004 
Note: The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases and the size of the 
disaster response for the analyzed period only as a reference—the algorithm minimizes the distance 
between potential control disaster countries and the treated disaster country on a case by case basis. Treated 
are disaster countries with a substantial share of disaster giving coming from firms economically active in 
the affected country (as defined by the 7.7%. 24.5% and 44.4% cutoff points). The total sample of country-
year disasters in the period 2003-2013 is 464. 
Figure 3 shows the trajectory of change in the annual growth rate between treated and 
control nations. Given that the SCM algorithm generates counterfactual disaster countries 
based on the pre-disaster history of the predictors of HDI, we expect no significant 
differences before the disaster. Accordingly, we observe the differences in the HDI 
growth rate only during the 10 post-disaster years. Results show that the level of recovery 
after 10 years is notably higher for countries that receive over 24.5% of disaster aid from 
economically-reliant firms. On average, the HDI growth rate for such nations is 92% 
higher than for their synthetic controls: this gap grows to 145.5% at the 44.4% of share of 
corporate giving. As such, our results suggest a slight decrease in the positive effect on 
HDI at higher levels of corporate giving. Hence, we find support for hypothesis 2, but 
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note that our results suggest that corporate involvement is not panacea for disaster 
responses, and that a nation’s long-term recovery likely benefits from the participation of 
other entities.  
 
Figure 4 The Effect of Giving from Economically-Reliant Firms on Disaster Recovery 
 
Note: Instead of showing absolute values, the figure shows the difference in HDI growth rate between 
treatment nations and correspondent synthetic controls for 15 years before the disaster and 10 years after 
the disaster. Period (0) is the disaster year. No sizeable effects before the disaster year suggest that the 
synthetic control method has generated efficient control nations. Treated are disaster countries with a 
substantial share of disaster giving coming from firms economically active in the affected country (as 
defined by the 7.7%. 24.5% and 44.4% cutoff points). The total sample of country-year disasters in the 
period 2003-2013 is 464 
The Value of Firm-Specific versus General Resources 
Regarding our last two hypotheses, we found that the positive effect of corporate aid 
on the speed of aid provision and a nation’s recovery from disaster becomes greater when 
the portion of this giving that is related to firms’ core business increases. To analyze this, 
we examined the effects of relatedness (i.e., 11.5%, 26.9%, and 42.4%) at each treatment 
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level of corporate giving (i.e., 7.7%, 24.5%, and 44.4%). Table 30 reports the results for 
hypothesis 3, which focuses on the effects of related giving on the speed of aid. We 
observe that increases in relatedness lead to significantly faster aid provision when the 
share of giving from economically-reliant firms is at least 24.5% of total aid. For 
instance, at 95th percentile of share of corporate giving and 7.7% of relatedness, treated 
nations receive aid 170% faster than counterfactual nations; at 44.4% of share of 
corporate giving and 42.4% relatedness, nations receive aid 260% faster than control 
nations. In other words, the marginal effect on relief speed increases with the share of 
related corporate giving. Figure 3 plots the trajectory of accumulated aid for each post-
disaster week for the cases of a nation with at least 24.5% of aid coming from 
economically-reliant firms and 11.4% of relatedness; and one receiving 44.4% and 42.4% 
respectively. In sum, these effects suggest a strong case for hypothesis 3.  
We followed the same procedure for hypothesis 4, which predicted that a nation’s 
recovery from disaster will be stronger when a greater portion of corporate aid comes in 
the form of related giving. Table 31 reports the treatment effect of relatedness on the 
growth rate of HDI and shows that it has a consistently positive and significant influence. 
Of note, we observe that the greatest average difference between treated and control 
nations occurs when there are high levels of corporate aid (44.4% share in aid) and a 
large portion of this aid comprises related giving (42.4%). Ten years after a disaster, the 
average HDI annual growth rate for such nations is expected to be almost 190% greater 
than for comparators. To show the magnitude of the role of relatedness in the effect of 
corporate giving on HDI, we compare in Figure 6 the trajectory of the annual growth of 
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HDI between two similar treated nations and their control nations. When relatedness is 
not considered, the difference between treated and synthetic controls is 56 percentage 
points lower. As such, we find strong support for hypothesis 4.  
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   Table 30. The Effect of Relatedness in the Relationship between Disaster Giving from Economically-Reliant Firms and Speed of Aid 
Share of Aid  
from 
 Economically-
Reliant Firms 
7.7% 24.5% 44.4% 
Relatedness of 
Corporate Aid 
Model 7                                                                           
11.5% 
Model 8                                                  
26.9% 
Model 9                                                           
42.4% 
Model 10                                   
11.5% 
Model 11                                             
26.9% 
Model 12                                                         
42.4% 
Model 13                                       
11.5% 
Model 14                                                                           
26.9% 
Model 15                                           
42.4% 
Predictors T C T C T C T C T C T C T C T C T C 
Size of 
 the Economy 
785.6 700.5 15845.
4 
15511.
7 
17890.
4 
16998.
2 
2748.4 2478.5 17864.
3 
17448.
8 
50711.
8 
49788.
2 
0.0 0.0 7412.1 7314.1 29648
.2 
29008
.4 
Human  
Hardship  
1025.4 1031.7 994.3 987.4 380.7 380.2 847.6 888.3 236.8 236.2 348.5 347.3 0.0 0.0 6125.3 6785.2 8211.
7 
8305.
5 
Salience 11.7 11.9 15.0 15.4 18.3 18.4 16.8 16.7 24.6 25.1 25.9 24.8 0.0 0.0 21.7 22.2 35.1 30.5 
Disasters 
 (Nation) 
8.3 8.3 8.8 7.6 8.8 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.3 7.2 7.5 7.4 0.0 0.0 9.0 9.1 9.8 9.7 
Disasters 
 (Global) 
289.1 289.9 240.4 229.7 240.8 222.0 310.1 309.7 248.4 247.7 239.4 239.6 0.0 0.0 211.3 215.4 240.9 241.3 
Newsworthy  
Events 
8.2 8.2 8.2 8.0 8.5 7.2 8.3 8.5 7.4 7.3 8.0 8.6 0.0 0.0 6.1 6.8 7.1 7.1 
Openness to 
Aid 
0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.6 
Estimated 
 Damage  
557.6 553.8 810.8 799.1 811.0 756.4 739.2 736.6 976.5 981.5 1008.7 1000.8 0.0 0.0 11594.5 11587.5 16997
4.6 
16785
7.4 
Outcome Variable 
% of disaster 
aid, first four 
weeks 
11.6 10.6 15.4 13.3 18.8 15.5 30.7 11.4 38.4 16.7 46.8 23.8 NA NA 48.7 17.6 63.2 17.0 
p-value 0.470 0.225 0.209 0.030 0.004 0.001 NA 0.002 0.000 
Note: The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases and the magnitude of the disaster response for the analyzed period only as a 
reference—the synthetic control algorithm minimizes the distance between potential control disaster countries and the treated disaster country on a case by 
case basis. Treated are disaster countries with a substantial in-kind giving that is related to the donor’s core operation coming from firms economically active 
in the affected country (as defined by the 7.7%, 24.5%, and 44.4% cutoff points). The total sample of country disasters in the period 2003-2013 is 2,084 
 
156 
 
Table 31. The Effect of Relatedness in the Relationship between Disaster Giving from Economically-Reliant Firms and Recovery 
Share of Aid 
from 
Economically-
Reliant Firms 
7.70% 24.50% 44.40% 
Relatedness 
of Corporate 
Aid 
Model 16 
11.50% 
Model 17 
26.90% 
Model 18 
42.40% 
Model 19 
11.50% 
Model 20 
26.90% 
Model 21 
 42.40% 
Model 22 
11.50% 
Model 23 
 26.90% 
Model 24  
42.40% 
Predictors  T C T C T C T C T C T C T C T C T C 
School 
Enrollment 
63.11 64.85 69.72 70.02 71.98 71.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 89.12 84.68 0.00 0.00 65.14 66.05 91.55 90.14 
Life 
Expectancy 
67.15 67.89 68.57 67.39 72.51 73.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.44 79.98 0.00 0.00 68.71 69.14 81.07 82.17 
Inflation rate 5.69 6.11 4.56 4.78 3.39 3.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.99 2.01 0.00 0.00 2.93 2.68 0.69 1.25 
Trade 
openness 
21.36 22.18 28.67 28.11 34.78 32.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 49.91 48.71 0.00 0.00 27.91 26.87 57.21 57.36 
Total Investment 15.4 15.68 19.75 19.84 26.34 27.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.74 21.14 0.00 0.00 19.66 18.76 21.6 20.7 
Estimated 
Damage 
557.64 553.81 810.76 799.13 811.01 756.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1008.74 1000.79 0.00 0.00 11594.47 11587.47 169974.58 97994.17 
Outcome Variable 
% of HDI 
annual 
growth, end 
of 10th year  
1.47 1.48 0.96 0.97 0.89 0.72 NA NA NA NA 0.48 0.25 NA NA 0.52 .24 0.55 0.19 
p-value  0.374 0.317 0.224 NA NA 0.007 NA 0.005 0.002 
Note: The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases and the magnitude of the disaster response for the analyzed period only as a 
reference—the synthetic control algorithm minimizes the distance between potential control disaster countries and the treated disaster country on a case by case 
basis. Treated are disaster countries with a substantial in-kind giving that is related to the donor’s core operation coming from firms economically active in the 
affected country (as defined by the 7.7%, 24.5%, and 44.4% cutoff points). The total sample of country-year disasters in the period 2003-2013 is 464 
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Figure 5. The Effect of Relatedness in the Relationship between Disaster Giving from 
Economically-Reliant Firms and Speed of Aid 
S
h
a
re
 o
f 
g
iv
in
g
 f
ro
m
 e
co
n
o
m
ic
a
ll
y
-r
el
ia
n
t 
fi
rm
s 
7
.7
%
 
 
2
4
.5
%
 
 
4
4
.4
%
 
 
Note: The outcome variable is the accumulated amount of disaster aid for the first four post-disaster weeks. 
Treated are disaster countries with at least 42.4% of in-kind giving that is related to the donor’s core 
operation coming from firms economically active in the affected country (as defined by the 7.7%, 24.5%, 
and 44.4% cutoff points).  The sample for the period 2003-2013 is 2,084 disasters.  
 
158 
 
Figure 6. The Effect of Relatedness in the Relationship between Disaster Giving from 
Economically-Reliant Firms and Recovery 
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Note: The outcome variable is the annual growth rate of HDI. Treated are disaster countries with at least 
42.4% of in-kind giving that is related to the donor’s core operation coming from firms economically active 
in the affected country (as defined by the 7.7%, 24.5%, and 44.4% cutoff points). Each figure shows the 
difference between the annual growth rates of HDI for treated and control nations 15 years before the 
disaster and 10 years after the disaster. The total sample of country-year disasters in the period 2003-2013 
is 464  
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Robustness Checks and Supplementary Analyses  
We ran a variety of supplementary models and robustness checks to deepen our 
analysis and bolster our findings. All results are available to view in our online appendix 
at https://disastergiving.wordpress.com/.  
Alternate method 
Although SCM allows us to cleanly identify the effect of corporate aid on the speed 
of aid provision and the level of recovery following a disaster, we conducted additional 
analyses using traditional regression techniques. While there are limits to this type of 
approach in contexts like ours—namely that they do an inefficient job of accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneity—consistent results would add support to our findings, while 
offering insight into the influence of our treatment variables across a broader range of 
values.  
To this end, we ran OLS regressions: country-level fixed-effects were used to control 
for time-invariant unobserved factors, and a variety of country-, disaster-, and time-
specific variables were used to control for time-variant effects. A description of these 
variables, as well as their sources and definitions, is provided in our online appendix. To 
enhance the econometric efficiency of these estimates, we also applied coarsened-exact 
matching (CEM) (Iacus et al., 2008, 2011). The rationale for using CEM is that it 
provides a way to deal with unobserved variance in country-specific capacities to 
manage disasters and enhance HDI over time. To conduct the matching, and balance 
baseline nation-specific factors between treatment and the control groups, we used the 
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same predictors as in our SCM analysis. As discussed, however, the ability of CEM to 
produce efficient estimates drops considerably when the number of available comparison 
entities or periods is low, in addition to its comparative disadvantage vis-à-vis the SCM 
to account for the aggregate nature of nations. 
Results of this analysis were consistent with our reported models. We found that a 
one standard deviation increase in the share of giving from economically-reliant firms 
resulted in a 230% increase in the portion of aid that arrived during the first four weeks 
after a disaster, as well as a 37.2% increase in HDI growth rate. The magnitude of these 
impacts increases 36% and 29.2%, respectively, for every standard deviation increase in 
the degree of relatedness of giving.  
Alternate dependent variable 
In our main analysis, we modelled a nation’s recovery from disaster using its HDI 
annual growth rate, as this provides a measure of aggregate social welfare. Our 
arguments suggest, however, that the disaster response efforts of economically-reliant 
firms are likely to center around restoring market functions and economic infrastructure. 
If this is correct, we would expect to see increases in economic as well as social 
indicators when corporations account for a greater portion of disaster aid. To test this, we 
replicated our analysis using a nation’s annual growth rate of GDP in place of the 
correspondent rate for HDI. This exercise replicated the significance and direction of our 
main findings. Aid from economically-reliant firms strongly affects a nation’s economic 
recovery from disaster. When economically-reliant firms account for at least 44.4% of 
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total aid, GDP growth for treated nations is twice that of control nations. This adds 
further support to our theoretical arguments. It also aligns with literature on the economic 
costs of disasters (Kousky, 2013) as well as work that show private investment has a 
larger effect than public investment on economic development (Khan & Kumar, 1997).    
The influence of economically-reliant vs. other firms 
Another key feature of our argument is that it predicts economically-reliant firms will 
have dynamic capabilities that enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of disaster 
response. Thus, while disaster aid may also come from firms that do not have a presence 
in an afflicted nation, we excluded these from our main analysis. If aid from outside firms 
has a similar effect to what we observed for economically-reliant companies, this would 
cast doubt on the validity of our theory. While the ideal way to check for this would be to 
replicate our analysis of giving from economically-reliant firms with an analysis of 
distant firms, there are not enough cases to support a meaningful comparative analysis: 
very few nations receive 24.5% (let alone 44.4%) of aid from distant firms. As the next 
best option, we selected a binary treatment level of 49.9% or more of aid from 
economically-reliant firms. We see non-significant effects when economically active 
firms comprise the minority of corporate giving. This supports our argument that the 
dynamic capabilities relevant for effective disaster responses are related to having a local 
presence in the affected nation.    
The effect of institutional development 
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One may argue that the underlying quality of national institutions may drive the 
efficiency of corporate disaster giving. Countries with more developed institutions may 
be readier to absorb, manage, and account for aid flows. Less corruption and higher 
accountability may also increase the willingness of firms to donate. Further, government 
effectiveness should be associated with a stronger capacity to match relief aid with victim 
needs. Although our SCM algorithms matched nations on several institutional variables, 
we took an additional step to evaluate the potential influence of local institutions on the 
speed and effectiveness of aid from economically-reliant companies. Specifically, we 
stratified the application of the synthetic case algorithm by government effectiveness—
which is a measure from the WDI that reflects perceptions about the quality of public 
services, the civil service and its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies—using the percentiles 50th, 75th, and 90th as cutoff values. 
We did not use lower percentiles because the number of available disaster countries with 
which to generate synthetic controls was insufficient. We found consistency in the effect 
of corporate disaster giving on disaster recovery across distinct levels of institutional 
development (see https://disastergiving.files.wordpress.com/).  
Is corporate disaster giving a win-win proposition? 
The findings offer evidence that countries, on average, are better off when 
economically-reliant firms account for comparatively large shares of disaster aid. In turn, 
the analyses in chapter 2 on the performance consequences of corporate disaster giving 
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resulted in the finding that corporate donors with positive pre-disaster media reputation 
are likely to obtain revenue not explained by normal market operation. Taken together, 
these results suggest that the conditions under which corporate disaster giving is a 
solution where firms and external stakeholders benefit are economic reliance with the 
disaster-stricken country and a positive pre-disaster media reputation by the donor.  
To offer initial evaluation of this possibility, I use the SCM to run comparative 
evaluations of changes in reputation and financial performance associated with disaster 
giving in countries that have benefited by the corporate intervention. First, I compare the 
trajectory of media reputation of corporate donors with positive pre-disaster media 
reputation in each of three groups of countries according to the share of disaster aid 
coming from economically-reliant firms. Group A are disaster-stricken countries that 
received at least 7.7% of international aid from economically-reliant firms; group B, at 
least 24.5%; and group C, at least 44.4%. In all cases, synthetic counterfactuals come 
from the pool of statistically similar non-donor companies.  
Figure 7 reports average results one year before and after the donation. In the three 
cases, corporate donors have significant improvements in media reputation when 
compared with control non-donors. The largest difference between treatment and control 
groups is observed in countries where the share of aid coming from economically-reliant 
firms is the lower (7.7%). This suggests that when the intervention of firms in disaster aid 
is relatively low, those firms that donate receive larger visibility than when the 
intervention of firms is higher. The placebo tests show that the difference in reputational 
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gains between firms in country groups A and C are particularly prominent in early post-
donation months. Additionally, reputation gains are bigger in group C countries, those 
with at least 44.4% share of corporate giving in total aid, that in group B countries, those 
with at least 24.5% share of corporate giving, but these differences are not significant in 
several months.  
Figure 7. The effect of corporate disaster giving on post-disaster media reputation of firms 
with positive pre-disaster reputation 
 
Note: Disaster countries are included in groups A, B, and C based on the share of 
corporate giving from economically-reliant firms on disaster aid, as defined by the 7.7%, 
24.5%, and 44.4% cutoff points, respectively. The figure shows average differences in each 
month between treated and control firms. Month 0 marks the month of the donation. Treated 
are firms that donated, have economic reliance with the affected country, and have positive 
pre-disaster media reputation. Control are non-donor firms that are otherwise similar.  
To provide an analysis of more proximate implications of disaster giving, I use the 
measure of off-trend revenue developed in chapter 2. I compare the likelihood of 
obtaining revenue that is not explained by market operation for donors in country groups 
A, B, and C versus counterfactual non-donors. As in the previous test, I center on firms 
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with positive pre-disaster media reputation that have economic reliance with the disaster-
stricken country.  
The results in Table 32 show the average differences in the likelihood of gaining off-
trend revenue between treatment and control groups are maximized in countries that 
received at least 44.4% of international aid from economically-reliant firms. Because 
these are the countries that receive the largest positive differences in the speed of relief 
and magnitude of recovery when compared with counterfactual countries, these results 
propose that when reputable economically-reliant firms mount a large collective effort on 
disaster relief and recovery, corporate disaster giving may be a private behavior that 
results in performance benefits and economic value for the affected country.   
An argument that solves the contradiction of these findings and the results on the 
effects on reputational spillovers is that reputational capital has an instrumental value for 
future performance (Roberts & Dowling, 2000).  
Table 32. The effect of corporate disaster giving on the likelihood of obtaining off-trend 
revenue in countries with different share of corporate giving on disaster aid  
Share of corporate disaster giving from economically reliant firms on total international aid 
 
7.7% 24.5% 44.4% 
Firm-Specific Variables    
Total Revenue (USDmm ln) 9.74 9.78 10.01 
Market Capitalization (USDmm ln)  9.57 9.64 9.78 
Return on Assets % 5.92 4.36 3.99 
Primary Industry (ln) 8.40 8.37 8.30 
Number of Employees (ln) 10.55 10.65 12.11 
Total Assets (USDmm ln) 14.89 15.14 17.47 
R&D Expenses (USDmm ln) 9.74 10.41 13.18 
Context-Specific Variables    
Human Hardship (ln) 12.63 11.85 7.99 
Economic Cost (USDmm ln) 6.37 7.44 10.25 
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Share of corporate disaster giving from economically reliant firms on total international aid 
 
7.7% 24.5% 44.4% 
Media Coverage (ln) 9.68 10.37 12.01 
Number of Disasters (Nation, ln) 2.19 2.01 2.03 
Number of Disasters (Global, ln) 5.47 5.53 5.54 
Newsworthy Events 8.88 8.14 7.95 
Openness to Aid 0.84 0.75 0.61 
Outcome Variable    
Off-trend revenue 11.84 17.72 38.95 
Disaster countries are included in groups A, B, and C based on the share of corporate giving from 
economically-reliant firms on disaster aid, as defined by the 7.7%, 24.5%, and 44.4% cutoff points, 
respectively. The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases only as a 
reference—the synthetic control study algorithm minimizes the distance between potential control firms 
and the treated firm on a case by case basis. Treated are firms that donated, have economic reliance with 
the affected country, and have positive pre-disaster media reputation. Control are non-donor firms that are 
otherwise similar. 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Globalization and the advance of neoliberal policies have made it more difficult for 
nations to ensure the welfare of their citizens, while simultaneously giving more power to 
the corporations therein (Frynas, 2005; Matten & Crane, 2005). Thus, companies are 
being called upon to adopt responsibilities that have traditionally fallen to governments, 
multilateral agencies, and NGOs. Scholars have made several inroads regarding 
describing these practices (Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011), and have 
begun to make predictions about when firms will adopt them, and with what 
consequences (Henisz et al., 2014; Prakash & Potoski, 2007). Yet, as with the broader 
CSR literature, societal outcomes have been largely overlooked (Frynas, 2005; Margolis 
et al., 2007). We also lack theory to predict when and why a firm’s actions will create 
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meaningful social welfare benefits, or the conditions under which businesses might be 
better-able than other types of organizations to deliver such benefits.   
We examined these issues in the context of sudden natural disasters; an area where 
there are growing calls for corporations to help address the insufficient response capacity 
of traditional aid providers (United Nations, 2016). To make predictions about the effects 
of corporate aid, we developed a theoretical framework based on the dynamic capabilities 
literature (Teece, 2007). We argued that nations will benefit when economically-reliant 
firms account for a larger share of disaster aid because these firms are better equipped 
than governments and aid agencies to sense areas of need following a disaster, seize 
opportunities to respond, and reconfigure routines and resources to do so. To wit, 
companies are likely to focus on rebuilding economic infrastructure and restoring market 
functions as soon as possible after a disaster, leading to faster aid provision and a stronger 
long-term recovery. We argued these effects would be amplified when responses 
leveraged firm-specific routines and resources. We tested our predictions using a 
proprietary dataset comprising information on every major natural disaster from 2003 to 
2013, as well as each aid donation and its source. Synthetic control analysis, as well as 
several robustness checks, provided support for our predictions. Corporate disaster aid 
appears to be not only socially beneficial, but also more efficient and effective than aid 
from traditional providers.   
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Implications for corporate social responsibility research 
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Our study is relevant to debates about the social desirability and effectiveness of 
CSR. It is popular among management scholars to focus on the organizational 
implications of CSR, while inferring societal benefits. Some scholars considered it 
intrinsically good—and certainly better than the alternative—that companies are 
developing self-regulation standards (Prakash & Potoski, 2007), engaging in disaster 
responses (Madsen & Rogers, 2014), and contributing to the provision of public goods 
(Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). This interpretation is open to critique, however, because 
societal outcomes are assumed rather than shown. Indeed, critics have argued there are 
inherent problems with these initiatives, largely because of their strategic nature (Marquis 
& Qian, 2013; Surroca et al., 2013). Per this view, firms use CSR primarily for symbolic 
and political purposes, rather than as a tool to deliver meaningful social benefits. This has 
led some to argue that efforts to enhance social welfare are best left to governments and 
aid agencies, and should not be ceded to corporations (Banerjee, 2008; Frynas, 2005).   
Our study is among the first to provide quasi-experimental evidence for the social 
value of CSR (Lyneis & Sterman, 2015; Wry, 2009). Our approach assumes that 
corporate disaster aid is primarily strategic and self-interested (Henisz et al., 2014). 
Rather than symbolic responses and sub-optimal aid allocation, however, results suggest 
that firms are taking practical action to restore economic and market functioning 
(Ballesteros, 2015; Horowitz, 2008). Thus, when firms make a large collective 
contribution to relief efforts, the net effect is that aid arrives more quickly and a nation 
recovers more fully following a disaster. In turn, responding companies may benefit from 
buffering their own economic shocks while also currying favor among local stakeholders 
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(Henisz et al., 2014; Madsen & Rogers, 2014). In this way, our findings raise interesting 
questions about the degree to which companies might benefit from CSR, not only as a 
firm-specific resource, but also through the creation of public or club goods (Ballesteros, 
2015).  
Our approach also contributes to the CSR literature by showing that dynamic 
capabilities can be usefully applied to theorize about the relationship between corporate 
action and societal outcomes. Unlike studies that have used this framework to explain 
why CSR differs among firms (Ramachandran, 2011; Scherer et al., 2016), we followed 
research that has shown capabilities vary systemically among organizational forms 
(Battilana & Lee, 2014; Lampel & Shamsie, 2003; Rindova et al., 2007). This allowed us 
to make theoretically informed predictions about the value of aid from corporations 
versus other types of organizations. Indeed, our argument and findings casts doubt on the 
notion that social welfare initiatives are always best left to public organizations 
(Banerjee, 2008; Sundram & Inkpen, 2004). To be clear, we are not suggesting these 
organizations are unimportant, but rather that economically-reliant firms have motives 
and capabilities that enable them to contribute to disaster relief in uniquely valuable 
ways. 
However, by focusing on aggregate initiatives and outcomes, our approach points to a 
potential tension in the relationship between CSR that benefits society versus individual 
firms. We argue that society benefits when firms direct their capabilities toward a 
common goal.  Yet there is evidence that firms are incented to mount distinctive 
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responses to capture private rents (Ramachandran, 2011; Teece, 2007). It will be 
important for future studies to identify factors that predict coordination and cooperation 
in CSR initiatives, as opposed to idiosyncratic efforts or free-riding (Ostrom, 2000). In 
this way, our approach also highlights the importance of focusing on the collective level 
of analysis to understand the conditions under which CSR is most likely to yield societal 
benefits (Marquis, Davis, & Glynn, 2013; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013; Wry, Lounsbury, & 
Glynn, 2011; York, Hargrave, & Pacheco, 2016; Zhao & Wry, 2016).  
Also, while our predictions are context specific, the process of sensing, seizing, and 
reconfiguring is relevant to a broad range of CSR initiatives. This framework is also 
amenable to predicting both positive and negative outcomes, and should thus be useful 
for theorizing about the conditions under which corporate initiatives are likely to 
contribute to desirable social outcomes. Indeed, while the dynamic capabilities of 
economically-reliant companies appear to be conducive to fast and effective disaster 
responses, firms may not be as well suited to deal with other social issues. Of course, the 
efficacy of CSR may also differ among firms. We anticipate that future studies will apply 
dynamic capabilities at the firm level to make predictions about the variable effectiveness 
of CSR initiatives undertaken by different companies. Our analysis of related versus 
unrelated aid is a first step in this direction, and provides evidence in support of the 
argument that corporations create greater societal benefits when CSR leverages firm-
specific competences (Kaul & Luo, 2017; Mcwilliams & Siegel, 2000).  
Implications for managerial practice 
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Companies face growing calls not only to adopt social responsibilities, but also to 
demonstrate that their efforts in this regard are effective (Eccles et al., 2014). Indeed, the 
benefits that a firm receives from CSR are blunted when stakeholders criticize its 
initiatives as being instrumental and symbolic (Frynas, 2005). As such, it is in a firm’s 
self-interest to have objective data that show how its efforts affect outcomes of interest. 
Scholars have begun to develop tools for assessing the societal outcomes of public sector 
initiatives (e.g., Ebrahim 2003) but, as Frynas (2005: 276) notes, “linking CSR to 
development [goals] requires a new repertory of tools…by which such private 
interventions can be justified, planned, executed and evaluated.” Our study offers a first 
step in this direction by advancing an approach that uses official data to empirically 
assess the social outcomes of corporate action. While this requires outcome data that is 
reliable and relevant to the aims of a focal initiative—and thus has some notable 
limitations—it nonetheless has the potential to help managers and other stakeholders 
more critically evaluate the social value of CSR. Such understanding may help firms 
maximize their social return on investment, while enhancing the strategic benefits of CSR 
initiatives. 
Our findings also have implications for corporate disaster responses. To this end, we 
show that disasters are an area where economically-reliant firms have a comparative 
advantage over other organizations in contributing to social welfare. Moreover, these 
efforts appear to be enhanced when responses are fast and leverage firm-specific routines 
and resources. For managers, this suggests that there is value in delegating response 
decisions to local affiliates. It also highlights the value of engaging in responses that 
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leverage a firm’s core expertise, as opposed to providing more general forms of aid (Kaul 
& Luo, 2017).  
Implications for disaster relief and recovery 
While there is anecdotal evidence that disaster responses benefit from corporate 
involvement (e.g., Horowitz, 2008; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013; Useem et al., 2015), our 
study is the first to empirically model this relationship. Our findings point to an important 
role for economically-reliant firms in disaster relief, but also key limitations. To the 
extent that corporate aid is motivated by a desire to restore market functions, our analysis 
suggests that a nation’s ability to recover from disasters may be related to the level of 
development and openness in its economy. Put another way, the small economic footprint 
of foreign and domestic companies in some nations likely makes corporate giving more a 
function of social preferences, and—given our argument about the conditions for a 
comparative advantage of the firm—less impactful for social welfare. Our approach also 
suggests that firms are more likely than traditional aid providers to engage in responses 
that are ancillary to their financial interests. There is a broad range of damages wrought 
by a disaster, and not all of these are equally relevant for a nation’s economic 
functioning. This suggests that 1) the practical contribution that companies make to 
effective disaster relief varies widely among nations, and 2) corporate involvement is not 
panacea for all facets of disaster response. Thus, while firms can play a valuable role in 
disaster relief, this does not obviate the need for traditional aid providers.   
Limitations and Future Work 
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In this study, we have started to elucidate the characteristics of corporate donors and 
their giving that may have implications for social welfare outcomes. Disaster relief is 
only one context where internal and external stakeholders ask firms to play a larger role, 
though, and caution should be taken when generalizing our findings. We anticipate that 
future studies will examine the influence of CSR for different social issues, and will 
develop context-specific predictions and findings. Such efforts will be important for 
generating a more robust and theoretically nuanced understanding of the relationship 
between corporate action and social welfare.   
Also, while our study strongly suggests that corporate aid is beneficial for disaster 
relief, important unresolved issues remain. For instance, our results suggest that 
beneficiaries are likely to receive in-kind goods more quickly than other types of 
donations, and that these are helpful for a nation’s disaster recovery. Yet disaster-
management practitioners often ask for liquid resources because in-kind donations cannot 
be repurposed as needs evolve, and can burden or clog aid-delivery infrastructure (Fritz, 
2004). Future studies should deepen our analysis and work to untangle these conflicting 
predictions. It may be useful here to examine the variable influence of different types of 
related resources. Some firms may have routines and resources that greatly benefit relief 
efforts, whereas it may be more beneficial for others to provide general resources. 
Further, to the extent that firms in some industries are better equipped to contribute to 
disaster responses, this type of analysis may also give insight into the relationship 
between a nation’s industrial demography and its recovery from disaster. A clear 
limitation that affects these ideas is that we do not observe the three dynamic capabilities 
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that, we argue, generate the comparative advantage of economically-reliant firms to 
deploy disaster aid. Future studies that rely on qualitative research designs may shed light 
on such mechanisms.   
Finally, while our analysis focused on isolating the value of aid from economically-
reliant firms, effective disaster relief requires coordination and cooperation amongst all 
responders (Cohen & Werker, 2008; Fritz, 2004). As such, the value of corporate aid may 
be shaped by interactions with other stakeholders, the extent to which aid decisions 
consider these other providers, and the degree to which donations are complementary 
versus redundant. These issues were beyond the scope of the dissertation, but provide 
fruitful terrain for future research.  
CONCLUSION 
Addressing the hardship caused by sudden natural disasters is a grand challenge with 
implications for human misery and the economic functioning of both nations and 
corporations. As companies are increasingly being called upon to participate in response 
efforts, it is important to understand their ability to contribute to positive societal 
outcomes. Our findings suggest that firms with operations in an affected country have 
unique capabilities that allow them to sense areas of critical need, seize response 
opportunities, and reconfigure routines and resources to respond more quickly and 
effectively than traditional aid providers. As such, we not only demonstrate that strategic 
CSR can deliver meaningful societal benefits in some contexts, but that nations benefit 
greatly from corporate involvement when disaster strikes.       
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APPENDIX 
Supplementary analyses and robustness checks  
OLS Regression. We regressed the speed of aid and the HDI using the following OLS 
specifications: 
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖 = 𝛼1(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠, 𝑐𝑑𝑔) + 𝛼2𝑎(𝑐𝑑𝑔 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) +
𝛼2𝑐(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝛼′(𝜃𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖   
                                         
𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼1(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠, 𝑐𝑑𝑔) + 𝛼2𝑎(𝑐𝑑𝑔 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) +
𝛼2𝑐(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝛼′(𝜃𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖                                           
 where the vector 𝜃𝑖 contains country-, time-, and event-specific variables with 
fixed-effects with clustered-by event errors. The results are shown in Table 33 
Additional Controls and Coarsened-exact Matching in OLS models  
The estimation vectors contain disaster, country, month, year, and firm-by-country 
fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant factors and path-dependent CSR-
related investment in the market. To account for potential yearly trends in the availability 
of disaster risk and aid (e.g., urbanization has increased exposure to certain types of 
disasters), we included year dummy variables. Additionally, we used month dummies 
because disasters like hurricanes show seasonal patterns in their frequency and 
magnitude. 
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Table 33. The Effect of Disaster Giving from Economically-Reliant MNEs on Disaster 
Relief and Recovery 
VARIABLES 
Dependent variable: 
Accumulated Donation First Month 
Dependent variable: 
HDI Growth Rate 
   
Donation from economically-reliant firms (USD) 0.244*** 19.493*** 
 (0.054) (1.609) 
Relatedness x Donation 0.126*** 0.557*** 
 (0.005) (0.137) 
Relatedness 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.132) 
CONTROLS   
School enrollment, secondary,  (% net) 0.001*** 0.078*** 
 (0.000) (0.020) 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) -0.000 -0.011 
 (0.000) (0.041) 
Inflation Rate -0.001 -0.066 
 (0.001) (0.041) 
Trade Openness 0.001*** 0.043*** 
 (0.000) (0.006) 
Openness to Aid 0.005*** 0.419*** 
 (0.001) (0.056) 
Size of the Economy 0.004*** 1.025*** 
 (0.001) (0.386) 
Area (Size) -0.001*** -0.407*** 
 (0.000) (0.121) 
Population 0.003*** -0.013 
 (0.000) (0.170) 
Storm 0.011*** 3.609*** 
 (0.003) (1.173) 
Flood 0.002 3.373*** 
 (0.003) (1.154) 
Earthquake 0.035*** 6.095*** 
 (0.003) (1.172) 
Mass Movement Dry -0.006  
 (0.007)  
Mass Movement Wet 0.001  
 (0.003)  
Human Hardship (deaths) 0.036 -32.824 
 (0.056) (42.089) 
People Affected -0.000 -0.223 
 (0.000) (0.580) 
Estimated Damage (US Million) 3,044.217*** 297,763.560 
 (1,125.475) (792,109.162) 
Annual Number of disasters (Nation) -0.001*** -0.049* 
 (0.000) (0.028) 
Annual Number of disasters (Global) -0.000*** 0.022** 
 (0.000) (0.009) 
Newsworthy events 0.003*** 0.096* 
 (0.000) (0.051) 
Constant -0.063*** -31.404*** 
 (0.009) (4.062) 
   
Observations 1,495,193 113,641 
R-squared   
Number of events 2,084 464 
Note: Clustered-by-event bootstrapped errors in parentheses. Fixed-effects model with month-, year-, country-, and 
event-effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Additional Control Variables 
At the country level, total land area (km2) and total population may not only skew 
disaster risk, but also the size of market systems and the likelihood of donation. Hence, 
using data from the World Development Indicators (The World Bank, 2014), I controlled 
for the logs of these variables. Regarding event-specific controls, I used dummies for 
disaster type as some specific types may fuel public response and aid more effectively 
than others (Birkland, 1997). The impact of the disaster was also controlled using the 
relative magnitude of killed, number of affected, and associated economic damage (i.e., 
killed/total population, affected/total population, and economic damage/GDP PPP, 
respectively).63 Finally, to account for donor fatigue, 64 the geographical distribution of 
shocks, and the learning effects of disasters, I included controls for the number of 
disasters by country and worldwide in a period of one year before the focal disaster 
date—both logged. Additionally, I accounted for the possibility that other major social, 
political, or economic events may have crowded out organizations’ attention and 
financial capacity to provide collective goods (Eisensee & Strömberg, 2007; Franks, 
2013). Newsworthy events is the average of “the median number of minutes a news 
                                                 
63 I obtained these data the EM-DAT, The World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (2014). Note 
that endogeneity may be an issue when regressing measures of disaster hardship. Arguably, hardship is 
endogenous to the characteristics of the philanthropic response. The following subsections explain the 
methods to account for this risk.  
64 Club members may face the situation of allocating scarce resources to multiple collective goods in 
the same fiscal exercise; early disasters may crowd out the response to subsequent shocks. 
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broadcast devotes to the top three news segments in a day” over the forty days after the 
disaster.65 
Coarsened-exact matching 
We used no-replacement coarsened exact matched procedure in which we targeted a 
treatment-to-control ratio of 1:10, but tested up to 1:2 for robustness. CEM is carried out 
with no replacement using variables chosen in accordance with the set of predictors of 
speed of aid and HDI.  
a) Speed of aid: 1) size of the economy, measured as the natural logarithm of a 
country’s pre-disaster GDP per capita (PPP); 2) human hardship, which is the natural 
logarithm of either the number of people killed or number of people affected as reported 
by EM-DAT; 3) salience, measured with the natural logarithm of (one plus) the count of 
news articles in Factiva and Lexis Nexis that referred to the event in the 48 hours after its 
occurrence; 4) newsworthy events, defined as the average of the median number of 
minutes that a news broadcast devotes to the top three news segments in a day over the 
forty days after the disaster (see Eisensee & Strömberg (2007) for an explanation of this 
indicator and a test of its effectiveness); 5) number of disasters at the country and at the 
international level, which speaks to other events that may dilute the attention paid to a 
focal disaster and; 6) openness to aid, which is a binary variable indicating the national 
                                                 
65 See Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) for an explanation of this indicator and a test of its effectiveness. 
The variable is calculated by Professor David Strömberg and is available at http://people.su.se/~dstro/.   
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government’s consent to receive foreign aid as coded from articles in Factiva and Lexis 
Nexis.   
b) HDI: 1) schooling measured by secondary education attainment; 2) life 
expectancy at birth; 3) inflation rate as reflected in the annual percentage change for 
consumer prices; 4) trade openness proxied by real exports plus real imports as a 
percentage of real GDP; 5) investment rate, which is the ratio of real domestic private 
and public investment to real GDP. Data for these variables is from World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI). 
Pre- and post-descriptive statistics for assessing quality and measures of imbalance 
were calculated as suggested by Iacus et al., (2008). We used the Freedman-Lane semi-
partialing method implemented as a linear probability model with fixed-effects for the 
treatment and control groups (Rogan & Sorenson, 2013) to control spatial 
autocorrelation in standard errors, (Dekker et al., 2007). See the Appendix for a 
description of the CEM procedure. 
The sum of absolute differences across the multivariate histogram has the following 
form: 
𝐿(𝑡, 𝑐)
1
2𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘
𝑛|𝑡𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘 − 𝑐𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘|     
 where 𝑡𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘 is the relative frequency of the categorical variables for the firms in the 
treatment group and 𝑐𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘 is the correspondent number for the firms in the control group. 
A magnitude of 𝐿(𝑡, 𝑐)=0 means perfect balance while a magnitude of 1 represents 
perfect separation. The procedure to obtain the relative frequencies of the categorical 
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variables is based on Iacus et al., (2008).  Once a number of categories for each 
continuous variable, a cross-tabulation of the discretized variables is generated for the 
treatment and the control groups. Then, the k-dimensional relative frequency is 
calculated. 
Table 34. Alternate Output Variable: Annual Growth Rate of GDP 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
7.70% (75th 
percentile) 
24.50% (95th 
percentile) 
44.40% (99th 
percentile) 
Predictor Variables T C T C T C 
School enrollment, secondary, (% net)  70.24 70.19 89.12 90.12 82.75 79.69 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 70.11 72.33 80.44 79.33 76.95 77.23 
Inflation rate 2.58 2.79 1.99 2.04 1.44 2.04 
Trade openness 31.48 31.78 49.91 47.69 46.96 47.96 
Total investment (ratio of total investment to 
GDP) 
23.14 26.18 20.74 22.17 19.66 18.78 
Estimated Damage (US Million) 810.14 811.17 1008.74 1001.89 117176.74 89992.78 
Outcome Variable 
% of annual GDP growth (10th post-
disaster year) 
5.97 5.01 7.49 3.89 3.68 1.22 
p-value  0.677 0.000 0.000 
Note: The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases and the magnitude of the 
disaster response for the analyzed period only as a reference—the synthetic control algorithm minimizes 
the distance between potential control disaster countries and the treated disaster country on a case by case 
basis. Treated are disaster countries with a substantial share of giving economically-reliant firms (as 
defined by the 75th, 95th, and 99th quantiles). The total sample of country-year disasters in the period 2003-
2013 is 464. 
 
Table 35. Comparing aid from Local versus Distant MNEs 
The Effect of Intervention from Distant MNEs 
 Model 27   Model 28 
Predictor Variables T C  Predictor Variables T C 
School enrollment, secondary (% 
net) 
68.44 71.56  Size of the Economy 648.51 701.29 
Life expectancy at birth, (years) 56.43 57.97  Human Hardship (deaths) 1250.34 994.36 
Inflation rate 7.36 6.34  Salience 10.69 10.85 
Trade openness 26.14 27.63  Disasters (Nation) 8.93 8.24 
Total investment (ratio of total 
investment to GDP) 
17.89 17.88  Disasters (Global) 290.15 290.14 
Estimated Damage (US Million) 45738.15 44993.56  Newsworthy Events 8.17 8.23 
    Openness to Aid 0.74 0.76 
    Estimated Damage (US Million) 386.91 399.41 
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Outcome Variables 
% of annual HDI growth 
(10th post-disaster year) 
1.89 1.93  % of accumulated aid at 
the end of 4th week 
5.43 6.01 
p-value 0.387  p-value 0.527 
Note: The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases and the magnitude of the 
disaster response for the analyzed period only as a reference—the synthetic control algorithm minimizes the 
distance between potential control disaster countries and the treated disaster country on a case by case basis. 
Treated are disaster countries with a substantial share of giving from distant firms (i.e., at least 51%). 
 
 
Table 36. The Role of Institutional Development 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
7.70% 24.50% 44.40% 
(75th percentile) (95th percentile) (99th percentile) 
Outcome Variable                                                     
% of annual HDI growth 
(10th post-disaster year) 
0.95 0.84 0.48 0.25 0.54 0.22 
Government Effectiveness 
50th  1.15 1.13 0.56 0.32 0.74 0.31 
75th 0.94 0.99 0.34 0.19 0.57 0.24 
90th 0.81 0.77 0.67 0.38 0.38 0.16 
Note: The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases and the magnitude of the 
disaster response for the analyzed period only as a reference—the synthetic control algorithm minimizes the 
distance between potential control disaster countries and the treated disaster country on a case by case basis. 
Treated are disaster countries with a substantial share of giving from economically-reliant firms (as defined 
by the 75th, 95th, and 99th percentiles). The analyses are stratified by the magnitude of the government 
effectiveness index calculated by the World Bank.  
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CONCLUSION 
This dissertation applies an integrative theoretical framework that builds on insights 
from the strategy, economics, and institutional literatures to understand the drivers and 
consequences of a form of non-market strategy: the corporate provision of public goods 
in the aftermath of natural disasters. In three papers, I examine this type of organizational 
decision-making by focusing on the firm’s economic reliance in market systems. I build 
on the theory of clubs to analyze how this relationship alters the frequency and magnitude 
of the organization’s choice to supply collective goods that benefit local communities. I 
draw on the literature on sensemaking to evaluate how substantial environmental 
uncertainty, causal ambiguity, and time pressure influence whether economically-reliant 
enterprises and their stakeholders choose to imitate reputable first-mover behavior in the 
face of socially constructed preferences. Finally, I study how economic reliance is the 
source of dynamic capabilities and the comparative advantage of the firm versus foreign 
national and multilateral public agencies to speed relief and the degree of national 
recovery from natural disasters. I use a longitudinal database covering over 93,000 
donations from almost 39,000 firms from 83 countries to 4,637 disasters that affected 176 
countries, and novel econometric methods to increase the identification of causal effects.  
CONTRIBUTIONS 
I hope that my dissertation’s integrative theoretical framework helps guide similar 
studies exploring the determinants and consequences of organizational decision-making, 
particularly those associated with the corporate provision of collective goods. A 
particularly promising research strategy is accounting for the role of economic reliance 
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and its effects on the likelihood and magnitude of corporate behavior, the ability of a 
corporation to identify what stakeholders consider when facing uncertainty and ambiguity 
and, then, choosing efficiently when to move first or follow, and on the competitive 
advantage of certain firms to generate economic surplus for external stakeholders. The 
results suggest that a theoretical argumentation based on economic reliance provides a 
clear identification of the set of business decision-makers that are prone to behave pro-
socially. Broader public-goods systems better characterize the frequency and magnitude 
of pro-social behavior among firms with no clear economic reliance. Such firms may 
donate, but the likelihood of not observing a donation is comparatively large.  
Hence, my dissertation uncovers a form of strategic consideration whose effect 
remains understudied (cf., Aguinis and Glavas, 2012; McWilliams, Siegel, and Wright, 
2006; Mellahi et al., 2015). My analyses show that traditional strategic considerations 
arguments such as reputational capital with internal (Flammer & Luo, 2015) and external 
stakeholders (Muller & Kräussl, 2011) or physical presence (Muller & Whiteman, 2008) 
alone do not capture the effect of economic reliance. Additionally, in my sample, such 
has greater explanatory power than social preferences theories altruism (Batson & 
Powell, 2003), fairness (Kahneman et al., 1986), and warm glow (Andreoni, 1990).   
Across the three chapters, the data confirm that studying national markets as club 
systems where entities share the costs and benefits of collective goods is a useful 
methodology to predict corporate behavior. This approach informs the institutional 
literature on how local institutional forces affect organizational behavior. My findings 
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suggest that the effect of institutional development on non-market strategy is more 
complex than the extant literature has suggested (Dorobantu et al., 2017). On the one 
hand, firms react positively to a government’s willingness to follow policies and 
regulations that guarantee the efficient use of resources and facilitate the maximization of 
its private benefits. This conforms with work showing that institutional development 
enhances corporate pro-social behavior (Marquis & Qian, 2013; Young et al., 2008). At 
the same time, when firms perceive that the government is incapable of supplying 
collective goods, they increase their average giving. Taken together, my dissertation 
provides a more nuanced understanding of the role of institutional forces in disciplining 
firms into a certain non-market strategy than previous studies (Mellahi et al., 2015). 
The findings in Chapter 1 contribute to the literature on industry self-regulation 
(Barnett & King, 2008; King & Lenox, 2000). This literature situates the motives of the 
provision of collective goods in a collectivity circumscribed by the industry (Baron, 
2009). My study focuses on the notion of a business community defined by geographical 
markets, a collectivity of industries. From this perspective, my study extends the 
literature on industry self-regulation to explain variance in the studied behavior across 
nations (i.e., groups of industries).  My study thus helps understand how the predictions 
of the literature on self-regulation regarding the capacity of firms to overcome collective 
action problems show statistical regularities across nations (Baron, 2001; Ostrom, 2003; 
Prakash & Potoski, 2007).  
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Chapter 2 suggests that one source of debate in the literature on timing strategy (e.g, 
first-mover advantage) is the little attention to the determinants of stakeholder 
expectations (Fosfuri et al., 2013). In this regard, I suggest a structural mechanism behind 
the social construction of performance advantages. When corporate behavior is a 
relatively novel phenomenon, stakeholders cope with uncertainty and ambiguity by 
focusing on prominent, easy-to-collect signals. Cognitive referents replace formal 
institutions and objective mechanisms based on probability estimates. Stakeholders often 
follow different cognitive referents than firms when evaluating the contextual 
appropriateness of timing choices. 
By showing that the performance consequences of donations to disasters depend 
heavily on the timing of donation, I contribute to contribute to the literature on non-
market strategy where timing is a dimension that has not been explored systematically 
(Mellahi et al., 2015). Traditionally, scholars approach the analysis of the relationship 
between financial performance and corporate social performance as a comparative 
evaluation of pro-social versus non-pro-social firms when these choices are made in 
stable conditions (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012). Therefore, how performance benefits arise 
under environmental uncertainty and causal ambiguity in fast-paced environments is 
largely an open empirical question. 
Combined lessons from Chapter 1 and 2 formalize a contribution to stakeholder 
theory by suggesting that economic reliance increases the ability of firms to predict 
stakeholder expectations. My study informs about the factors that make geographically 
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located customers, competitors, and governments strategic stakeholders for the 
organization (Freeman, 2010). My study suggests that the market standing of the firm and 
the degree of market competition are two necessary elements to understand when and 
how power dependence, need for legitimacy, and urgency vary across firm-stakeholder 
relationships (Mitchell et al., 1997).   
Finally, my dissertation suggests that drawing upon the scholarship on dynamic 
capabilities (Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997) may help address a longstanding debate in 
the literature on non-market strategy scholars. We know very little about the economic 
consequences of pro-social behavior and opinions are divided as to whether performance 
benefits for the firm and economic surplus for stakeholders should be expected 
(Dorobantu et al., 2017). At the heart of this debate is the fact that there is little theory to 
predict when and why a firm’s actions will create sizeable economic surplus, or the 
conditions under which businesses might be better-able than other types of entities to 
deliver such benefits (Kaul & Luo, 2017).  
I propose that these inquiries can be addressed by connecting the findings in Chapter 
3 with the causal intuition in Chapter 1. Economic reliance facilitates the firm to identify 
local needs in times of distress. This drives managers’ attention on economically costly 
disasters that can disrupt the financial performance of the corporation—those extreme 
events that hit countries where the firm has economic interdependencies and where there 
is a significant gap in the traditional sources of aid (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). By 
confirming that economically-reliant firms are in an advantageous position to help drive 
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timely delivery of disaster aid, thereby lessening the adverse effects of natural disasters 
on social welfare, my dissertation sheds light on the mechanisms that explain firms’ 
comparative advantage to supply collective goods after disruptions vis-à-vis other donors 
(Godfrey, 2005; Hart, 1995; Porter & Kramer, 2002). 
Consequently, considering the unique capabilities of economically-reliant firms and 
the situations where these are likely to be deployed in ways that yield positive outcomes 
for society is a promissory avenue of research. The core insight in the application of 
dynamic capabilities is that performance differences—especially in rapidly changing and 
uncertain environments—arise from varied dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000). While most studies compare firms, there is also evidence that dynamic 
capabilities differ systematically among organizational forms (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; 
Romanelli, 1991).  
To summarize, my dissertation is one step in the direction to understand the 
antecedents and effects of corporate disaster giving with unambiguous and objective 
measures that enhance replication. Given the coverage of the dataset, my study better 
informs on the firm-, industry-, and country-specific factors that moderate and mediate 
the determinants and consequences of the organizational choice than previous studies. 
Traditionally, pro-social behavior has been evaluated at the country level and, although 
there have been influential studies on corporate disaster giving using a multi-country 
setting, these limit to one event affecting several countries (Whiteman et al., 2005) or a 
few single-country events (Madsen & Rodgers, 2014). Moreover, my study covers 
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organizations that commonly are not included in the extant literature such as firms from 
emerging countries, particularly when they give abroad. Finally, my dataset mitigates the 
risks of measurement error and omitted-variable bias that have been a concern regarding 
the findings of observational studies in developing countries (Mellahi et al., 2015).    
LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
My dissertation centers on the argument that firms in an industry consider themselves 
as part of a supportive club in a country. Thus, when an exogenous event harms the value 
of their club good, they may have an incentive to rebuild it by giving. The assumption is 
that the investment equilibrium reached before the event is disturbed by the disaster, and 
thus after the event, it again becomes logical to invest in the club good.  
Empirically and theoretically, the study of the drivers and consequences of disaster 
giving within industries make sense given the characteristics of the phenomenon, e.g., 
firms from the same industry tend to donate the same amount, but the observation of 
similar donation amounts do not occur across firms from different industries. However, 
further study of the unpacked conditions and mechanisms that affect the frequency and 
magnitude of donation and its consequences at different levels of analysis is needed. For 
instance, one may argue that exclusivity misstates the nature of the effected club. Large 
disasters destroy assets across a wide range of industries. If the club good is the 
functioning of the local economy, then actors from many industries own stakes, and the 
effected club is much broader than a single industry. It follows that the external 
stakeholders that evaluate the contextual appropriateness of the business response and 
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reward and punish firms may also be customers of different industries. They thus 
evaluate such responses across industries and not within the industry.  
The findings on the economic value of corporate disaster giving call for further 
investigation to understand the optimal value of the provision of collective goods from 
the social standpoint. My dissertation focuses on cases where there is a disaster funding 
gap, and corporate aid comes as an unmitigated social good. However, a plausible 
argument is that the marginal productivity of corporate giving will decrease as its 
magnitude increases because such productivity is partly a product of complementarities 
with public investment (Cavallo & Daude, 2011; Khan & Kumar, 1997). Private giving, 
for instance, may well stimulate public intervention in areas or on a scale that firms are 
not willing or able to fully achieve themselves.  
Moreover, corporate giving requires an institutional framework that is difficult to 
substitute through private mechanisms or externalize via markets. That is, a lack of public 
goods may make the costs of supplying disaster relief and recovery unbearable for an 
average firm. Additionally, it is likely that some of the strategic factors that motivate 
corporate giving may be only salient when there is also an opportunity for enhancing 
business-government relations. Managers may expect to bolster corporate legitimacy in 
the local market by giving to disasters (Marquis & Qian, 2013), but that depends on a 
parallel interest by traditional donors.  
Another open question that may be of interest for institutional theorists concerns the 
association among efficiency in corporate giving, economic growth, and institutional 
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development. Recalling that low-income nations also tend to have relatively low 
institutional capacities (The World Bank, 2014), an interesting paradox arises. Corporate 
disaster giving constitutes a scarcer resource in low-income countries; hence its marginal 
value should be higher than in high-income countries. At the same time, lower levels of 
local institutional capacities may result in a lower marginal productivity of business 
giving. For instance, high levels of corruption increase the inefficiency of recovery 
funding since governments are less likely to enforce building codes and infrastructure 
quality (Kahn, 2005), and more likely to engage in rent seeking (Cavallo & Daude, 
2011). Hence, from the perspective of global welfare, is it efficient to allocate private 
giving to lower-income countries that may have a higher marginal utility for its victims 
but lower utility for productivity? Further empirical work may help clarify this paradox.   
Taken the lessons from the three chapters together, my dissertation shows that the low 
economic footprint of corporations in some countries makes corporate giving more a 
function of social preferences, such as altruism, and given our argument on the conditions 
for a comparative advantage of the firm, a less impactful resource on social welfare 
(Ballesteros et al., 2017). Hence, the fact that traditional international aid concentrates on 
countries such as Nepal and Burma and corporate aid on countries such as Chile and 
Japan is an efficient allocation of global resources. The rise of corporate disaster giving is 
a Pareto-improvement mechanism in disaster countries lacking enough international aid 
for disaster funding (Hochman & Rodgers, 1969). Moreover, if the corporate donor 
obtains private benefits from such giving and the private gains are not misdirected from 
business purposes (e.g., philanthropy is not subject to moral hazard, Jensen & Meckling, 
 
191 
 
1976; Salomon, 2013), the effect is to enhance shareholder value (Porter & Kramer, 
2002) and no other sector of society is worse off, corporate disaster giving can thus be 
seen as a Pareto optimal choice—a subject worthy of further exploration. 
The findings suggest that the study of organizational decision-making in the context 
of disasters is a good cornerstone for theory development in the strategy and organization 
literatures, where systemic or correlated risk remains understudied (Oetzel & Oh, 2014; 
Salomon, 2013). Particularly attractive for institutional and organizational theorists is 
that natural disasters commonly involve “an excessiveness” where the salience of 
specific social arrangements and stakeholder relationships increases (Klinenberg, 2003). 
This phenomenon facilitates the observation of societal and institutional dynamics that 
are commonly obscured and small in scale (Durkheim & Mauss, 1963; Klinenberg, 
2003; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). 
Nevertheless, applying the integrative framework to other settings may provide a 
comparative evaluation of the predictive power of the three theoretical cornerstones in 
more stable market conditions. For instance, in the absence of systematic disruptions, do 
we need dynamic capabilities to differentiate the comparative advantage of the 
corporation to provide collective goods or would a differentiation between the general 
characteristics of the firm and other societal entities suffice? What happens when we 
compare the ability of the firm to accrue performance benefits in stable market 
conditions? Do we find that firms are more effective to predict and satisfy stakeholder 
expectations with their pro-social behavior? My findings suggest that the divergence in 
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cognitive referents between firms and stakeholders is robust to lower degrees of 
uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Additional limitations and boundary conditions of my dissertation are associated with 
the focus on publicly-traded and relatively large firms. Although this type of 
organizations accounts for nearly 90 percent of the recorded corporate donations in the 
observed period (and, thus, selection bias is mitigated), smaller and/or private firms may 
follow unique mechanisms and conditions when behaving pro-socially. Future work 
based on case studies may better complete our understanding of private provision of 
collective goods by unpacking such factors. This effort also would provide a finer 
grained understanding of the relationship between economic reliance and the geographic 
distribution of club systems particularly in countries with large territories.  
In this regard, a future avenue of research entails the collection of data at the local 
and regional level to better unpack the causal effect of economic reliance on corporate 
pro-social behavior. For instance, incorporating zip code data in the analyses would help 
us understand in a more accurate fashion the spatial distribution of disaster damage, 
market activity, and corporate giving. Scholars conducting single-country studies have 
made progress in the conceptualization of (geographically circumscribed) business 
communities (Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). My study suggests a method to replicate such 
endeavor in a longitudinal and international setting.    
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MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Beyond its theoretical value, this dissertation has implications for management 
practice. In 2015, an average large corporation was 300% more likely to engage in 
disaster giving than 25 years before. Because the money allocated to disaster aid often 
surpasses a corporation’s total annual social budget (Ballesteros et al., 2017), and several 
studies suggest that disaster giving is a high-stakes decision often associated with 
competitive advantages (Madsen & Rodgers, 2014; Muller & Kräussl, 2011; Patten, 
2008), the timing of donating is an important managerial question. In this way, my 
dissertation—centers on the fundamental transformation that the business world is now 
undergoing in attention given to the growing number of large (correlated or systematic) 
risks and, particularly natural disasters, and how it is affecting firms’ non-market strategy 
and their relationships with their stakeholders (George et al., 2016). 
Overall, my findings suggest that firms are more likely than not to make inefficient 
decisions regarding their engagement in disaster giving. About 51% of firms engaging in 
this behavior obtained negative performance consequences that were significantly larger 
than the size of their donations. As such, I provide evidence of the factors that managers 
should consider when choosing to engage in corporate pro-social behavior under 
conditions under conditions of high informational and time constraints. 
The economic hardship associated with natural disasters is expected to continue to 
grow because of expanding human settlement in regions exposed to extreme natural risks 
(Cutter et al., 2009; Dong & Tomlin, 2012; Kunreuther & Useem, 2009; von Peter et al., 
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2012). Traditional sources of humanitarian aid and standard insurance practices have not 
proven sufficient to cover fat-tail disaster losses, particularly in large markets (Kellett & 
Caravani, 2013; Noy, 2012; Weitzman, 2011). The value of corporate disaster giving for 
socioeconomic development is thus likely to grow over time. In this context, the cardinal 
practical question will be how such form of pro-social behavior can be stimulated and 
disciplined organically, and this dissertation may inform such endeavor.  
The rise of corporate disaster giving may be a Pareto-improvement mechanism in 
disaster countries lacking enough international aid for disaster funding (Hochman & 
Rodgers, 1969). Moreover, if the corporate donor obtains private benefits from such 
giving and these benefits are not misdirected from business purposes (e.g., giving is not 
subject to moral hazard, Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Salomon, 2013), the effect is to 
enhance shareholder value (Porter & Kramer, 2002) and no other sector of society is 
worse off, corporate disaster giving can thus be seen as a Pareto optimal choice—a 
subject worthy of further exploration. 
My dissertation presents an exploratory effort of this exploration. The findings help 
unpack the conditions under which corporate disaster giving may provide benefits for the 
donor firm and the affected country. When disaster-stricken countries receive significant 
proportions of international aid from firms that have economic reliance and a positive 
pre-disaster reputation, firms realize post-donation revenue that is not explained by 
market operation and countries receive relief comparatively fast and recover in great 
magnitude. 
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Aside corporate disaster giving, firms are facing calls to not only engage in 
traditional forms of non-market strategy, but also to adopt responsibilities that have 
historically fallen to aid agencies, governments, and non-governmental organizations 
(George et al., 2016). Firms are increasingly developing self-regulatory standards to 
substitute for regulations that governments are unable or unwilling to enforce (Ostrom, 
2000; Potoski & Prakash, 2005), building hospitals, schools, and community projects 
(Matten & Crane, 2005; Palazzo & Scherer, 2008). Others are leading important social 
innovations such as telemedicine and distance learning (Ballesteros, 2013).  
In this dissertation, I propose theories and methods suitable for replication in other 
non-market settings. I hope that my work helps scholars to deepen the understanding of 
the conditions and mechanisms under which the corporate provision of collective goods 
provides benefits for the firm and society at large. 
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ANNEX 
A DATABASE OF DISASTER DONATIONS  
Data Collection and Coding Procedures  
My dataset comprises data on every sudden natural disaster recorded in the EM-DAT 
database. As detailed below, I used a combination of manual and automatic procedures to 
find data on disaster donations, and code their value and sources. We searched for news 
items related to each disaster in the Factiva and Lexis Nexis databases. The search 
window is one year after the official time of occurrence of the disaster according to EM-
DAT. For example, the 2010 earthquake in Chile had the range 02/27/2010-02/27/2011. 
To identify relevant articles, we searched for combinations of ‘affected country name’, 
‘type of disaster’, and (where applicable) ‘disaster name’.   
We searched within each article for information on the type of disaster, and corporate 
aid donations.  
a. The disasters that passed the criterion of a sudden shock were identified as 
follows: 
i. Mass movement: “landslide” OR “avalanche” OR “rockfall” OR 
“subsidence” 
ii. Earthquake: “seismic” OR “quake” OR “earthquake” OR 
“tsunami” 
iii. Flood: “flood” 
iv. Storm: “storm” OR “typhoon” OR “cyclone 
v. ” OR “hurricane” OR “tornado” 
vi. Volcano: “volcano” OR “volcanic” OR “eruption” 
b. Corporate giving was identified by searching for the following terms: 
“donation” OR “donate” OR “donated” OR “donating” OR “pledge” OR “pledged” 
OR “pledging” OR “give” OR “gave” OR “given” OR “giving.” An example of the 
Boolean search is:  
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[03/11/2011-03/11/2012]; (“Japan” OR “Japanese” OR “Japan’s” OR 
“Japans”66) AND (“tsunami” OR “earthquake” OR “quake” OR “disaster”) AND 
(“donation” OR “donate” OR “pledge” OR “pledging” OR “give” OR “gave” OR 
“given” OR “giving”). 
 
Coding each corporate aid donation  
To make over 2,310,000 electronic reports computationally tractable, we applied 
differential language analysis using JavaScript Object Notation (i.e., JSON and AJAX) to 
parse the data. For each article, we coded the following fields: 
• Entity making the donation 
• Actual donation. 
o In case of in-kind donations, the characteristics of the product or service 
were recorded (e.g., 1000 bottles of water, a team of nine technicians) and 
monetized using either current prices applicable in the affected country 
(e.g., the average price of one litter of bottled water, the daily man-power 
wage for a specific professional or technician) or an equivalent pecuniary 
value based on other firms’ reporting of their donation to the same 
disaster. 
o In case of donations reported in a currency different than the dollar, we 
converted using the currency exchange rate of the day of the donation. 
• To increase the relevance of the output (for example, some news reports were a 
series of articles with no relevance to the study but whose combination would 
                                                 
66 There were spelling mistakes in some articles. 
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make the report to be included in the outcome), the search was qualified with the 
following filtering process: 
o The name of the country had to be within 50 words of the type of the 
disaster or the word “disaster.” 
o Entities and the act of donating were parsed: The entities per article were 
extracted and grouped in three categories: organization (e.g., Tepco), 
location (e.g., Canada), and individual (e.g., Barack Obama). 
o The verb identifying the act of donating had to be within 30 words of an 
entity 
Coding for giving from economically-reliant corporations and related aid 
We used an automated coding process to search within each report for details about 
the type, financial value, date, and source of each donation. Researchers coded donations 
that were coming from corporations with local affiliates as reflected in the Lexis Nexis 
Corporate Affiliations database. For each in-kind donation, we recorded the 
characteristics of the product or service in question and converted this to a monetary 
figure based on current prices in the affected nation, the monetary value reported by the 
donor, or the reported value of similar donations from other organizations. Donations 
were converted into U.S. dollars using the exchange rate on the date the gift was made.  
For Chapter 3, we coded a measure of related giving that reflects the degree to which 
disaster aid leverages firm-specific routines or resources. To calculate this, we began by 
using a firm’s four-digit SIC code to identify its key business activities. We coded the 
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dollar amount of in-kind donations that aligned with these activities as related [i.e., 
products, services, or activities that are relevant for the firm’s market operation (e.g., 
Bayer providing medicines in response to Typhoon Haiyan)].   
Once these two coding procedures have been completed, we randomly selected a 
sample of 5% of coded donations. Researchers not involved in the previous procedures 
checked for measurement error. This resulted in fewer than 5% of the selected sample 
that marked as inaccurate. About 60% of these errors were mainly associated with 
monetizing the in-kind value of donations, with less than 8% of the donations were 
incorrectly marked as related giving. The rest of sample of discrepancies were mainly 
associated with missing data on the nature of donor’s business.  
Assessing Data Quality  
The following procedures were implemented to rule out measurement error: 
1. Five percent of the events (156) were randomly selected and giving was 
manually searched using Google, Lexis Nexis, and Factiva. From this procedure, 
5.128 percent of the selected events (8) had data inaccuracies, e.g., donation amount, 
date of donation.    
2. We had access to exclusive information of donation for the 2010 tsunami 
and earthquake in Chile via the Chilean government. By comparing our database with 
the list of donors provided by the Chilean government, we found that our dataset 
comprised 68 percent of the official source. Our tracking did not include donating 
frequency of small- and medium-sized Chilean, non-multinational enterprises. In 
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terms of magnitude, our dataset accounted for 92 percent of the total corporate aid for 
the event.      
3. When available, the accuracy of the data was corroborated using external 
sources: 
a. The Financial Tracking System (FTS) of the United Nations Office 
for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which is a global database 
that records self-reported international humanitarian aid for different 
humanitarian crises.67 The FTS has information on corporate donation for 
about 3 percent of the tracked events; and government and NGO donation for 
about 10 percent of the tracked events. In all cases, for corporate giving, the 
built dataset was larger than the FTS dataset. 
b. Disaster corporate aid trackers of the Corporate Citizenship Center 
(CCC) at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation.68 This source provided 
information on corporate donation for 0.610 percent of the tracked events. In 
all cases, our database was larger than the CCC dataset.    
DATA FOR THE MEASURE OF ECONOMIC RELIANCE  
The distinct levels of company hierarchy are the following with information from 
Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations database:  
                                                 
67 For information about the method of collection of FTS data and their verification, visit the following 
site: http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=AboutFTS-Data.  
68 These data are available at http://www.uschamberfoundation.org/corporate-citizenship-
center/disaster-corporate-aid-trackers.  
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Table 37. Company hierarchy according to the Corporate Affiliations database 
Ultimate 
Parent 
The very top company listed in a company hierarchy and the ultimate 
controlling company within a corporate structure. 
Parent 
The top tier within an organization but may not be the “ultimate parent.” 
It should have other companies reporting to it, and would itself report to 
another legal entity. In many cases the terms, “parent” and “ultimate 
parent” are used synonymously. Corporate Affiliations commonly refers 
to the “ultimate parent” as the “parent.” 
Subsidiary Separate corporate legal entity owned by the company at 50.1% or more. 
Joint 
Venture 
A business in which two or more companies share responsibility and 
ownership. 
Affiliate 
A separate legal entity in which there is an ownership interest by the 
parent company of less than 50%. 
Division 
An internal unit of a company, not incorporated or a separate legal entity. 
Usually tends to have many employees. 
Branch 
An internal unit of a company, not incorporated or a separate legal entity. 
Usually tends to have a small number of employees. 
Unit Same definition as division. 
Factory Same definition as division. 
Plant Same definition as division. 
Group Corporate classification grouping “like“ industries or businesses 
Holding 
A business whose voting stock is owned to influence its board, policies, 
and management. 
Non–
Operating 
Entities 
(Shells) 
Legal non-operating entities (displayed at the bottom of its immediate 
parent’s hierarchy) 
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Treatment of Missing Data 
Given the relatively small subset of firms engaging in disaster giving by event, 
addressing this issue with traditional strategies like listwise deletion or mean substitution 
would have fostered the risk of obtaining biased estimates, increasing Type II errors, and 
underestimating correlations and coefficient weights (Stock & Watson, 2003). Therefore, 
I used two different methods to address missing data. The primary analyses were 
conducted with the first method and the second method was used for robustness checks. 
First, I used a multiple-input bootstrapping algorithm for time-series-cross-sectional 
data as explained by Honaker et al. (2011). This form of multiple imputation accounts for 
smooth time trends, changes across cross-sectional variables, and time and space 
correlations and it susceptible to integrate scant knowledge to specific cells when 
available. A review of how this method can produce more accurate imputation 
particularly for data used in the social sciences than traditional procedures can be found 
in  Honaker and King (2010).  
Second, I used imputation with maximum likelihood. This strategy centers on the 
observed relationships among the covariates and considers a degree of random error that 
takes into account uncertainty of imputation (Blackwell, Honaker, & King, 2015). For 
increasing accuracy of the MLE calculation, I grouped the data by industry.  
Additionally, to cope with missing values on the event-specific variables, I applied 
multiple imputation based on a bootstrapping-based algorithm as recommended by 
Honaker, King, and Blackwell (2011). To account for nonlinear effects in the case of 
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disasters, I used dummies to inform if killed, total affected, and estimated damage were 
in the percentile regions 0th-25th, 25th-50th, 50th-75th, or 75th-95th , with the omitted 
categories are above 95th.   
CAUSAL INFERENCE 
The analyses for the different chapters sought to exploit the considerable benefits that 
the characteristics of the phenomenon present for obstacles for the identification of causal 
effects. The variation in the studied behavior across firms, geographies, and time 
facilitate statistical regularity in a degree not observed in the extant literature. Overall, the 
setting offers several advantages for causal inference that are particularly beneficial for 
the study of the consequences of corporate behavior.  
First, it is not subject to the endogeneity traditionally affecting the study of the 
implications of corporate pro-social behavior. The exogenous nature of the disaster 
mitigates the risk of reverse causality when assessing the link between the organizational 
choice and its material consequences. Second, the characterization of the size and 
frequency of the organizational choice overcomes subjective concerns that have affected 
the empirical literature. The key constructs associated with financial performance (i.e., 
annual revenue) and economic value (i.e., aid collected within the first post-disaster 
month and the annual growth rate of the Human Development Index) are unambiguous 
and objective. This enhances internal validity and facilitates replication. Finally, 
contextual factors that often are assumed such as environmental uncertainty, causal 
ambiguity, and time pressure can be measured. The size of the dataset increases statistical 
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power when analyzing country-time factors such as institutional development. By 
stratifying the dataset, I have been able to better capture the effects of these factors on the 
studied relationships. 
Despite these econometric advantages, the study of the broad relationships present 
different challenges for the identification of causal effects. Decision-making is likely 
endogenous to some of the explored covariates. The risk of documenting a spurious 
relationship is particularly high since the discussed organization-specific variables (e.g., 
financial performance) and pro-social behavior are likely moving in the same direction as 
idiosyncratic unobserved factors (e.g., managerial capabilities and risk aversion). 
Alternatively, the direction of the causal relationship may not be clear. Therefore, I 
applied followed a variety of strategies to increase causal inference.  
Regarding the study of economic reliance as a driver of corporate disaster giving, one 
concern in my study is that the decision to enter a market is endogenous to the likelihood 
of engaging in disaster giving. That is, given the geographical (and, thus, political, and 
socioeconomic) heterogeneity in the context of disaster risk, firms with a similar 
propensity to donate self-select into specific market systems. The econometric problem 
here is that donating and economic reliance are both moving in the same direction as an 
unobserved factor (e.g., adversity to systemic risk), which prevents an observation of the 
causal effect of economic reliance on the frequency and size of giving.  
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To mitigate the occurrence of this issue, I applied coarsened exact matching (CEM) 69 
(Iacus et al., 2008, 2011) to balance the baseline propensity to engage in pro-social 
behavior between the treatment (i.e., firms with at least one affiliate in the affected 
country) and the control groups (i.e., firms with no presence in the market). To conduct 
the match, I draw on the literature in non-market strategy and, specifically, corporate 
disaster giving. I compared pre- and post-descriptive statistics in the treatment and 
control groups for assessing quality. Additionally, I calculated measures of imbalance as 
suggested by Iacus et al., ( 2008). The main results hold in the matched sample, which I 
include in the Appendix in addition to the matching summary.  
Additionally, a plausible argument is that the effect of economic reliance on the 
provision of collective goods is heterogeneous across events. For some shocks, economic 
reliance may have relatively little effect because of the magnitude of news coverage 
(Stromberg, 2007). For instance, events such as Hurricane Katrina in the U.S. and the 
2010 earthquake in Haiti were certain to receive philanthropic giving irrespective of the 
economic connection of the organization. Therefore, it is likely that the studied 
association is stronger for events whose probability of being in the news is relatively low. 
Thus, I followed Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) and conducted robustness analyses 
limiting the sample to disasters with a probability of being in the news of 50 percent and 
lower. I also run analyses including countries that never received donations from firms, 
which does not affect the estimates. 
                                                 
69 See (King et al., 2011)  for a comparative assessment of the effectiveness of matching methods.  
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The study of the consequences of corporate disaster giving presents even greater 
challenges for causal inference. For instance, regarding the effects on firm performance, 
the study focuses on how the perception of the contextual appropriateness of corporate 
disaster giving, driven by media reputation and corporate financial standing, affects 
donations decisions and performance benefits. Testing these associations is a complex 
task because reputation, financial standing, and donation choices are likely endogenous to 
firm performance. Isolating causality requires an approach that compares performance 
variables among firms that donated with different timing and magnitude, and have 
distinct levels of media reputation and financial standing, but are otherwise similar 
regarding underlying attributes. The assumption of heterogeneity in these characteristics 
but homogeneity in everything else is difficult to satisfy and poses an estimation 
challenge for conventional panel-data techniques. The risk of documenting a spurious 
relationship is particularly high since financial performance and pro-social behavior are 
likely moving in the same direction as unobserved factors such as managerial capabilities 
and risk aversion. Similarly, nations may have capacities that are independent of 
corporate giving, but difficult to empirically isolate, such as variance in their ability to 
care for citizens and manage disaster responses. Not taking these factors into account 
may lead to biased, inefficient estimates 
Conventional panel-data tools such as fixed-effects and control variables impose the 
assumption that ex ante firm- and context-specific trends extend to post disaster 
conditions, which is often not the case. Difference-in-differences and traditional quasi-
experimental designs eliminate unobserved heterogeneity but require effects to be time-
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invariant (Abadie et al., 2010; Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004). Furthermore, 
large-sample matching methods do not work very well when the number of 
counterfactual units or sample periods is small, as is the case in my study. In turn, 
matching methods such as coarsened-exact matching exhibit a limited ability to find a 
suitable control because of the small number of similar cases. 
Synthetic control method. Given these considerations, I applied the synthetic control 
method (SCM) in my second and third chapter as the second-best econometric option for 
causal inference to a field experiment. This method allows me to reproduce a quasi-
experimental design. The key difference between the SCM and traditional matching 
techniques is that control entities are made up of combinations of different potential 
counterfactuals. This method uses an algorithm to evaluate the efficiency of every firm 
not affected by the treatment variable in reproducing the pre-treatment characteristics of 
firms affected by the treatment. These characteristics are selected from variables (i.e., 
predictors) thought to drive the outcome variable (i.e., the dependent variable in 
traditional regression), in my case annual revenue, speed of aid, or the rate of growth the 
Human Development Index. Once found, these units are averaged into a single case, 
corresponding to a synthetically created firm (see Abadie et al., 2010, 2015 for detailed 
discussions). For instance, no one firm approximates the underlying characteristics of 
Anglo American in the years leading up to the 2010 earthquake and tsunami. However, 
features of Rio Tinto, Antofagasta, Tek, Bifox, and Codelco are combined in different 
proportions to form a synthetic ‘Anglo American’ that closely matches features 
predictive of corporate disaster giving. Thus, SCM controls time-variant and invariant 
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unobserved heterogeneity and allows us to understand what would have happened to the 
donation magnitude of a given firm to a disaster-country pair in the absence of the 
treatment.70  Likewise, no one country approximates Chile in the years leading up to the 
2010 earthquake and tsunami. However, features of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Paraguay, Brazil, Mexico, and the United States can be integrated in different proportions 
to form a synthetic Chile that is a close match on features that predict the speed of 
disaster relief as well as the nation’s historical levels of social welfare.  
The statistical efficiency of SCM relies on minimizing the difference between the 
predictors of every treated firm and its synthetic control in each of the analyzed pre-
donation periods. Because standard errors in traditional panel-data methods measure 
uncertainty in aggregate data, statistical inference with SCM is run differently. I calculate 
the likelihood that the observed revenue or measures of disaster recovery are the effect of 
corporate disaster giving versus chance by conducting falsification exercises like 
permutation exercises, which are called placebo tests. In practical terms, I artificially 
reassign the intervention to entities in the control pool and run SCM by using a firm that 
did not channel its donation through an NPO as a treated entity. I then match this placebo 
firm with a synthetic counterfactual and assess the results. I repeat this procedure with 
every entity in the control group, which generates a distribution of effects that are indeed 
observed by chance. I finally compare this distribution of false treatment effects with the 
actual distribution and generate p-values. The benefit of the SCM is that is always 
                                                 
70 Our online appendix shows how the SCM algorithm combines features of these firms to approximate 
Anglo-American responding to the 2010 disaster in Chile. See 
https://disastergiving.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/synthetic-control-method.pdf. 
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feasible to calculate the exact distribution of the estimated effect regardless of the number 
of donor firms, disaster-country pairs, and observation periods.    
FORMAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SYNTHETIC CASE METHOD  
The traditional case-study method used in the extant literature has two critical 
empirical challenges. First, comparison cases are often chosen based on subjective 
criteria of affinity. Second, they typically use data on a sample of disaggregated units, 
but employing inferential techniques that observe uncertainty at the aggregate value in 
the population.  
Uncertainty about the efficiency of the control group to reproduce the counterfactual 
result is not mitigated with the availability of aggregated data because such uncertainty is 
not captured by the standard errors of the traditional inferential methods commonly 
employed (Abadie et al., 2010). Applying the synthetic logarithm to every potential 
disaster country in the control group allows us to better assess if the studied effect found 
in the synthetic control for the disaster country with the minimum share of business 
giving is significantly large vis-à-vis the effect estimated found in a randomly chosen 
country with no intervention. This inferential method is efficient because it is always 
feasible to calculate the exact distribution of the estimated effect of corporate disaster 
giving regardless of the number of disaster countries. Thus, the inference identifies 
whether the estimated effect of the business intervention is significantly large vis-à-vis 
the distribution of effects for the disaster countries not exposed to a ratio of corporate 
disaster giving to disaster relief of at least five percent.  
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I use Chapter 3 to formalize describe the SCM. To test the hypotheses, we analyzed 
three levels of treatment. The distribution of corporate giving is highly skewed,71 which 
means that using the mean value of 5.25% combined with standard deviations is not an 
efficiency strategy. Instead, we used the 75th (7.7% of aid is from economically-reliant 
firms), 95th (24.5%), and 99th (44.4%) percentiles as treatment cutoffs. For relatedness, 
we used three treatment levels in our analysis. As the distribution for relatedness is 
relatively normal, we used the mean (26.9%) and +/- one standard deviation (11.5% and 
42.4%) as treatment indicators.  
We compared disasters that prompted a share of economically reliant corporate 
giving of at least the share of giving from economically-reliant firms defined by each 
quantile  (i.e., intervention) to a weighted combination of a control events with a lower 
proportion of business response (i.e., the synthetic control). Without loss of generality, 
our sample of J+1 events contains one event with such a degree of corporate disaster 
giving and J events in the potential control group. Let be the dollar amount of total 
disaster aid or HDI that would be observed for disaster country i at time t in the absence 
of the intervention, for disaster countries i=2,…,J+1, and periods t=1,…,T. Let  be 
the dollar amount of total disaster aid or HDI that would be observed for disaster country 
i at time t if that country received the intervention, which provides a proxy of the 
efficiency to supply essential collective goods (Day et al., 2012).  
                                                 
71 See the online appendix at https://corpsanddisasters.wordpress.com/.  
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Given the unpredictability of the analyzed shocks, the disaster giving has no effect on 
the outcome before the intervention and anticipation effects are ruled out. That is, for 
and , . Implicit in the notation is the assumption of no 
interference between units (i.e., the intervention does not affect outcomes of the 
untreated disaster countries; cf., Rosenbaum, 2007). Let be the effect of the 
intervention for disaster country i at time t, and let be an indicator that takes value 
one if disaster country i is exposed to the intervention at time t. Hence, the observed 
outcome is  
                                                           
(5) 
Because only the first disaster country is exposed to the intervention and only after 
period , where , then 
 
The target parameters are , which are the lead-specific causal effect 
of corporate disaster giving on total disaster aid and social welfare. Thus, for , 
                                                         
(6) 
Since is observed, I approximate to estimate . t=1,…,T. Let vm be a certain 
weight that captures the relative importance of the n-th variable and helps minimize the 
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differences between the pre-disaster characteristics of the treated disaster country and the 
synthetic country control, W. Hence, the synthetic control estimator that captures the 
effect of the share of economically connected corporate disaster giving in the treated 
disaster country is given by 𝑌1𝑡
𝐼 − ∑𝑗=2
𝐽+1
 𝑤𝑗𝑌𝑗𝑡. 
I estimate the studied effect as follows: 
                                                    
(7) 
where is an unknown common factor with constant factor loadings across disaster 
countries,  is a vector of the predictors described above, is a vector of 
unknown parameters, is a vector of unobserved common factors, is an 
vector of unknown factor loadings, and the error terms are unobserved country-
specific shocks affecting disaster aid or social welfare with zero mean for all i and t. 
Notice that we do not conduct a prediction of ex ante disaster giving in our matched-
case-study analysis. Arguably, disaster donations are observed only after the occurrence 
of the shock. Additionally, recall our strategy of focusing on sudden disasters. Also 
notice that, as suggested, our estimation method allows the effect of unobservable 
heterogeneity to vary over time.  
Case example. Constructing a Synthetic Chile 2010  
N
it t t i t i itY Z       
t
iZ ( 1)r t (1 )r
t (1 )F i
( 1)F 
it
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The following is the result of the SCM algorithm assigning weights to different 
disaster-afflicted nations whose combination statistically resemble the pre-disaster 
trajectory of the HDI growth rate.  
Table 38. Synthetic control of Chile 2010 
Control Weight 
Afghanistan 0 
Albania 0 
Algeria 0 
American Samoa 0 
Antigua and Barbuda 0 
Argentina 0.460 
Armenia 0 
Australia 0 
Austria 0 
Bahamas 0 
Bangladesh 0 
Barbados 0 
Belgium 0 
Belize 0 
Bolivia 0 
Bosnia-Hercegovina 0 
Brazil 0.109 
Bulgaria 0 
Burkina Faso 0 
Cambodia 0 
Canada 0 
China 0 
Colombia 0.172 
Comoros 0 
Congo 0 
Costa Rica 0 
Croatia 0 
Cuba 0 
Cyprus 0 
Czech Rep 0 
Denmark 0 
Dominica 0 
Dominican Rep 0 
Ecuador 0 
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El Salvador 0 
Ethiopia 0 
Fiji 0 
France 0 
Georgia 0 
Germany 0 
Greece 0 
Guadeloupe 0 
Guam 0 
Guatemala 0 
Haiti 0 
Honduras 0 
Hong Kong (China) 0 
Hungary 0 
India 0 
Indonesia 0 
Iran Islam Rep 0 
Iraq 0 
Ireland 0 
Italy 0 
Jamaica 0 
Japan 0 
Kazakhstan 0 
Kenya 0 
Kyrgyzstan 0 
Lao P Dem Rep 0 
Latvia 0 
Lithuania 0 
Macedonia FRY 0 
Madagascar 0 
Martinique 0 
Mexico 0.148 
Moldova Rep 0 
Mongolia 0 
Morocco 0 
Mozambique 0 
Myanmar 0 
Namibia 0 
Nepal 0 
Netherlands 0 
New Zealand 0 
Nigeria 0 
North Korea 0 
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Norway 0 
Oman 0 
Pakistan 0 
Panama 0 
Papua New Guinea 0 
Paraguay 0.083 
Peru 0 
Philippines 0 
Poland 0 
Portugal 0 
Puerto Rico 0 
Romania 0 
Russia 0 
Rwanda 0 
Samoa 0 
Saudi Arabia 0 
Senegal 0 
Serbia 0 
Seychelles 0 
Slovakia 0 
Slovenia 0 
South Africa 0 
South Korea 0 
Spain 0.017 
Sri Lanka 0 
St Lucia 0 
St Vincent and The Grenadines 0 
Sudan 0 
Sweden 0 
Switzerland 0 
Taiwan 0 
Tajikistan 0 
Thailand 0 
Tonga 0 
Trinidad and Tobago 0 
Turkey 0 
Turks and Caicos Is 0 
Uganda 0 
Ukraine 0 
United Kingdom 0 
United States 0.001 
Uruguay 0 
Venezuela 0 
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Viet Nam 0 
Yemen 0 
Zimbabwe 0 
 
Placebo exercises   
To check on the validity of our findings, we extended the procedure suggested in 
Abadie et al., (2010, 2015) and ran placebo tests as a falsification exercise. The approach 
works by reassigning the treatment of interest to untreated entities. Each placebo entity is 
then matched with a synthetic control, and values for predictor and outcome variable are 
calculated. If the results of this analysis mirror what is observed for actually treated 
entities, this would cast doubt on the argument that treatment is indeed producing the 
outcome of interest.  For instance, if we want to observe the placebo effect of corporate 
giving on recovery of the 2008 earthquake in China (given that this nation received fell 
in the 95% percentile of share of giving from economically-reliant firms), we choose 
another similar disaster nation that received less than 24.5% of giving from corporations. 
We expect, if our argumentation is correct, that we will not observe a meaningful 
difference in post-disaster recovery (as proxied by the trajectory of the HDI growth rate) 
between the false China 2008 and all those nations included in the synthetic control.  
We first need to make sure that the SCM has done a good job in finding a synthetic 
control. We expect that the differences in the predictor values are not statistically 
significant.  
 
 
217 
 
 
 
Predictor Balance: 
Table 39. Accumulated placebo exercises for Chile 2010 
  Treated 
Synthetic 
Control 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 71.8 68.5 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 22.5 22.2 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 19.9 22.2 
School enrollment, secondary,  (% net) 55.5 5.9 
Inflation 5.1 5.9 
Total investment (ratio of total investment to 
GDP) 38.7 30.9 
 
 
As shown in the following figure, this assertion holds.  
Figure 8. A Placebo Effect of Giving in the Post-Earthquake China’s Recovery  
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Or the following is one of the falsification exercises for the United States’ recovery from 
2004 Katrina. 
Figure 9. The Effect of Disaster Giving on the Hit of Hurricane Katrina on the U.S. GDP 
 
Conversely, the following is the difference in the GDP annual growth rate between the 
actual Chile that suffered an earthquake and tsunami in 2010, but received over 44% of 
giving from economically-reliant firms, and a synthetic control.  
Figure 10. The Effect of Disaster Giving on the Hit of the 2010 Disaster on Chile’s GDP 
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Estimating placebo effects for every control nation allowed us to create outcome 
distributions for both the speed of aid, and disaster recovery. If results from our analysis 
of actually treated nations were to fall inside of these placebo-effect distributions, it 
would cast doubt on the validity of our findings. Ultimately, this process enables to use p-
values to conduct a statistical comparison of the placebo-distribution and the estimated 
effects in treated nations. 
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